November 18-24: Taʻiz offensive slows, no new peace talks scheduled

Although it has been over a week since the new round of the UN-sponsored peace talks was supposed to be held, the representatives of the warring parties have not yet convened. Meanwhile, airstrikes and fighting continues in seven areas of Yemen—Taʻiz, Marib, Lahj, Shabwah, al-Dhaliʻ, Ibb, and al-Baydha—and outside three Saudi cities near the border. The UN special envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, continues to push for this new session, which is now reportedly expected to take place in Geneva in mid-December. Over the weekend, delegates from the Houthi Movement and the General People's Congress party (GPC) flew once again to the Omani capital, Muscat, after they announced their acceptance of the UN envoy's invitation. On Tuesday, Prime Minister/Vice President Khaled Bahah met with the US ambassador to Yemen, Matthew Tueller, in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. During the meeting he assured Tueller that his government is ready for the peace talks on the condition that the Houthis and their allies are “serious and honest” in implementing UN resolution 2216, which calls for their withdrawal from Sanʻa and other areas pro-Houthi forces have captured.

It's been nearly 10 days since the ground offensive was launched to “liberate” the central governorate of Taʻiz: the clashes have been chiefly taking place in the western districts of al-Wazi'iyah, Dhubab and Mowzaʻ, and a few eastern fronts. The pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have retreated from a number of positions there amid heavy airstrikes, but coalition forces and resistance fighters haven’t been able to advance toward Taʻiz city due to landmines planted by Houthi/Saleh forces. Inside the city, rocket bombardments by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have targeted residential areas as clashes take place in downtown and on the outskirts of Taʻiz.

In Marib governorate, the clashes continue to take place in the western district of Sirwah. PM Bahah briefly visited Marib for less than an hour. His visit on Sunday along with a number of ministers was intended as a morale boost for the local resistance fighters. The Houthi/Saleh forces have reportedly gained a mountainous strategic position in Kawfal area and are still holding a number of positions in Sirwah district.

Sporadic clashes have also continued to take place in the governorates of Shabwah, al-Dhaliʻ, Ibb, and al-Baydha.

In the southeastern province of Hadhramawt, the toll of the first IS-claimed suicide attack on Friday has risen to 18 soldiers and 17 jihadi militants.

November 10–17: Coalition launches Ta‘iz offensive, peace talks postponed

While the new session of UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva seems to have been postponed, the airstrikes and ground fighting continued over the past week, mostly in central and southern Yemen and beyond the border with Saudi Arabia. Early Tuesday, President Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi returned to his provisional capital, Aden, one day after Yemeni resistance and Saudi-led coalition forces launched a major operation to "liberate" the central city of Taʻiz. Hadi chaired a meeting focused on the security issues in Aden, where a number of areas are reportedly under the control of jihadi militants. On Sunday, Vice President and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah announced from Suqutra Island the return of his cabinet members to the southern port city of Aden.

Amid airstrikes by Saudi Arabia and its allies,  clashes have been taking place in the central governorates of Taʻiz and Marib as well as the southern governorates of Lahj and Shabwah.

In Taʻiz Governorate, fighting has been chiefly raging on the western fronts, near the Red Sea port town of Mokha, in addition to clashes in downtown Taʻiz city, where jihadi militants are believed to be fighting alongside other local resistance factions. Near Mokha town, battles have intensified as the resistance fighters along with Saudi-led coalition forces have gained ground in the al-Waziʻiyah area. However, tens of anti-Houthi forces were reportedly killed in roadside ambush.

In Marib, tribal fighters and coalition forces have attempted once again to advance in the western Sirwah district, with air support from fighter jets and Apache helicopters. Meanwhile, Yemeni Army (pro-Hadi) Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad ʻAli al-Maqdashi, visited the district to oversee the battles there.

In Lahj, clashes have taken place near al-Anad military base, one of the most important military installations in the south. Resistance fighters along with coalition forces have reportedly gained a number of positions there.

In Shabwah, fierce fighting has been taking place in Bayhan district, which is controlled by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces. In the clashes, Islah Party members have reportedly been killed.

November 3–9: Fighting intensifies on multiple fronts as Geneva talks approach

With new peace talks fast approaching, the ground fighting continues to escalate rapidly on several fronts across Yemen and across the border with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi-led coalition’s aircraft continue to provide local anti-Houthi fighters with aerial support and weapons. Ground fighting has been swiftly intensifying in or around six Yemeni cities since early last week, while the new round of UN-sponsored talks aiming to end the conflict in Yemen is just few days away. The new peace-talks session is expected to take place in Geneva on November 15. On Sunday, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon flew to Riyadh to reinforce the push for a peaceful political settlement among the warring parties. Having finalized the initial negations ahead of the upcoming talks in Geneva, delegates from the Houthi Movement and the General People’s Congress party (GPC) returned from Muscat on Friday to brief their leadership in the Yemeni capital, Sanʻa. The exiled government in Riyadh has already assigned five representatives for the new Geneva talks. While the UN special envoy for Yemen appeared to be optimistic, several observers believe the talks are doomed to fail amid the escalated conflict on the ground.

In the central city of Taʻiz, clashes are taking place in downtown and intensifying in the eastern frontline, with both sides using heavy artillery and tanks. More than a dozen pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have been killed and wounded in an ambush; civilians have also reportedly been killed. While the pro-Houthi/Saleh forces surround the city from three sides, coalition airstrikes continue to target those forces. More reinforcement troops from the coalition, along with armored vehicles, have reached Taʻiz during the past week.

Near the Red Sea port of Mokha, pro-Houthi/Saleh forces claimed to hit a coalition warship, which they say is the fourth to be bombed.

In Ibb governorate, pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have taken control of Damt district near Dhaliʻ city, after fierce clashes with local resistance fighters left tens of dead on both sides. Although the coalition’s aircraft provided the resistance fighters with aerial support and weapons, the pro-Houthi/Saleh forces still control large parts of the district.

In Marib governorate, clashes erupted on new frontlines in the western districts amid airstrikes and artillery barrages. The local tribal fighters along with coalition forces are poised to capture al-Wakifah valley, some four kilometers outside the western district of Sirwah.

In the southern governorate of Lahj, near Aden city, fighting has escalated in what was seen as an attempt by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces to recapture Aden. On the other hand, 200 Sudanese and Gulf troops were reportedly seen leaving Aden, heading toward al-Anad airbase, where at least 400 coalition forces have been stationed.

Meanwhile, another Tropical Cyclone, Megh, battered Suqutra Island on Sunday, just days after Cyclone Chapala left at least three people dead and displaced hundreds from their homes on the island. One woman was reportedly killed while four other people were injured by the second storm.

Putting the Saudi "coup letters" in context

In September, several international news outlets reported on a set of letters, written by a member of the Saudi royal family (known in Arabic as Al Saud, the House of Saud), calling on the entire family to overthrow King Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. None of these outlets, however, has published an English translation of the letters. We're doing so here for the first time. These letters deal only briefly with the war in Yemen, but the war--and the larger trend of military adventurism--is one of the author's major grievances with the Salman regime. You can download the full English text of the letters here. Below are some choice excerpts, followed by commentary on the letters by journalist and Chatham House Fellow Peter Salisbury.

[box transparent="1"]

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

An urgent alarm call to all the Al Saud

The peace and compassion and blessings of God be upon you.

All praise to God, Lord of the universe, and God’s peace and blessings be upon His most noble messenger.

This is advice and an alarm call to all the sons and grandsons of the Founder, the late King Abdulaziz, who receive this letter....

The Founder brought us up on a set of principles that maintain authority, strengthen the state, and keep a balance in the country between the ruler and the ruled. We learned from him that maintaining authority requires that power should be held only by the oldest and most suitable, and that they should make the others share in their decision-making; that the character of the state should remain Islamic and pure; not to compromise the application of Sharia; to respect religious scholars and preserve their role in society; and to value notables.

The late Founder also taught us not to mix authority with business, to take our share of public money formally and not stretch out our hands in cheating, deception or fraud, what is now known as corruption and embezzlement. We also learned from him to adhere to good morals and religious correctness, and when plagued with something, not to shout about it, or be defiant. We learned to give people their value, to behave modestly in the majlis, and to accept advice; not to turn down a petitioner, not to close the door, not to reject those who ask, not to let down the oppressed, not to help the oppressor.

Some of these recommendations began to be neglected, and the wise men did not react to stop those who breached them, which lead to compromise in the rest leading to neglect of all the recommendations. We came near to collapse of the state and loss of authority. Disaster is closing upon us and others. The last of the neglected recommendations was marginalising the elders and the experienced, and handing over authority to juveniles and foolish dreamers who act behind the facade of an incompetent king....

How for example did we accept that the sons of Abdulaziz should be marginalised both in power and in participation in decision-making? How did we accept, passively and without intervening, the King’s mental condition which renders him unqualified to continue in authority? How did we accept that a person close to the King should dominate the country politically and economically, and leave him to make plans at his will?

Furthermore, how did we accept a foreign policy that weakens our people’s trust in us and incites the peoples of other countries against us? How did we accept engaging in uncalculated military risks, such as the military alliance to strike Iraq and Syria, and the Yemen war? How did we accept that our fate should be hostage to the whims of adolescents and impetuous caprice?...

Thirteen sons of King Abdulziz are still alive, and between them they possess great competence and experience, particularly Princes Talal bin Abdulaziz, Turki bin Abdulaziz and Ahmed bin Abdulaziz with their great ability and well-known political and administrative experience which should be harnessed in the interest of religion, the Holy Places, and the people.

The abovementioned three in particular and all thirteen sons of the Founder in general should carry the banner, gather consensus, and assemble the ranks of the House of Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, led by the oldest and best of them and their capable sons—who are a treasure imperishable if God wills—to act and remove all three, the incapable King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the negligent, impetuous and arrogant Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and the thief, corrupt, destroyer of the nation Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—just as King Faisal, his brothers, and their sons and cousins did when they removed King Saud—so that the best and oldest can take charge of the affairs of the country and its people....[/box]

Read the full text of the letters here.

I asked journalist and Chatham House Fellow Peter Salisbury a few questions to help us gauge the importance of these letters in the context of internal Saudi politics.

YPP: How much importance should we ascribe to these letters? Assuming the author isn't capable of pulling off an actual coup, what, if any, change can other members of the royal family hope to achieve? Salisbury: The surprise with these letters isn’t that they have appeared; it’s that it has taken so long for them to do so.

When King Salman appointed two members of his Sudairi branch of the family, his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef and his favourite son Mohammed bin Salman, who may have been as young as 29 at the time, as first and second in line to the throne, it sent shock waves across the Saud family [Will's note: "Sudairi" refers to the descendants of King Abdulaziz and Hussa bint Ahmad al-Sudairi, including the so-called "Sudairi Seven," the most powerful grouping of Abdulaziz's many sons].

At the time, a lot of reports on the appointments  focused on generational change - it was the first time in Saudi Arabia’s modern history that one of Abdulaziz al-Saud’s grandchildren rather than sons had been made crown prince - and on the youth of his son after years of septuagenarian crown princes. But the bigger issue for the Al Saud was that King Salman had concentrated current and future power in the Kingdom in the hands of one branch of the family. Some analysts described the move as being, in effect, a palace coup, with the King also setting his son up as future monarch. The author of the letter is fairly clear on this point: “How… did we accept that the sons of Abdulaziz should be marginalised both in power and in participation in decision-making?” he writes.

So the rest of the family  - the descendants of Abdulaziz’s other sons - were unsurprisingly unhappy. But the King's war in Yemen and the young Prince became very popular in the early months of King Salman’s reign, thanks in no small part to glowing domestic media coverage. It would have been very risky indeed to publicly criticize King Salman or the Mohammeds. Eight months in to King Salman’s reign, it looks like the author of the letter has exhausted internal channels for expressing his frustrations and has turned to the Western media, which has by and large been very critical of the war in Yemen and tends to be pretty critical of the House of Saud and the West’s relationship with the regime.

That makes the letter feel a bit like a desperate last attempt to get King Salman to reverse course on the succession issue, by someone trying to carve out a political space for themselves. It’s interesting to see this happen, and critics of the Saudi regime will of course latch on to it but I am not sure what impact if any it will have on the actual internal workings of the state, especially given that the concentration of power within the Sudairi family is continuing apace (the author talks about mixing ‘authority with business’ which is a pretty clear attack on the deputy crown prince -  a lot of the letter is an attack on hism - who has taken a big role in managing the economy, took over the lucrative position of head of the Royal Court, and has been accused of redirecting a lot of business and patronage to his own inner circle, which is in reality fairly standard practice when a new King takes over).

I could be wrong of course, but this isn’t actually the first time something like this has happened and in general the impact has been pretty limited. The author seems to recognize this: “[T]ime goes by quickly, and each day that passes makes it more difficult to grip the matter than the day before”, he wrote in September, and two months on we haven’t seen any movement.

YPP: In addition to King Salman, the letters call out Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Nayef in particular. Is it accurate to view the two Mohammeds as allies/partners, or do they each have different agendas? In other words, would Mohammed bin Salman be likely to retain his current position of power in the event of Salman's death? Salisbury: First, a disclaimer: a lot of analysis of the inner working of the House of Saud tends to devolve into Kremlinology - people trying to derive meaning from what little information emerges from inside the Palace (well, the Palaces but you get what I mean). So what I am providing here is my best educated guess.

As far as the two Mohammeds - MbN and MbS, as they are known - are concerned, it’s worth remembering that MbN was a widely acclaimed figure in the Saudi media in the past and that he has been seen as the US’ favorite Prince since the turn of the millennium thanks to his role in taking on Al Qaeda inside the Kingdom. Now we’re seeing him being eclipsed in media terms by MbS and it is difficult to know if that's a choice and he’s taking a knee, staying out of the limelight, and if so why - because he isn’t happy with the Yemen war (as many suggest)? - or because he doesn’t have much of a choice; or as some people suggest because he is happy to give his young cousin enough rope to hang himself with. But either way, MbS has become incredibly visible in the Saudi press while MbN is a much quieter figure these days.

Nevertheless MbN is in a strong position to become a very popular King: he’s young enough to have a few decades on the throne and if he succeeds Salman will be the first of his generation to become King. He is likely to be wary of MbS, who is in the process of gathering an awful lot of power around himself with respect to not just the military but also the economy. So theoretically it might make sense for MbN to do what King Salman did and completely change the line of succession. But they are from the same branch of the family, and I suspect that the Sudairis as a unit will be keen for the two Mohammeds to remain on friendly terms to ensure that power is concentrated within the family for the foreseeable future. A lot, of course, depends on how long of a reign King Salman has, how various aspects of current foreign policy play out, and how the oil price and economy fare in the next five years or so. YPP: What other important groupings or factions exist within the royal family, and how might their priorities differ from the current ruling faction? Salisbury: Basically, the other factions are the remaining sons of Abdulaziz and the sons of his children, particularly the offspring of former Kings and senior Princes, who are worried that their branches of the family may be robbed of their inheritance - i.e. a fair shot at the throne in the future. Abdulaziz had an estimated 45 sons and a similar number of daughters so being a Saudi Prince is a bit like like having the surname Smith in the UK or US.

The author of the letter mentions a number of the most prominent former Kings and Princes - Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Nayef - while taking a swipe at the previous King, Abdullah, and at  Salman so I think it’s fair to guess he isn’t from either of these branches of the family. It’s also interesting that he refers to the 13 living sons of Abdulaziz and puts forward a list of potential candidates for King who are fairly low-key and would likely not overstep the mark when it comes to marginalising the rest of the family.

The issue for the rest of the al-Saud is that if the Sudairis become the only branch of the family who are considered for succession, everyone else will become increasingly removed from the levers of the state and hence prime opportunities to receive and distribute patronage.  That means their influence and power will be eroded, and that their ability to angle for future posts or crown prince roles will also be limited. So the issue really is one of being marginalized in the long term, and of a power-grab by a single branch of the family, which in and of itself is seen by many Princes as breaking the rules.

October 20–November 2: New talks expected, fighting continues, cyclone takes a toll

The civil war entered its eighth month on October 26, as the airstrikes and ground combat continue to rage on, mostly in central Yemen. That day, Saudi-led airstrikes destroyed an MSF-supported hospital in the northern governorate of Saʻdah, leaving the entire governorate with only one health facility. “At least 200,000 people now have no access to lifesaving medical care,” said an MSF press release. A new round of UN-sponsored peace talks aiming to end the drawn-out conflict in Yemen is expected to take place in Geneva on November 15, after being postponed last month. Meanwhile, fighting on the Saudi side of the border continues to intensify in the areas of Najran, Jayzan and Asir. 

Last month, the UN envoy to Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, tried to talk the warring parties into holding a new round of talks based on a seven-point proposal put forth during previous talks in the Omani capital, Muscat. Both the Houthis and their ally former president Ali Abdullah Saleh have assented to the negotiated implementation of UNSC resolution 2216, which requires them to hand over their weapons and withdraw from occupied cities. Yemen’s Saudi-backed government-in-exile, however, has insisted since the peace talks began on the Houthis’ full implementation of 2216 as a precondition to talks. Now, after many quibbles over the time and place of this new session, the UN envoy expects the talks to be held in Geneva on November 15.

In the meantime, the frontlines in the central governorates of Taʻiz, Marib, al-Baydha, and Ibb have seen clashes intensifying as Saudi-led warplanes provide aerial support for local resistance fighters. Sporadic clashes are also taking place in the southern governorate of Lahj, just north of Aden.

In Taʻiz city, clashes between local resistance militias and pro-Houthi/Saleh forces escalated over the past two weeks. Coalition war planes have been targeting the positions of Houthi/Saleh forces and airdropping weapons to the resistance. Over the weekend, local resistance fighters were able to secure a route into Taʻiz through the Houthi blockade, and smuggle a number of armored vehicles into Taʻiz amid the weeks-long siege imposed by the pro-Houthi forces.

Also in Taʻiz, a group of salafi militants, calling themselves “Humat al-ʻAqidah” (Guardians of Faith), have recently emerged and are fighting alongside the local resistance fighters. While the expected “decisive operation” for liberating Yemen’s third-largest city hasn’t yet began, the city may soon witness even fiercer fighting.

In Marib city, fighting for control over the western district of Sirwah continues to intensify, although parts of this district have already been “liberated” by Maribi tribes and coalition forces. Early last week, clashes broke out all over again, when the coalition-trained Maribi forces along with local tribal fighters made a push further into Sirwah, a district seen as the key area leading to the capital, Sanʻa. They were able to gain another position in the Mashjaʻ area of Sirwah, as pro-Houthi forces retreated under heavy airstrikes and artillery barrages. However, clashes are still taking place in other parts of Marib.

In al-Baydha, intermittent clashes between pro-Houthi forces and local tribal fighters took place mainly in two areas of the governorate, while Saudi-led warplanes provided the local resistance with air support. Airstrikes hit the provincial security building in downtown al-Baydha, while others targeted a number of positions of the pro-Houthi forces on the outskirts of the city.

In Ibb city, clashes have escalating over the past two weeks, especially after the Saudi-led coalition decided to supply the local resistance fighters with arms and provide them aerial support. The fighting has been taking place in the eastern areas near al-Dhaliʻ governorate. Some local observers, however, opine that the “liberation” of the neighboring cities of Taʻiz and Ibb should begin simultaneously.

On Monday, November 2, Cyclone Chapala swept over the Yemeni island of Suqutra, killing three people and injuring many more. The storm, which meteorologists called the most powerful to hit Yemen in recent history, made landfall on Yemen's southern coast the following day, flooding the city of al-Mukalla and other coastal towns. Recent reports say that more than 40,000 citizens have been displaced by the storm, which has dropped as much as a decade's worth of rain on some parts of the country already. Emirati and Omani authorities have already dispatched aid to Suqutra; al-Mukalla, which has been under the control of al-Qaeda for several months, has yet to receive outside assistance.

Wedding airstrike shatters families, and a village's sense of safety

An aircraft hovered in the sky of a small village in Yemen’s central highlands, as three brides were being driven to a multistoried house where three brother-grooms were celebrating and waiting for them one night early this month. It wasn’t long after the brides were received, around 10:00 p.m. local time, when a missile hit the house, just a few minutes after the bridal caravan of more than 20 cars from two neighboring villages had arrived. That was on October 7, when the family of Mohammed Saleh Ghawba was celebrating the wedding of three sons—Moayad, 25; Ayman, 23; and Abdurrahman, 21—at their three-story house in Sanaban village, 33 kilometers east of Dhamar City, the provincial capital.

This aerial attack on the brother-grooms wedding, the second airstrike to hit a wedding in just 10 days, claimed the lives of 43 people, mostly women and children from the grooms’ and brides’ families. According to a list of civilian deaths provided by relatives of the victims’ families and verified by the YPP during a recent visit, 13 women and 15 children were killed by the strike, which also caused great damage to the house.

The ruins of the Ghawba family home, with the wreckage of a car from the bridal caravan in the foreground

Thirteen members and relatives of the Ghawba household were killed, including the youngest of the grooms and their parents. One of the brides was also killed along with a dozen of her relatives. While her father who came along from al-Kharbah village, some two kilometers south of Sanaban, survived the aerial attack, he couldn’t escape the devastating shock that left him in a grim mental state, along with the families of the two other brides from al-Jamimah village, less than a kilometer north of Sanaban.

As customs go in rural areas of Dhamar and other places in Yemen, the bride’s family carries out marriage ceremonies for their daughter at their home for a couple of days; the family of the groom does likewise. But usually, the wedding banquet for men is held the next day after receiving the bride. On the wedding day, the groom’s family sends a group of delegates in a convoy to the bride’s family to escort the bride to the groom’s house. In return the bride’s father comes along with a convoy twice as large, as a matter of courtesy. This is why the bridal convoy from the villages of al-Jamimah and al-Kharbah included nearly 30 cars.

“At least ten cars from each village were escorting the three brides to Sanaban,” said Abdussalam al-Sanabani, 40, a relative of the brother-grooms who was in the bridal convoy.

He said that at 9:30 pm on Wednesday, October 7, the convoy approached the grooms’ house in Sanaban, where the three brides were then welcomed, while the brides’ relatives of men and women in addition to their children who came along with the convoy were also received accordingly.

“Just a few minutes later, a huge explosion took place and flames engulfed the house,” Abdussalam said.

According to several eyewitnesses in Sanaban, a warplane was seen circling overhead about 15 minutes before the arrival of the bridal convoy.

“The warplane was circling noticeably as the bridal convoy was approaching the village [Sanaban], and I heard it flying at low latitude to the northwest as the missile struck the house,” said local resident Maher Mohammed Saleh, 30, who was some 10 meters away from the house. “I even heard the missile whizzing before it hit the house.”

That night the survivors from the Ghawba family, together with their neighbors, began searching for bodies in the rubble; they continued into the morning. A large part of the house, which was originally built of red bricks, was totally demolished. A number of vehicles from the bridal convoy had caused secondary explosions, increasing the damage.

“Most of the bodies were either badly charred or ripped apart,” said Abdurrahman Saleh Ghawba, 50, a paternal uncle of the brother-grooms, who lost three sons in the blast. Among them was Mohammed, 25 who had been married five days prior. Abdurrahman could hardly identify the remains of his newlywed son.

“We could only recognize him through his wedding ring, which had his wife’s name etched on it,” said Abdurrahman during an interview. Abdurrahman was on the way to Dhamar city when the airstrike hit the house. His only two brothers, including the grooms’ father, were killed in the aerial attack.

Mohammed Jamal Saleh Ghawba, 35, a paternal cousin of the brother-grooms, lost his 5-year-old daughter, Jood, along with both of his parents, a brother, a nephew, and a niece. He described the horrible scene to the YPP.

“Women and children were burning in front of me while crying and screaming for help,” he said. “It’s even more terrible when you see your father cut in half.”

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Moayad, 25, the eldest of the three brother-grooms, spoke to the YPP a week after his wedding party was hit by the airstrike about the need to move forward.

“The blast was big; I saw bodies scattered and burning all over,” Moayad said. “We have lost many of our family members and relatives, but we need to move on in our life.”

He now lives along with his wife from al-Jamimah village at a house he rented in the Sanaban village. He owns a grocery there, while his brother Ayman, 23, who also survived the attack, was working at a store selling construction and building tools, which their father used to own.

Ayman, in contrast to his brother, still couldn’t believe what had happened. He seemed to be greatly affected, and never went out of the house his eldest brother has just rented.

“I lost my wife, my parents and several others of my relatives; how is life going to be after all that?”

Ayman’s wife was from al-Kharbah village, while the wife of Abdurrahman, the youngest groom who was killed by the airstrike, survived and now living in al-Jamimah village with her family.

This aerial attack was the first in the Sanaban village and one of the deadliest attacks since the Saudi-led coalition began its air offensive in late March to roll back the gains of the pro-Houthi forces, and restore to power the exiled government of President ‘Abdu Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. After seven months of bombing, the coalition, which receives logistical support and materiel from the US and UK, has not yet achieved any of its stated goals, while UN-backed talks have thus far failed to bring the warring parties closer to a political solution to the conflict in Yemen. According to UN figures, more than 4,500 people have so far been killed, including more than 500 children. Alongside the aerial offensive, ground fighting is raging on several fronts across the country, displacing more than two million Yemenis from their homes.

Saudi military spokesman, Ahmad al-Asiri, has denied that the coalition is responsible for the strike in Sanaban. "Not every time an explosion or an attack takes place, it is committed by the coalition. We do not target civilian areas, " al-Asiri told Al Jazeera after the attack.

There is no clear reason as to why the wedding party in Sanaban village would be hit. The village is situated near rocky hills, 20 km northwest of Rada‘ City in al-Baydha Governorate. Only one military post could be seen 15 kilometers south of Sanaban, on the way to Dhamar City.

The presence of the Houthis could be hardly seen in the village; the Houthi movement’s slogans were hard to find anywhere in Sanaban. The locals seemed to have refrained from taking a side in the ongoing conflict. Even with the Houthis advancing on Rada‘, ostensibly to fight al-Qaeda there, the elders in Sanaban were keen not to have the locals involved in the fighting. Before the wedding airstrike, Sanaban village was thought to be somewhat safer than most other places in Yemen.

Adnan Hussein Ali al-Sanabani, a relative of the brother-grooms, whose family was present during the wedding party, decided to leave the capital, San‘a, over a month ago.

“I decided to bring my family here to Sanaban and stay until the conflict is over,” said Adnan during an interview with him at his house in the village. In San‘a, he was living along with his family in a house near the Presidential Palace, near Nahdayn Mountain, a place the Saudi-led warplanes have been heavily pounding for months now.

“I thought the village [Sanaban] would be a safe place to live, away from the conflict. Now I have lost daughter, Reenad; she was just five years old.”

Reporter Saif AlOliby accompanied Mohammed Ali Kalfood to Sanaban and contributed to this report.

Correction: an earlier version of this post referred to the home village of one of the brides as al-Kharab. The village's name is al-Kharbah.

October 28: Washington, DC: Yemen networking happy hour

Are you a DC-area professional, intern, student, activist, or artist with an interest in Yemen and/or the Arabian Peninsula? If so, you’re invited to join the Yemen Peace Project for a casual networking happy hour on 10/28! The DC area is home to lots of people working on issues related to Southwest Asia and North Africa, across a range of sectors and specialties. Whether we work in foreign policy, security, humanitarian relief, economic development, or arts and culture, we can all do our own jobs better by building connections with people in other fields. So let’s get together, have some food and some drinks, talk about Yemen, and get to know each other.

Location: St. Arnold's on Jefferson

5:30 - 7:30 p.m., 10/28. RSVP in the comments or on Facebook.

October 6–19: Civilians suffer as conflict drags on; new peace talks announced

Yemen’s civil conflict is now in its seventh month, and UN-backed peace talks remain stagnant. The conflict that started in late March has killed more than 4,500 Yemenis so far, including at least 502 children, according to UNICEF. An estimated 10% of the country’s population has been internally displaced. While 80% of Yemenis needs humanitarian assistance, more than half a million children face life-threatening malnutrition as a risk of famine grows. In an open letter, Oxfam and other NGOs urged UN Security Council members to act to end the months-long civil war and alleviate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. On Tuesday, October 6, suicide attacks in the southern port city of Aden targeted the exiled government, which forced Vice President/ Prime Minister Khaled Bahah along with a handful of ministers to withdraw from the city. Three IS-claimed suicide attacks in Aden—the provisional capital—hit the exiled government’s temporary building, the residence of Emirati troops, and the Coalition’s Joint Command Center. At least 15 coalition troops and Southern Resistance fighters were reportedly killed in the attacks, which reveal that Aden’s security situation is much more fragile than it appears to be.

Some 400 Sudanese troops—out of 6,000 that the Sudanese government has reportedly pledged—were deployed to this “liberated” port city On Monday, October 19, two days after 300 troops had already arrived. But it has not yet been confirmed whether this second batch of Sudanese troops will be tasked with maintaining security in Aden, or be sent into combat elsewhere.

On Wednesday, October 7, more than 40 people were killed when an airstrike hit the house of three brother-grooms in Sanaban village, east of Dhamar city in Yemen’s central highlands. This was the second wedding party to be bombed in 10 days, as Saudi-led airstrikes continued to hit cities and towns across the country.

With aerial cover and support, fighting near the Red Sea coast continued to drag on with the aim of advancing on and “liberating” Taʻiz city, where pro-Houthi/Saleh forces have been imposing a siege for weeks now, leaving the local residents with no water, fuels, or other basic necessities. Although it has been more than two weeks since the Saudi-led coalition launched their operation liberate Taʻiz, no clear action has been taken, other than airstrikes, which have taken a heavy civilian toll along with artillery shells from pro-Houthi/Saleh forces. The coalition-allied fighters, which were deployed outside Lahj province on the road to Taʻiz late in September, have not been able to advance further since then. A coalition spokesperson said that “the geographical nature of the battlefield” is one reason behind that. Over this weekend, Saudi-led warplanes mistakenly struck some of those allied fighters, killing at least 30 and wounding 40 others.

In Marib Governorate, the Saudi-led coalition forces along with local tribal fighters are trying to maintain full control over the governorate, but landmines are slowing their progress. However, the coalition forces and their tribal allies are aiming to open another front in the neighboring governorate of al-Jawf. The Qatari government has reportedly offered to send troops to join the al-Jawf battle ground.

Across the borderline, pro-Houthi troops continue to pound the Saudi Army bases and installations in Najran, Jaizan and Aseer. Several Saudi soldiers have been killed and many others captured. Another Scud missile was also fired from the capital, Sanʻa, toward Khamis Mushayt airbase last week. While the Houthi army spokesman said that the missile hit its target, the Saudi-affiliated media contradicted this.

The launching of the ballistic missile came hours after the top Houthi leader, ‘Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi delivered a televised speech on Wednesday, October 14. His speech came right after a speech made by former president ʻAli ʻAbdullah Saleh. Both blamed Saudi Arabia for stalling the UN-backed talks aimed at ending the months-long conflict in Yemen. On Sunday, the UN envoy to Yemen announced that a new round of peace talks will be held soon. All parties to the conflict have agreed to participate in the talks that will be held in Geneva late this month.

Senate hearing showcases America's ambivalence

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing today titled "The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council." Chaired by Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), the hearing featured Stephen Seche and Mary Beth Long as expert witnesses. Seche served as the US ambassador to Yemen from 2007-2010 and currently serves as the VP of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a think-tank funded by GCC governments but staffed by some credible DC thinkers. Long served for several years in the Department of Defense, and is now the head of a private security firm with a Middle East focus.  The senators present started out with questions on the current war in Yemen, the nature and purpose of American support for the Saudi-led coalition, and the role of Iran in the conflict. From there the hearing flailed into a discussion of Russia's relationship with the GCC states, with both committee members and witnesses undecided as to whether the GCC is wooing Russia to replace the US as their Most Important Ally, or planning to go to war against Russia in Syria. There was much talk of the "Russia-Iran alliance" as well. In fact, in some ways this was actually a hearing on Iran and what the US can and should do about Iranian influence in the region.

Those parts of the hearing that focused on Yemen were worth watching, however. Senator Corker and others on the committee pressed the witnesses on whether the US actually has any interests that are served by bombing Yemen, or whether America's involvement is purely motivated by Saudi/GCC interests. The eventual concensus seemed to be that the US was dragged, largely unprepared, into this conflict by Saudi Arabia, but that it is in America's interest to limit Iranian influence in Yemen. The witnesses disagreed on the actual extent of that influence, with Seche expressing the conventional wisdom of Yemen-watchers--that Iran isn't in charge of the Houthi-Saleh campaign for domination, or in his words, that "the Houthis are their own boss," but that Iran would benefit from a Houthi victory--while Long claimed that the Houthis are an outright Iranian proxy. Moreover, according to Long, Iranian, Russian, and Hezbollah fighters are already on the ground in Yemen (she at one point said, with a straight face, "we don't know how many there are, but we know it's increasing.").

Ms. Long's testimony was essentially a set of Saudi-authored talking points, with her Main Point being that, if the US wants to see this war come to a positive conclusion with decreased civilian casualties, it needs to hurry up and sell Saudi Arabia a lot more smart bombs, OR ELSE. Seche's testimony was much more balanced, without a clear political or economic agenda, which was refreshing.

Toward the end of the hearing, Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) raised quite forcefully the issue of Yemen's humanitarian catastrophe, and the fact that the Saudi-led bombing campaign and naval blockade have contributed to it, a point to which Seche agreed. Senator Markey went on to say that "our silence is complicity" in Saudi Arabia's violations of international humanitarian law. He further pointed out that US law forbids military assistance to military entities that have committed "gross violations" of international law and human rights, and suggests that KSA's actions in Yemen put it within the bounds of such prohibitions.

If Senator Markey defined one end of the spectrum of arguments presented at today's hearing--the empathetic, humanitarian, reasonable end, Mary Beth Long positioned herself firmly at the other. According to Long, the fact that Houthi-Saleh forces used a Russian-made missile against coalition forces proves that Russian and/or Iranian military advisors are on the front lines in Yemen, and that Iranian weapons shipments are practically pouring into Yemen on a daily basis. This disregards the fact that the missile in question was, as far as anyone can tell, part of the arsenal of the Yemeni army, and that the pro-Saleh military includes units trained in the use of such missiles.

The take-away: though both witnesses represent institutions with ties to GCC powers, Ambassador Seche offered thoughtful and earnest opinions based on his own experience, while Ms. Long parroted propaganda. When forced to boil down their recommendations for US policy, Seche urged US policy makers to make sure that any further arms transfers to Saudi Arabia come with "significant strings" in the form of commitments to engage productively in peace talks. Long, on the other hand, urged the US to deliver more and better munitions to Saudi Arabia as quickly as possible.

And one final exchange that I found very interesting: Senator Markey asked the witnesses if the US administration should be making more of a fuss about Saudi violations of international law. Seche said no; calling out the Saudis in public would be counterproductive, but the administration should speak to KSA "privately" about this. Markey then asked if the Senate, and specifically the FRC, should speak out publicly on the issue since the administration can't. Seche enthusiastically said yes, that a vocal Congress could be helpful in international negotiations. He even said that he had used the "help me get this pesky Congress off my back" approach in his own dealings with intransigent foreign governments in the past.

You can watch the full video of the hearing, or download the witnesses' written testimony, right here.

Below I've Storified just some of the livetweeting of the hearing, by myself as well as Beka Feathers of PILPG and Kate Kizer of ADHRB.

September 18 - October 5: Indiscriminate attacks continue, coalition advances in east and south

With peace talks still stalled, Yemen saw some of the heaviest indiscriminate airstrikes of the war over the past two weeks, in addition to ground fighting in the central parts of Yemen and near the Bab al-Mandab. Since mid-September, more than 300 people have reportedly been killed by Saudi-led airstrikes in a number of cities and towns. Indiscriminate shelling by pro-Houthi/Saleh forces, particularly in the city of Taʻiz, has also killed dozens of civilians in recent weeks. A UNOCHA-funded report found that “more civilian deaths and injuries from explosive weapons were recorded in Yemen during the first seven months of 2105 than in any other country in the world.” According to that report, at least 86% of those killed by bombs and other explosives in Yemen’s war have been civilians.

In the capital, Sanʻa, at least 90 people were killed in less than a week (September 18-23), including an entire family of 10 in the UNESCO-listed Old City of Sanʻa and another whole family of 11 members in a neighborhood to the north of the capital.

Meanwhile, on September 20, over 70 people were killed while visiting a local market in Munabbeh village of Saʻdah Governorate—just three days prior the ʻEid al-Adha Islamic holiday.

On September 27, an Apache helicopter killed at least 30 people in the northwestern village Bani Zayla’ of Hajjah Governorate, near the border with Saudi Arabia. On the next day, two airstrikes hit a wedding party in the southwestern village of Wahijah near the Red Sea coastal town Mokha, in Taʻiz Governorate. As many as 135 people, mostly women and children, were reportedly killed.

The wedding aerial attack, the deadliest single incident since the start of the Saudi-led air campaign, has drawn strong condemnations and resentful calls worldwide. On that day, UN chief Ban Ki-moon unusually criticized this Saudi campaign in a public statement, and called for an end to the bombings. The Netherlands’ UN mission also drafted a Human Rights Council resolution that called for an impartial, UN-led investigation into human rights and international law violations in ‪‎Yemen.

But while the Saudis were facing international pressure, the Netherlands eventually withdrew the draft. Instead, the Netherlands and other western states backed a resolution penned by Saudi Arabia and the Hadi regime, which made no mention of coalition airstrikes, and left the job of investigating human rights and law violations in the hands of the Hadi regime.

On September 22, Hadi returned to Aden after six months in exile in Riyadh. On September 26, he addressed the United Nations at the 67th UN General Assembly in New York City. From there, Hadi returned to Riyadh on Saturday October 3, not Aden as it was expected.

On Thursday, October 1, the Saudi-led coalition forces reportedly took control of the strategic strait of Bab al-Mandab on the Red Sea. Prime Minister and Vice President Khaled Bahah, who reportedly paid a brief visit to a camp near Bab al-Mandab, said the current operations "will push to retake Mokha and al-Hudaydah," both on the Red Sea, and then the "whole coastline up to the border with Saudi Arabia." The coalition also announced that it will start an operation next Thursday morning to liberate Taʻiz.

The seizure of Bab al-Mandab strait came in as Hadi-allied forces and resistance fighters from the southern port city of Aden were mobilizing in the al-Subbayha area of southern Governorate Lahj, some 70 km on the road to the central city of Taʻiz.

Meanwhile, coalition forces along with local tribal fighters have gained more positions in Marib and are closing in on the northwestern district of Sirwah, which is seen as the key area leading to the capital. While the pro-Houthi forces seem to have lost positions in the interior fronts, they have gained ground in the neighboring Saudi cities across the borderline. They claim to have captured military bases and destroyed several army installations, in addition to holding tens of Saudi soldiers as prisoners.

Khadija Al Salami's film "I am Nojoom" comes to DC, 10/24 & 25

Later this month, the Arabian Sights Film Festival in Washington DC will screen Yemeni filmmaker Khadija Al Salami's acclaimed feature film I am Nojoom, Age 10 and Divorced. Khadija Al Salami will be on hand to talk about the film and answer questions from the audience. The screenings are cosponsored by the YPP. From the Arabian Sights website:

A 10-year-old girl walks into a courtroom, looks the judge straight in the eye and tells him, "I want a divorce." In Yemen, where there is no age restriction for marriage, Nojoom Ali's father, terrified of shame and desperate for money, arranges for Nojoom to marry a villager who is three times her age in exchange for a trivial dowry. Subjected to physical and psychological abuse at the hands of her husband and grouchy mother-in-law, Nojoom escapes and attains protection from a compassionate judge. Despite the risk to his own career and family, the judge pursues justice on her behalf. Based on Nojood Ali's best-selling autobiography, this gripping feature film tells of the little girl who made headline news in 2009 and became a symbol of the movement against forced and underage marriage. Recipient of the top prize at the Dubai International Film Festival.

View the flier for this event.

For showtimes and tickets, follow this link.

Letter from San‘a: "every breath is stolen"

This post was sent to us by a special guest contributor, Fatima Noman. Fatima is 16 years old, and lives in San‘a. This is her second post for the Mafraj Blog. I always imagined the light I saw before dying would be that sent from God—bright white with an angel glancing at me, tranquility—not that dropped by an aircraft.

It scares me how many times I've escaped death. I feel every breath of air I breathe is stolen. I feel like a fugitive running from death. Have you ever touched a dead person? They feel so cold, icy. Gelid. Every missile that hits makes my blood turn cold, my jaw dangles wide open and I can't speak. I try to remind myself that once again I have fled death. Once again I have beat the odds.

Some days I am strong and invincible. Other days like today I am shattered, broken and frail. I am trying to sleep but the thought of waking up dead is frightening me, but nobody is ever ready to die. I remember being 9 years old dreaming of my teens and how "cool" I'd be and how rebellious and flawless my life would be. Now at sixteen all I can think of is whether tomorrow I'll be cocooned in a white cloth being placed in a hole of dirt and whether my Mother will be grieving or if she'd be right next to me getting her share of dirt.

Some days are hard and just unbearable. I feel futile and vain. I've always been that person, you know the one that cries easily just one wrong word or one wrong move engenders a fit of tears. Lately, the tears have surged, they've turned into waterfalls, vast and endless. I try to talk my self into not breaking down but I can never find the right words. Every time I gaze at the mirror I vow to myself to not get frightened. I remind myself that the moment I came to life the hour of my death was previously written. It's useless, day after day. Talk after talk. Useless, pointless and worthless.

Just a year ago all I could think of was what university I want to go to and how to score higher grades. And of course the image that has always been in the back of my mind; sitting on a porch on a sunny day with my children playing around the backyard giggling and my two youngest fighting over the swings. Now, I feel illegible to dream or hope or aspire.

Today as I was sitting on my bed cushioned in the safety of my pillows reading my book when the missile hit. I jumped off the bed and out of the room. I waited then returned. This happened 5 times in the course of 8 minutes and each time I returned to the bed I would say: Fatima! You won't move this time, but I fail myself I continuously fail myself.

Lately, all I think of is if I do make it out this alive will I ever feel safe in silence or will silence always mean a stronger hit?

The Marib offensive, three weeks in

On the surrounding rocky hills some four kilometers to the west of Marib City, pro-Houthi forces have been holding positions since early this month, while the Saudi-led coalition’s own forces along with local tribal fighters fight to sweep them out of the way to the capital, Sanʻa. The coalition’s ground offensive in the oil-rich governorate of Marib, in central Yemen, is part of a larger strategy to take control of Sanʻa, some 175 km to the west of the governorate. The ongoing battle in Marib, though, seems to have produced a standoff so far, two weeks after the ground offensive officially began on September 13, hours after the exiled President Hadi and his government in Riyadh backed out of UN-sponsored talks to end the months-long conflict in Yemen.

According to several sources in Marib, however, clashes between tribal fighters and pro-Houthi forces were already taking place more than a week earlier. The coalition-trained Maribi fighters and coalition armed forces were “sent as reinforcements.”

“The fighting broke out late in August in Sirwah district [northwest of Marib], when the Houthis attempted to make a push toward Marib City,” a tribal elder in the city told the YPP via telephone, indicating that the clashes between the warring parties were escalating day by day.

Coalition forces based in the Safer area, to the east of Marib City, have been reportedly preparing to mount a ground offensive as part of their larger campaign to “liberate” Houthi-controlled Sanʻa, in what was allegedly dubbed “Operation Sweeping Current.”

Meanwhile, pro-Houthi forces were able to advance on the rocky hills outside Marib, after fierce clashes along three fronts there killed dozens on both sides, according to local tribal and military sources.

On September 4, Houthis also fired a short-range ballistic missile from Bayhan district of the neighboring Shabwah province, killing 67 Emirati, Saudi, Bahraini soldiers as well as an unknown number of local tribal fighters at a camp in Safer.

By September 8, four days after the ballistic missile attack, hundreds of trained tribal fighters along with a number of coalition’s own forces were seen heading for Marib city, coming from Safer.

“At least 700 local fighters, who were trained in Saudi Arabia along with troops from the coalition forces, have arrived in the headquarters of the 3rd Military Region and a military base in Sahn al-Jin area,” military sources in Marib told the YPP, pointing out that the military base in the area is used as a training camp for the local fighters.

The military sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that these allied troops were “sent as reinforcements on Tuesday [September 8],” after the pro-Houthi forces took control of three positions near the rocky hills.

Despite those reinforcements, the pro-Houthi forces “started to carry out heavy missile attacks using Katyusha and Uragan BM-27 rocket launchers, targeting both the HQ of the 3rd Military Region and the training camp,” said the sources, adding that several coalition troops were killed, and a number of armored vehicles destroyed.

On that day, the UAE government officially stated that one Emirati soldier was killed in the Marib fighting. There had been no official comments from the other Gulf States participating in the current ground offensive, but Houthi-affiliated media outlets claimed that two Qatari soldiers were killed, and that a score of armored vehicles were totally destroyed. Those figures could not be confirmed independently.

In response, the tribal fighters fought their way back to the western areas of al-Jufaina, Edat al-Raa’ and Tabbat al-Masaryah, where pro-Houthi forces are holding their positions. Coalition fighter jets and Apache helicopters provided the Maribi fighters with air support, according to both military sources.

On September 12, the Saudi-led coalition officially announced the ground offensive in Marib, hours after the exiled government in Riyadh announced it would not participate in the UN-backed peace talks, which were expected to be held in few days later.

On Friday, September 25, at least 1,000 local fighters, who had been trained in Saudi Arabia, crossed through the town of al-Abr in Hadhramawt governorate, and headed for Marib aboard military armored vehicles and tanks.

The military sources said that these troops arrived at the HQ of the 3rd Military Region and the military base in Sahn al-Jin area. “But this time, the troops advanced under an air cover and after heavy airstrikes” on Houthi positions. According to several tribal sources in Marib, the fighters aboard military armored trucks pushed into the western fronts under heavy aerial cover on Saturday, indicating that al-Jufaina and Tabbat al-Masaryah fronts have seen the most brutal fighting.

On Sunday, a weapons depot in Tabbat al-Masaryah was bombed by airstrikes and flames were seen rising above this rocky hill front, according to the sources. The airstrikes have also targeted a Houthi checkpoint in Harib area of Shabwah, on the border with Marib, killing a number of Houthi fighters including their leader, who was identified as Abo Malek al-Khawlani.

On Monday, the tribal fighters closed in on the pro-Houthi forces at the Tabbat al-Masaryah front in the northwest, and were poised to drive them out from two positions, said a local tribal source, indicating that the push uphill was preceded with the heaviest airstrikes and the artillery shells yet seen. However, the Houthi-affiliated TV channel al-Masira said that Houthi forces were making "a tactical retreat," and that "the aggressors were using internationally banned missiles".

The fighting is not over yet in Marib; on Sunday the convoy of one of the Yemeni military commanders in charge of “liberating” Marib, Brigadier al-Qumayri, hit a landmine planted by the pro-Houthi forces. Four of al-Qumayri's body guards were killed, including his son, Hamza, and several others were injured, while he survived the bombing unscathed, according to a tribal source.

Update: Yemen Press reported on Tuesday that tribal and coalition forces had gained full control of Marib Dam, as well as Tabbat al-Masaryah. The YPP's sources confirmed those reports.

Communities in Hajjah count the cost of indiscriminate airstrikes

Abdullah Hadi, 39, returned to the water bottling facility outside his town around 3:00 a.m. to make the final checklist for the laborers working overnight, before ending his shift. Half an hour later, the chief coordinator and a dozen of his workers were killed by an airstrike. In the northwestern areas of Yemen, near the border with Saudi Arabia, scores of civilians have been killed while hiding in their homes, working at farms and factories, or while visiting popular markets, which are vital sources of income, food, and other necessities for most of the populace in the Tihamah coastal region and elsewhere in Yemen. Thousands of people in the northwest have also had to abandon their home towns, seeking safety elsewhere.

Haradh and Abs districts of Hajjah Governorate in particular have been continuously pounded since the first Saudi-orchestrated airstrikes on March 26. The coalition’s air campaign was originally billed as “quick and sharp,” aiming to roll back forces loyal to the Houthi movement and former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh, and restore the exiled government in Riyadh to power.

To those ends, warplanes from Saudi Arabia and its allies started to bomb pro-Houthi military bases and weapon depots. Moreover, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a naval and land blockade with the aim of preventing arms shipment from reaching the Houthis.

But the Saudi-led coalition, which receives logistic support and materiel from the US and UK, has also targeted Yemen’s civilian infrastructure, taking a heavy toll on noncombatants, while blocking all commercial imports to Yemen and stalling much-needed humanitarian and medical shipments. According to the United Nations, at least 80% of the population needs some form of humanitarian assistance. Widespread power outages and fuel shortages have forced dozens of hospitals to shut down, while others have had to reduce their operation to the emergency units.

Despite the warnings of impending famine and the dire humanitarian situation across Yemen, the coalition has continued for six months now to bomb residential areas and ravage the country’s infrastructure. Targets of the airstrikes have included government buildings, health facilities, educational institutions, stadiums, seaports, heritage sites, IDP/refugee camps, factories, gas stations, and water storage and processing facilities.

During the past six days alone, at least 90 people have been killed in the capital, Sanʻa, as warplanes target densely-populated areas, including the UNESCO-listed Old City of Sanʻa, where an entire family of 10 members was buried under the rubble of their house this week. More than 70 people were reportedly killed on Sunday as coalition warplanes bombed a local market in Munnabih village of Saʻdah governorate, according to local health officials.

According to the international NGO Oxfam, at least 25,000 airstrikes have hit  Yemen since late March. The organization, one of the aid agencies in the country that has been affected by the aerial attacks, has also said that more than two thirds of the population lack access to clean water, which increases the risk of life-threatening diseases such as malaria, cholera, and diarrhea.

In rural areas of the Tihamah coastal plain, where tropical diseases are seasonally rampant, 41% of the local clean water supply systems—which Oxfam was supporting—have shut down.

In Abs district of Hajjah Governorate, some 30 km away from the town of Haradh—where Abdullah Hadi and most of the local water plant’s workers lived, the water tanks, the vocational training institute, the cultural center, and the central prison were among the public facilities hit by airstrikes, according to local residents .

“The Saudi warplanes appear to strike anything in here and in the neighboring areas as well,” Hafiz Makin, a 36-year-old resident, told the YPP. “A number of houses have even been targeted in particular.”

When the Saudi-led aerial campaign was launched in March, Hafiz was hopeful that the Houthis and their allies would soon be forced to withdraw from the areas they have occupied. “But after more than five months now, we have lost a lot of our loved ones, and virtually lost the life in our hometown,” he said.

Thousands of families in the district of Abs have been forced to leave their homes in search of safety elsewhere. Ali Yahya, a resident of Abs who works as a volunteer for aid agencies in the district, said that the situation in both Abs and Haradh is catastrophic amid daily airstrikes and artillery barrages.

“Most of the basic infrastructure in Abs and Haradh have been bombed; life has become difficult here,” said Yahya, noting that at least 17,000 local residents have been internally displaced. “There are two camps for IDPs in Bani Hassan area, some three kilometers from Abs”

According to several local residents, the water factory shelling was one of the most egregious examples of indiscriminate airstrikes they have seen since March 29, when the Saudi warplanes began to strike in and around Abs district, three days after the start of their aerial campaign in Sanʻa.

Al-Sham Factory, which used to produce large amounts of drinking water bottles, was totally destroyed by a predawn airstrike. “The entire factory was set on fire, engulfed in flames for several hours,” said the owner of the factory, Ali Rozoum.

“It is an overwhelming disaster to almost everyone in the area; thirteen local workers have just been killed all at once.”

September 8-17: Marib offensive heats up, PM returns to Aden

Following the breakdown of UN-backed talks in the Omani capital, Muscat, the envoy to Yemen has urged the warring parties to return to the table to end the six-month conflict. Exiled President Hadi and his government in Riyadh announced Sunday that they will not participate in the upcoming UN peace talks, although the UN Envoy Ould Sheikh Ahmed earlier welcomed the warring parties’ readiness.  

In a statement, Ahmed said that the Houthi and GPC representatives “have shown a great degree of flexibility” during the recent talks held for weeks in Muscat.

Hadi’s announcement came one day after the Saudi-led coalition’s own forces have mounted a fresh offensive in the oil-rich province of Marib, along with trained local tribal fighters.

It’s been five days now since the launch of Marib Offensive, although clashes have reportedly been taking place in the southeastern areas of Marib since last Tuesday, when the Hadi-allied forces along with dozens of armored vehicles were sent from the eastern area of Safer to the headquarters of the 3^rd Military Region and an allied military base nearby.

The southern and western areas have seen attack-and-retreat fighting, with troops from the coalition forces trying to advance eastward to al-Jufaina and al-Fow areas, while others are trying to regain Dhat al-Ra’, where the tribal encampments of both Nakhla and al-Suahil are held by the pro-Houthi forces.  Pro-Houthi forces have been trying to fend off any advancement of their opponents, reportedly using BM-22 rocket launchers against coalition armored vehicles. They claim to have destroyed more than 20 armored vehicles in addition to killing and arresting several troops from the coalition forces.

The UAE government has officially announced that one Emirati soldier was killed in Marib fighting, days after it said that the death toll of its soldiers, who killed by the ballistic missile attack on September 4 in Marib had risen to 52 soldiers. While Qatar’s government has not yet commented officially, Houthi-affiliated media claim that a senior Qatari officer was killed.

The coalition’s fighter jets and Apache helicopters were providing air support/cover in Marib fighting and targeted any suspected movement by the pro-Houthi forces in areas located on the borderlines with Shabwa, al-Baydha and al-Jawf provinces. The warplanes also destroyed the road connecting Marib to the capital, San’a, after it was reportedly designated (by the Popular Resistance) as a military target.

The fighter jets also hit residential areas in several cities and towns, killing dozens of civilians, mostly children and women. On Tuesday alone, at least 10 cities were hit by airstrikes; over a hundred civilians were reportedly killed and wounded. The six-month war has killed more than 4,500 Yemenis and brought the country to the brink of famine.

Across the Saudi border, pro-Houthi units have killed several Saudi soldiers and captured military bases in Najran, Jaizan and Aseer cities. The Saudi government announced that five soldiers were killed in Najran.

Meanwhile, Vice President and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah arrived in Aden along with seven ministers from the government in exile. This second appearance since his first brief visit on the first of August comes as a step toward restoring a government after months of working from exile Riyadh. "Khaled Bahah and the ministers who arrived with him are in Aden to stay permanently," said exiled government spokesman Rajeh Badi.

September 1–7: Airstrikes intensify after Marib missile attack

The UN-backed talks in the Omani capital, Muscat, have failed to bring Yemen’s warring parties any closer to an agreement; pro-Houthi/Saleh units have launched another short-range ballistic missile, killing dozens of Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini troops in Marib, while other units continued to attack Saudi military installations across the border; the coalition has again intensified its airstrikes on Sanʻa and other cities in what has been seen as retaliation for the ballistic missile attack; two brigades of soldiers from Saudi-led coalition have been deployed in Aden; Qatari troops have reportedly joined the battle; fighting in the central governorates of Taʻiz, Ibb, and al-Baydha has been raging on since early last week. Last week, Yemeni political representatives, involved in weeks-long negotiations in Muscat, heatedly debated the seven-point proposal on the table. The Houthis and their allies put forth an initiative, seen as a concession and an alternative to the seven-point proposal, which requires them to implement UNSC resolution 2216 immediately. The initiative includes a number of points, the most important of which is the return of the exiled government to Sanʻa for 90 days. As a result, the negotiations have hit a stumbling block once again. On Monday, September 7, the Houthi and GPC delegates returned to Sanʻa, while reports indicate that disputes among members of the exiled government have started to appear on the surface.

On Friday, another short-range ballistic missile was fired by pro-Houthi/Saleh units toward a camp, some 25 km from Marib city, where coalition forces were deployed as a prelude to an assault on Sanʻa via Marib. The missile attack killed 45 Emirati soldiers, 10 Saudis, and five Bahrainis, in addition to tribal fighters allied with the coalition. The attack came two days after the Chief of Staff and the Interior Minister of the exiled government came to Safer area of Marib. On the day of the attack, the Chief of Staff was reportedly sacked.

The Saudi-led coalition has intensified the aerial bombardment on Sanʻa and other cities, killing scores of civilians. At least 10 cities and towns have been hit over the past week. Since Friday, at least 27 were reportedly killed in Sanʻa alone.

The coalition has deployed 8,000 additional troops in the southern port city of Aden. A brigade including 5,000 Southern Resistance fighters has been reportedly dissolved, after mutiny erupted and the commander was seriously injured. One thousand Qatari troops have also been sent to Yemen, while Sudanese forces are reportedly being prepared to be sent as well.

August 25–31: Fighting rages on in Hudaydah, Ta‘iz, Marib, and Shabwah

As another month of war comes to a close, a peaceful resolution to Yemen’s conflict is no closer. UN-backed talks in the Omani capital, Muscat, seem to be doomed to failure; a Scud missile, reportedly fired from Yemen’s capital towards the Saudi city of Jaizan, was seen as a sign of determination and a message of defiance from the Houth-Saleh alliance; a fresh battle is taking shape in al-Hudaydah; Houthis and their allies have regained more positions in Taʻiz; troops from the Saudi-led coalition, deployed recently in Marib, have already advanced on Shabwah and will return to the neighboring governorates of Marib and al-Jawf ahead of the expected Sanʻa battle, while a brigade involving at least 5000 troops from the Southern Popular Resistance in Aden city has been formed to take charge of the city’s security. At least eight cities have been hit by the airstrikes over the past week, where scores of civilians have reportedly been killed, while Houthi-Saleh units continued to intensify their cross-border attacks on Saudi army installations. The UN special envoy, currently based in Muscat, has been pushing for a political settlement since early last week, but the exiled government in Riyadh is sticking to its previous demand that the Houthis withdraw from occupied cities and hand over their arms prior to any further negotiations. The Houthis, however, warned they would carry out “a disastrous response” if the Muscat talks failed. On Wednesday, a Scud missile was fired from Sanʻa, targeting a power plant in the Saudi city of Jaizan.

In the western coastal governorate of al-Hudaydah, clashes erupted in the southern town of al-Durayhimi between tribal fighters from the Zaraniq tribe and Houthis as they were trying to send reinforcement to Taʻiz. Houthi forces seem poised to take control of the road to Taʻiz, where they have also retaken some western districts.

In the southeastern province of Shabwah, Apache helicopters were seen supporting the Saudi-led coalition forces that advanced to liberate the area late on Friday. Dozens of Houthis were reportedly killed. But in the neighboring governorate of Marib, fighting escalated over the weekend, with the Houthis gaining ground after reportedly using rockets and missiles in the battle.

United States Policy & Yemen's Armed Conflict

The Yemen Peace Project (YPP), in partnership with Resonate! Yemen and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, has published a new report entitled United States Policy & Yemen’s Armed Conflict. The report examines the events leading up to the outbreak of the conflict in early 2015, assesses the successes and shortcomings of US foreign policy before and during the conflict, and presents realistic recommendations for a more peaceful and constructive American approach to Yemen’s crisis. The report focuses on five specific policy areas: diplomatic engagement, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, security and counterterrorism, and assistance to US citizens in Yemen, and it concludes with a set of additional recommendations for constructive US involvement in Yemen’s eventual post-conflict reconstruction effort. You can read the executive summary and priority recommendations below, and download the full report here (PDF). النسخة العربية

Executive Summary

In March of this year, long-simmering regional and political tensions exploded into a full-fledged armed conflict in Yemen, with the Houthi movement and military forces loyal to former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh fighting for control of the country’s major cities and key provinces. Arrayed against the Houthi-Saleh alliance are local militias allied with President ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his government-in-exile, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, armed elements of the Southern Movement (al-Hirak), army units tied to General ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and the Islah Party, several powerful tribes, and an assortment of salafi and jihadi factions.

To date, more than 4,300 Yemenis have been killed in this conflict; at least half of these have been civilians. More than 1.4 million civilians have been forced to flee their homes. Most of the civilian casualties are the result of illegal indiscriminate attacks, carried out by both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi-Saleh alliance.

Although the United States has not committed combat forces to the conflict, it is playing an important role. On the diplomatic front, the United States has played an important and laudable role in working to bring the warring parties to the table. The Obama administration must now work with Yemen’s neighbors and the rest of the international community to establish secure routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid, push for an end to hostilities, reach an internationally-supported political settlement, and build a comprehensive material and economic reconstruction plan. The US must also work with other members of the United Nations Security Council, which has been circumvented by the Saudi-led coalition, to ensure that any further military intervention in Yemen complies with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

In contrast to its constructive diplomatic efforts, many of the US administration’s other activities and policies are contributing to the perpetuation of the conflict and the destabilization of Yemen. US military and intelligence personnel are supporting the Saudi-led coalition’s ongoing campaign of aerial bombardment, which has violated international humanitarian law by deliberately targeting civilian residences and infrastructure, and by failing to protect civilians from harm.

The United States has also continued to carry out its own airstrikes against suspected members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), killing at least 76 people in 2015. US counterterrorism efforts in Yemen have long attracted criticism for their emphasis on “kinetic” tactics—missile strikes and armed assaults on AQAP targets—rather than programs that address the causes and facilitating factors of extremism and violence. As the balance of power within Yemen changes, US strikes risk further destabilizing the situation, and contributing to militant groups’ recruitment efforts.

Yemen was already facing a humanitarian emergency before the present conflict broke out. Today the country is in the midst of a full-blown catastrophe. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), more than 80% of Yemen’s population is in need of some form of assistance. Millions of Yemenis are suffering from food insecurity and a lack of clean water; famine is just around the corner. Meanwhile, Yemen’s health care system has collapsed, and thousands of Yemenis are dying for lack of access to medicine and treatment. The UN’s emergency appeal for Yemen is only 18% funded. Early in the conflict Saudi Arabia pledged to cover the entirety of the previous appeal; none of the promised funds have been delivered. Both the coalition and the Houthi-Saleh alliance are preventing aid from reaching civilians, in violation of international law. Despite the presence of several US warships in the Gulf of Aden, the US has failed to assist in the evacuation of US citizens and other foreign nationals from Yemen, as required by a recent UNSC resolution.

Priority Recommendations

Diplomatic engagement:

• The US must urge Saudi Arabia and its allies to end their military intervention, and insist that any further international involvement in the conflict adhere to the restrictions of the UN Charter and international law. The US should push for a new UNSC resolution to that end.
• The US must work toward the inclusion of all parties and factions, including nonstate fighting groups, in the peace process. The participation of such groups in negotiations is essential to a lasting peace.
• The US must actively engage with regional actors outside the GCC—most importantly Iran—and with other global powers, with the aims of discouraging proxy support for factions in Yemen’s internal conflicts and creating a regional and international structure of support for an eventual peace agreement.

 Military intervention:

• The US must immediately suspend its logistical and technical support for Saudi and coalition airstrikes, which do not meet legal standards regarding the protection of civilians or distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and halt any pending transfers of ordnance or other materiel to coalition states.
• The US must take all measures at its disposal to discourage unlawful attacks against Yemeni civilians, or military actions which place civilians at undue risk.

Humanitarian assistance:

• The US must act immediately to fund the UN’s humanitarian response plan, and to help establish safe routes for the delivery of aid.
• The US must urge Saudi Arabia to deliver the funds it has already pledged for humanitarian assistance, and allow UNOCHA to determine where and how those funds are used.
• The US must urge the Houthi-Saleh alliance, as well as the Saudi-led coalition, to allow the free passage and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Security and counterterrorism:

• The United States must suspend its targeted killing program immediately, and put in place a system to evaluate the program’s effectiveness, as well as the potential effectiveness of alternative, non-kinetic programs.
• The White House, intelligence community, Department of State, and Department of Defense must establish a counterterrorism strategy prioritizing non-military solutions to long-term challenges.
• The Department of Defense must evaluate the effectiveness of past military aid to Yemen, and tie any future assistance to real institutional reforms.

Assistance to US citizens:

• State Department and military officials must take all possible measures to ensure the safe evacuation of any remaining US citizens who wish to leave the country, and ensure that citizens and their family members who have left Yemen already—many of whom are now in Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, or elsewhere in the region—are quickly and safely transported to the US.

Additional recommendations are included in the Policy Assessment and Recommendations section of the full report.

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سياسة الولايات المتحدة والصراع المسلح في اليمن

ملخص تنفيذي

في أواخر شهر مارس من هذا العام، أفضى التوتر السياسي الإقليمي المتأجج مُنذُ فترة طويلة إلى صراع مسلح شامل في اليمن ضد حركة الحوثيين والقوات المسلحة الموالية للرئيس السابق علي عبدالله صالح الذين يقاتلون في سبيل السيطرة على المدن الرئيسية والأقاليم الأهم في البلاد. وفي مواجهة تحالف الحوثي وصالح تشكل تحالف عربي بقيادة المملكة العربية السعودية ودولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة وعناصر مسلحة أخرى موالية للرئيس الحالي عبدربه منصور هادي وحكومته في الخارج، من الحراك الجنوبي ووحدات مسلحة تنتمي لحزب الإصلاح والجنرال علي محسن الأحمر وعديد القبائل ذات النفوذ وكذا جماعات متنوعة أخرى من فصائل السلفيين والجهاديين.

وحتى الآن، قُتل أكثر من 4,300 يمني في هذا الصراع ، نصفهم على الأقل من المدنيين؛ كما نزح أكثر من 1.4 مليون مواطن. وتعود الإصابات بين المواطنين إلى الهجمات غير القانونية التي لا تفرق بين المقاتلين والمدنيين و المُنفذة من طرفي الصراع، سواءً التحالف العربي أو تحالف الحوثي وصالح. وبالرغم من عدم التزام الولايات المتحدة بأي قوات مقاتلة في هذا الصراع، إلا أنها تعلب دوراً محورياً فيه. وعلى الصعيد الدوبلوماسي، لعبت الولايات المتحدة دوراً هاماً وواضحاً في إعادة أطراف الصراع إلى طاولة الحوار. وعليه، فإن على حكومة أوباما أن تعمل مع دول الجوار في اليمن وبقية المجتمع الدولي من أجل تأمين طرق إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية، وإنهاء الصراع، والتوصل إلى تسوية سياسية بدعم دولي، وكذا وضع خطة إعادة إعمار مادية واقتصادية شاملة. كما يتوجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل مع الدول الأعضاء في مجلس الأمن للأمم المتحدة، الذي تجاوزه التحالف العربي بقيادة السعودية، على ضمان أن أي تدخل عسكري آخر في اليمن سيكون وفقاً للفصل السابع في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة. وفي تناقض مع الجهود الدبلوماسية البناءة، تُساهم العديد من أنشطة وسياسات الإدارة الأمريكية في استمرار الصراع وزعزعة الأمن في اليمن. حيث تدعم الدوائر العسكري والاستخباراتية للولايات المتحدة الضربات الجوية التي يُنفذها التحالف العربي بقيادة السعودية في الوقت الراهن، والتي ارتكبت العديد من الاختراقات للقانون الإنساني الدولي عبر الاستهداف المتعمد للأحياء السكنية والبنى التحتية المدنية وكذا فشلها في حماية المدنين.

في حين استمرت الولايات المتحدة في تنفيذ ضرباتها الصاروخية ضد أعضاء مشتبهين من تنظيم القاعدة قُتل خلالها ما لا يقل عن 76 شخص في العام 2015 م، ولطالما جذبت جهود الولايات المتحدة لمكافحة الإرهاب في اليمن انتقادات لتركيزها على التكتيكات "الحركية" (“kinetic” tactics ) للضربات الصاروخية والهجمات المسلحة على مواقع القاعدة بدلاً من التركيز على البرامج التي تعالج الأسباب والعوامل المؤدية إلى التطرف والعنف. ونتيجة لتغير توازن القوى داخل اليمن، فإن الضربات الأمريكية قد تساهم في زعزعة استقرار الوضع وزيادة التجنيد في صفوف الجماعات المسلحة.وقبل إندلاع الصراع الراهن، كانت اليمن تواجه وضع إنساني حرج، الأمر الذي ترتب عليه حدوث كارثة إنسانية كبيرة في الوقت الحالي. ووفقاً لمكتب منسقية الأمم المتحدة للشئون الإنسانية (UNOCHA) فإن أكثر من 80% من إجمالي سكان اليمن في حاجة لشكل من أشكال المساعدة الإنسانية، ويعاني ملايين اليمنيين من إنعدام الأمن الغذائي والحاجة للمياة النظيفة؛ وتبدو البلاد على حافة الوقوع في مجاعة. في حين شهد النظام الصحي في اليمن إنهيار واضح، فإن آلاف اليمنيين يموتون بسبب القصور في تقديم الخدمات الطبية والعلاجية. كما أن نداء الطوارئ الذي قدمته الأمم المتحدة بخصوص دعم خطة الاستجابة الإنسانية في اليمن لم يتم تمويل سوى 18% منه. وفي بداية هذا الصراع تعهدت المملكة العربية السعودية بتغطية الخطة بشكل كامل؛ إلا أنها لم توفِ بذلك حتى الآن. بينما يعيق كلاً من التحالف العربي وتحالف الحوثي وصالح إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية للمدنيين في اختراق واضح للقانون الإنساني الدولي. وبالرغم من تواجد عدة سفن حربية تابعة للولايات المتحدة في خليج عدن، فشلت الولايات المتحدة في إخلاء المواطنين الأمريكيين والجنسيات الأخرى من اليمن، كما هو مطلوب في قرار مجلس الأمن الأخير.

توصيات متعلقة بالأولويات

التعامل الدبلوماسي: • على الولايات المتحدة حث المملكة العربية السعودية وحلفائها على إنهاء التدخل العسكري، والإصرار على أن يخضع أي تدخل دولي مستقبلي في اليمن لقيود القانون الدولي في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة. وعليه يتوجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تدفع نحو صياغة قرار صادر عن مجلس الأمن بهذا المحتوى. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل على إشراك كل الأحزاب والفصائل، بما فيها من جماعات مقاتلة غير حكومية، في عملية السلام. إن مشاركة كل هذه الجماعات في المفاوضات أمر محوري من أجل بناء سلام دائم. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل بشكل فعال مع اللاعبين الإقليميين خارج دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، إيران على وجه الخصوص، والقوى الدولية الأخرى للحد من تغذية أطراف الصراع الداخلي في اليمن والسعي لإيجاد إطار إقليمي ودولي يفضي إلى إتفاق سلمي نهائي.

التدخل العسكري: • على الولايات المتحدة تعليق دعمها الفني واللوجستي لضربات التحالف العربي الجوية التي لا تتوافق مع المعايير القانونية فيما يخص حماية المدنيين أو التمييز بين الأفراد المحاربين من غيرهم، وإيقاف أي تحويلات معلقة من الذخائر أو المواد الأخرى لدول التحالف. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تتخذ جميع التدابير المتاحة لديها للحد من الهجمات غير القانونية ضد المدنيين اليمنيين، أو الأعمال العسكرية التي تعرض المدنيين لخطر لا مبرر له.

المساعدة الإنسانية: • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل فورا على تمويل خطة الاستجابة الإنسانية للأمم المتحدة، والمساعدة في تأمين طرق إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية. • على الولايات المتحدة حث المملكة العربية السعودية على الإيفاء بما تعهدت به من تمويل لخطة الاستجابة الإنسانية، والسماح لمنسقية الأمم المتحدة للشئون الإنسانية (UNOCHA) بتحدد كيف وأين يستخدم هذا التمويل. • على الولايات المتحدة حث تحالف الحوثي وصالح، والتحالف العربي أيضاً، على تأمين ممر حر والسماح بتوزيع المساعدات الإنسانية.

الأمن ومكافحة الإرهاب: • ينبغي على الولايات المتحدة تعليق برنامجها "القتل المستهدف"" targeted killing" على الفور، ووضع نظاماً لتقييم فعالية البرنامج، فضلا عن الفعالية المحتملة من البرامج البديلة، برامج"غير الحركية""“non-kinetic. • يتعين على البيت الأبيض، ومجتمع الاستخبارات، وزارة الخارجية، وزارة الدفاع وضع استراتيجية لمكافحة الإرهاب وإعطاء الأولوية للحلول غير العسكرية للتحديات طويلة المدى. • ينبغي على وزارة الدفاع تقييم فعالية المساعدات العسكرية السابقة لليمن، وربط أي مساعدة مستقبلية بإصلاحات مؤسسية حقيقية.

مساعدة مواطني الولايات المتحدة: • ينبغي على وزارة الخارجية والمسئولين العسكريين اتخاذ جميع التدابير الممكنة لضمان الإخلاء الآمن لأي من مواطني الولايات المتحدة المتبقين والراغبون في مغادرة البلاد، وضمان نقلهم وأفراد أسرهم الذين غادروا اليمن سابقاً، والذين لا يزالون حتى الآن في جيبوتي أو مصر أو في أي مكان آخر في المنطقة، على وجه السرعة وبشكل آمن إلى الولايات المتحدة.

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