Implementation Mechanism of the GCC Agreement

Although the GCC agreement was signed in Riyadh almost three months ago, most people have never seen a full text of the document, or of the implementation mechanism that was signed with it. Newspapers have only published quotations or summaries. Thanks to our friend in San`a, Abdulaziz al-Sakkaf, we're able to finally publish here the official English translation of the Implementation Mechanism. I plan to provide some commentary on this at some point, but for now, the document is here for all to read. Translated from Arabic

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Contents:

Part I. Introduction

Part II. The transition period

Part III. First phase of the transition

Part IV. Second phase of the transfer of power

Part V . Settlement of disputes

Part VI. Concluding provisions

Annex: Draft Presidential Decree

Part I. Introduction

1. The two parties recognize that

(a) As a result of the deadlock in the political transition, the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation has deteriorated with increasing rapidity and the Yemeni people have suffered great hardship;

(b) Our people, including youth, have legitimate aspirations for change; and

(c) This situation requires that all political leaders should fulfil their responsibilities towards the people by immediately engaging in a clear process for transition to good democratic governance in Yemen.

2. The two parties deeply appreciate the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its Secretary-General, the United Nations Secretary General acting through his Special Adviser, the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and those of the GCC and the European Union, to support an agreement on the peaceful transfer of power. The two parties adopt this Mechanism on the basis of the GCC initiative and fully in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2014 (2011).

3. The following definitions shall apply in relation to this Agreement:

(a) The term "GCC Initiative" refers to the GCC initiative to resolve the Yemeni crisis in the draft of 21 and 22 May 2011;

(b) The term "the Mechanism" refers to this Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the GCC Initiative;

(c) The term "the two parties" refers to the National Coalition (General People’s Congress and its allies) as one party, and the National Council (Joint Meeting Parties their partners) as the other.

4. The GCC Initiative and the Mechanism shall supersede any current constitutional or legal arrangements. They may not be challenged before the institutions of the State.

Part II. The transition period

5. The two parties acknowledge that under Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, the President of Yemen irrevocably delegated to the Vice-President the presidential powers to negotiate, sign and bring into force this Mechanism, along with all constitutional powers pertaining to its implementation and follow-up. Those powers include calling for early elections and taking all of the decisions necessary to form a government of national unity, including swearing in its members, as well as establishing the other bodies set forth in this Mechanism.

6. The transition period shall enter into effect as follows:

(a) In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2014 (2011), which notes the commitment by the President of Yemen to immediately sign the GCC Initiative and encourages him, or those authorized to act on his behalf, to do so, and to implement a political settlement based upon it, and in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, the President or the Vice-President acting on his behalf shall sign the GCC Initiative concurrently with the signature of this Mechanism by the two parties.

(b) Concurrently with the signing of this Mechanism, and acting under the powers delegated by the President in Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, the Vice-President shall issue a decree providing for early presidential elections to be held within 90 days of the entry into force of this Mechanism. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the decree shall enter into force 60 days before the elections. The draft text of the Decree is annexed to this Mechanism (Annex 1).

(c) This Mechanism shall enter into force when the President or Vice-President has signed the GCC Initiative, all parties have signed this Mechanism in accordance with this paragraph, and the decree referred to in subparagraph (b) above has been issued.

7. The transition period shall begin with the entry into force of this Mechanism. The transition period shall then consist of two phases:

(a) The first phase shall begin with the entry into force of this Mechanism and end with the inauguration of the President following the early presidential elections;

(b) The second phase, which shall last for two years, shall begin with the inauguration of the President following the early presidential elections. It shall end with the holding of general elections in accordance with the new Constitution and the inauguration of the new President of the Republic.

8. During the first and second stages of the transition, decisions of Parliament shall be taken by consensus. If consensus on any given topic cannot be reached, the Speaker of Parliament shall refer the matter for decision by the Vice-President in the first phase, or the President in the second phase. That decision shall be binding for the two parties.

9. The two parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Parliament adopts the legislation and other laws necessary for the full implementation of commitments in respect of the guarantees set forth in the GCC Initiative and this Mechanism.

Part III. First phase of the transitional period

Formation of the government of national unity

10. Immediately on entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the opposition shall nominate its candidate for the post of Prime Minister. The Vice-President shall issue a presidential decree requesting that person to form a government of national unity. The government of national unity shall be formed within 14 days of the issuance of the decree. A republican decree shall be issued to that effect and signed by the Vice-President and Prime Minister;

(a) Each party shall account for 50 per cent of nominees for the government of national unity, and due consideration shall be given to the representation of women. With regard to the distribution of portfolios, one of the two parties shall prepare two lists of ministries and transmit them to the other party, which shall have the right to choose one of the lists.

(b) The Prime Minister-designate shall appoint the members of the government as proposed by the two parties. The Vice-President shall then issue a decree setting forth the agreed names of the cabinet members. Nominees shall have a high standard of accountability and commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law.

11. The members of the government shall take the constitutional oath before the Vice-President. Within ten days, the government of national unity shall submit its programme to Parliament for a vote of confidence within five days.

Functioning of the government of national unity

12. The government of national unity shall take its decisions by consensus. If there is no full consensus on any given matter, the Prime Minister shall consult with the Vice-President or, after the early presidential elections, the President, in order to reach consensus. If consensus between them is not possible, the Vice-President or, after the early presidential elections, the President, shall take the final decision.

13. Immediately after its formation, the government of national unity shall

(a) Take the necessary steps, in consultation with the other relevant actors, to ensure the cessation of all forms of violence and violations of humanitarian law; end the confrontation of armed forces, armed formations, militias and other armed groups; ensure their return to barracks; ensure freedom of movement for all through the country; protect civilians; and take the other necessary measures to achieve peace and security and extend State control;

(b) Facilitate and secure humanitarian access and delivery wherever it is needed;

(c) Issue appropriate legal and administrative instructions for all branches of the State sector to comply immediately with standards of good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

(d) Issue specific legal and administrative instructions to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the police, prisons and security forces to act in accordance with the law and international standards, and to release those unlawfully detained;

(e) The government of national unity shall comply with all resolutions of the Security Council and Human Rights Council and with the relevant international norms and conventions.

Powers of the Vice-President and government of national unity

14. In implementing this Mechanism, the Vice-President shall exercise the following constitutional powers, in addition to those appertaining to his office:

(1) Convening early presidential elections; (2) Exercising all functions of the President in respect of Parliament; (3) Announcing the formation of, and swearing in, the government of national unity in the first phase; (4) All functions relating to the work of the Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability; (5) Managing foreign affairs to the extent necessary for the implementation of this Mechanism; (6) Issuing the decrees necessary for the implementation of this Mechanism.

15. In the first phase, the Vice-President and government of national unity shall exercise executive authority encompassing all matters pertaining to this Agreement, including the following, acting in conjunction with Parliament where appropriate:

(a) Formulating and implementing an initial programme of economic stabilization and development and addressing the immediate needs of the population in all regions of Yemen;

(b) Coordinating relations with development donors;

(c) Ensuring that governmental functions, including local government, are fulfilled in an orderly manner in accordance with the principles of good governance, rule of law, human rights, transparency and accountability;

(d) Approving an interim budget, supervising the administration of all aspects of State finance and ensuring full transparency and accountability;

(e) Taking the necessary legislative and administrative steps to ensure that presidential elections are held within 90 days of the entry into force of this Mechanism;

(f) Establishing the following institutions as provided for by this Mechanism:

(1) Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability;

(2) Conference for National Dialogue.

(g) The government of national unity and the Vice-President shall immediately establish a liaison committee to engage effectively with youth movements from all parties in the squares and elsewhere in Yemen, to disseminate and explain the terms of this Agreement; initiate an open conversation about the future of the country, which will be continued through the comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue; and involve youth in determining the future of political life.

Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability

16. Within five days of the entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the Vice- President in the first transitional phase shall establish and chair a Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability. The Committee shall work to

(a) End the division in the armed forces and address its causes;

(b) End all of the armed conflicts;

(c) Ensure that the armed forces and other armed formations return to their camps; end all armed presence in the capital Sana'a and other the cities; and remove militias and irregular armed groups from the capital and other cities;

(d) Remove road blocks, checkpoints and improvised fortifications in all governorates;

(e) Rehabilitate those who do not meet the conditions for service in the military and security forces;

(f) Take any other measures to reduce the risk of armed confrontation in Yemen.

17. During the two transitional phases, the Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability shall also work to create the necessary conditions and take the necessary steps to integrate the armed forces under unified, national and professional leadership in the context of the rule of law.

Early presidential elections

18.(*) The early presidential elections shall be held in accordance with the following provisions:

(*) Translator's note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 20 in the original Arabic text.

(a) The elections shall take place within 90 days of the signature of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism;

(b) The early elections for the post of President shall be organized and supervised by the Higher Commission for Elections and Referendums using the current register of voters on an exceptional basis. Any citizen, male or female, who has attained the legal age for voting and can establish as much on the basis of an official document such as a birth certificate or national identity card, shall have the right to vote on the basis of that document;

(c) The sides commit not to nominate or endorse any candidate for the early presidential elections except for the consensus candidate Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi;

(d) The Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to provide and coordinate electoral assistance to help ensure the orderly and timely holding of elections.

Part IV. Second phase of the transfer of power

Functions and powers of the President and government of national unity

19.(†) After the early Presidential elections, the newly elected President and the Government of national unity shall exercise all of their customary functions as set forth in the Constitution. In addition, they shall exercise the powers necessary to continue the tasks specified for the implementation of the first phase, and additional tasks specified for the second phase of the transfer of power. The latter include

(†) Translator's note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 21 in the original Arabic text.

(a) Ensuring that the Conference for National Dialogue is convened, and forming a preparatory committee for the Conference, as well as an Interpretation Committee and other bodies established pursuant to this Mechanism;

(b) Establishing a process of constitutional reform that will address the structure of the State and the political system, and submitting the amended Constitution to the Yemeni people in a referendum;

(c) Reforming the electoral system; and

(d) Holding elections for Parliament and the Presidency in accordance with the new Constitution.

Conference for National Dialogue

20.(‡) With the beginning of the second transitional phase, the President-elect and the government of national unity shall convene a comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue for all forces and political actors, including youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other political parties, civil society representatives and women. Women must be represented in all participating groups.

(‡) Translator's note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 18 in the original Arabic text.

21.(§)The Conference shall discuss the following issues:

(§) Translator's note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 19 in the original Arabic text.

(a) The process of drafting the Constitution, including the establishment of a Constitutional Drafting Commission and its membership;

(b) Constitutional reform, addressing the structure of the State and political system, and submitting constitutional amendments to the Yemeni people through a referendum;

(c) The dialogue shall address the issue of the South in a manner conducive to a just national solution that preserves the unity, stability and security of Yemen.

(d) Examination of the various issues with a national dimension, including the causes of tension in Saada;

(e) Taking steps towards building a comprehensive democratic system, including reform of the civil service, the judiciary and local governance;

(f) Taking steps aimed at achieving national reconciliation and transitional justice, and measures to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law do not occur in future;

(g) The adoption of legal and other means to strengthen the protection and rights of vulnerable groups, including children, as well as the advancement of women;

(h) Contributing to determining the priorities of programmes for reconstruction and sustainable economic development in order to create job opportunities and better economic, social and cultural services for all.

Constitutional Commission

22. The government of national unity shall establish a Constitutional Commission immediately on the conclusion of the work of the Conference of National Dialogue within six months. The Commission shall prepare a new draft constitution within three months of the date of its establishment. It shall propose the necessary steps for the draft constitution to be discussed and submitted for referendum in order to ensure broad popular participation and transparency.

Organization of elections under the new Constitution

23. Within three months of the adoption of the new Constitution, Parliament shall enact a law convening national parliamentary elections and, if provided for by the Constitution, presidential elections. The Higher Commission for Elections and Referendums shall be reconstituted and the new register of voters re-compiled in accordance with the new Constitution. That law will be subject to subsequent review by the newly elected Parliament.

24. The term of the President elected under paragraph 7 of this Mechanism shall end upon the inauguration of the President elected under the new Constitution.

Part V. Settlement of disputes

25. Within 15 days of the entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the Vice- President and the Prime Minister of the government of national unity shall form an Interpretation Committee to which the two parties shall refer in order to resolve any dispute regarding the interpretation of the GCC Initiative or the Mechanism.

Part VI. Concluding provisions

26. Women shall appropriately represented in all of the institutions referred to in this Mechanism.

27. The Government shall provide adequate funding for the institutions and activities established by this Mechanism.

28. In order to ensure the effective implementation of this Mechanism, the two parties call on the States members of the GCC and the United Nations Security Council to support its implementation. They further call on the States members of the GCC, the permanent members of the Security Council, the European Union and its States members to support the implementation of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

29. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is called upon to provide continuous assistance, in cooperation with other agencies, for the implementation of this Agreement. He is also requested to coordinate assistance from the international community for the implementation of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

30. The following are invited to attend the signature of this Mechanism: the Secretary-General of the GCC and the Secretary-General of the United Nations or their representatives, as well as the representatives of the States members of the GCC, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union and the League of Arab States.

(Signatures and dates)

Annex

Exercising(**) the authority conferred on me by the President under Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, I hereby solemnly convene elections for the office of President of the Republic to be held on 00/00/2012. This Decree is deemed to be in force from today, and the convening of elections contained therein is irrevocable. The convening of elections shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Mechanism, without any need for any further steps, sixty days before the holding of elections as set forth in the Mechanism.

** Translator's note: On the basis of the unofficial English translation, the following may be missing from the Arabic text:

" Annex: Decree issued by the Vice-President concurrently with the signature of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

The Vice-President of the Republic, acting under to the authority conferred on him by the President under Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011."

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette.

AQAP turns three, still sucks

Today is the three-year anniversary of the formation of al-Qa‘idah in the Arabian Peninsula  (AQAP, formally Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-‘Arab), created by the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni AQ affiliates in 2009. Jihadologist Aaron Zelin (@azelin) has found this statement, written by an AQAP supporter on an online forum, celebrating the anniversary. I'm posting the link here to remind everyone what a despicable and morally corrupt bunch of bastards the AQAP leadership is, and because most mainstream media pieces on Yemen, though obsessive about the threat of terrorism, give no insight into the actual motivations and beliefs of these "terrorists" (note that in the statement in question, the epithet is self-applied).

While not an official statement, this document reflects in both content and form statements that have been released over the years by the organization's official media organs (you can read two such statements, sloppily translated by yours truly, here and here). Though we should always be mindful of the gap between rhetoric and motivation--whether reading the statements of politicians, jihadists, or even revolutionaries--there is insight to be gained here about how AQAP thinks about itself and its mission. This is particularly important now, as the spread of apparently AQAP-affiliated groups in certain parts of Yemen shows that some part of the group's political ideology, if not its religious philosophy, resonates with an increasingly wide segment of Yemen's population.

I have friends in Yemen who swear that AQAP is a phantom, conjured, funded, and controlled by elements of ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh's regime, and that it will evaporate once the regime is gone. I respectfully disagree. This is an attractive theory, but I think it overstates the power of the regime. Since the 1970s, Yemen has been home to a wide variety of Islamist activists and jihadists. Many of these have found themselves on the government's payroll at one time or another. The individuals and groups that became al-Qa‘idah in Yemen and later AQAP include some of these, and some of them doubtless still have ties to Saleh and/or other powerful officials (including Saleh's now arch nemesis, ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar). This does not mean that anyone in the regime can control these militants. President Saleh has absolutely manipulated the threat of AQAP and has played games with AQAP and with the US government in its pursuit of AQAP, but Saleh is not pulling all the strings here.

I'm confident that AQAP will continue to exist once Saleh is gone. The big question is how many Yemenis will continue to be sympathetic to the group's message. In the late 1990s, most Yemenis mocked and reviled AQ and groups like it. The present surge in sympathy and popularity is mostly due to two things: the desperation of the Yemeni people in the face of a stubborn regime and an ineffectual government, and the escalating--and escalatingly idiotic--US counter-terror operations. Of course, the vast majority of Yemenis are still opposed to AQAP, but the increase in the organization's ranks will be reversed only if the new Yemeni government can get its act together AND the US can develop a more rational and constructive way to combat terrorism and extremism.

(There's a third cause as well, but it's related to the other two: money. It seems that the new AQAP-affiliate groups, like the one now operating in Rada‘ under the leadership of Tariq al-Dhahab, are recruited and funded by local strongmen, and are probably the most lucrative source of employment available to many men. The ways this relates to good governance and good CT policy should be obvious.)

The current matter of AQAP or AQAP-ish groups taking over places like Rada‘ is one I will come back to later, but the larger point is clear: extremist militancy, like all of Yemen's other threats (hunger, poverty, unemployment, etc.), can only be solved by better governance and constructive international cooperation. The sentiments we read in the pro-AQAP statement above are as out of touch with Yemeni reality as the statements of the regime, and such ideas will get no traction in a Yemen where government responds to the needs of the people. As to how to build such a Yemen, well, we're still working on that.

Revolution in Their Eyes: New York edition, 1/27 - 6/30

This month the YPP will be bringing a selection of photographs from our exhibition "Revolution in Their Eyes" to the City University of New York (CUNY) in Manhattan.

The photographs will be displayed in the offices of CUNY's Middle East and Middle Eastern American Center (MEMEAC) for the entire spring semester.

Please join us for the opening reception on January 27, from 6:30pm - 8:30pm, hosted by MEMEAC.

Following the reception, YPP director Will Picard will host an informal gathering of New York-area Yemeni-American activists to discuss the state of the Yemeni revolution and the future of cooperation between activists in the US and Yemen. All are invited to join. For more information, please email Will Picard at picard@yemenpeaceproject.org.

For more info about the event, and directions to the CUNY Graduate Center, visit MEMEAC's website. You can also view event info and invite your friends on Facebook.

US Yemen policy: worse than you thought

Over the past few days, most Yemen-watchers (both Yemeni and foreign) on the internets have expressed dismay over the possibility that the United States would allow President/Former President/Honorary President 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh into this country. As of yesterday, if the New York Times' sources are to be believed, the Obama administration had as good as made up its security-addled mind to grant Saleh a visa "for legitimate medical treatment" in New York City. I've talked to a few people this week who don't understand why I think this is a terrible idea. If you're one of these people, I suggest you read Andrew Exum's post from last night on the subject, because I don't feel like repeating what's already been well said. The main points I'd like to make are that, while we all know by now that Obama's CT advisor John Brennan has more say on Yemen policy than the entire State Department, the US government has been pursuing a full-court press of stupidness when it comes to Yemen and Arabia in general, and that the administration is not prepared for the consequences of this stupidity.

On Friday and Saturday the Saleh regime's security forces attacked protesters who had made a five-day march from Ta‘iz to San‘a, killing at least 10 and injuring dozens. US Ambassador Gerald M. Feierstein decided this would be a good time to say publicly and on the record that the marchers were not, in fact, peaceful protesters, but agents of chaos and violence. Even for Yemenis accustomed to America's arrogance and wrongheadedness, this statement was shocking.

The administration officials quoted in the NYT article above are quick to blow off any suggested parallels between their decision to host Saleh now and the Carter administration's welcoming of the Shah of Iran in 1979. They've got all kinds of justifications for the decision, which might even sound convincing to some Americans. These justifications are misguided and dangerous. Let me spell this out in terms simple enough for John Brennan to understand: for 11 months, Yemenis have demanded the ouster of Saleh and the establishment of a democratic government. For 11 months, the US has refused to support those demands; has refused to condemn Saleh's murderous repression of his people; has tried to force unwelcome, Saudi-crafted false solutions down Yemen's throat; has repeatedly blamed protesters for the regime's violence against them; has continued to kill innocent Yemeni civilians in ill-conceived and poorly-executed CT efforts; has continued to support the regime's military; and now appears ready to allow Saleh to take a free vacation in New York while his children continue to murder Yemenis. In short, the Obama administration is treating the people of Yemen as The Enemy. Can any of us really expect Yemenis not to return the favor?

Mr. Brennan, how do you think this will end?

Houthi Expansion and Marginalization

For the second day in a row, we're pleased to offer a piece by PhD candidate and renowned Yemen-watcher Fernando Carvajal. This one covers recent developments in the far north, where the al-Huthi movement is facing battles on several fronts. One of the main issues prolonging Yemen’s instability beyond the recent GCC agreement on transition of power from President Saleh remains the unresolved conflict between Zaydi Houthi rebels and religio-political forces. This issue continues under reported inside and outside Yemen, with only a few videos found online and often brought to our attention by dedicated observers like Aaron Zelin (jihadology.net). The conflict is by no means new, nor confined to events related to the youth revolution, nor is it confined to the six wars fought between Houthis and government forces throughout the predominantly Zaydi northern territories of Saʻdah, al-Jawf and Harf Sufian.

Today’s conflict has reached a point beyond mere political positioning or demands over religious freedom. People still continue to debate its origins, whether it resulted from the new political alignments following the 1994 civil war giving the Sunni Islamists (al-Islah) a share of power, or from broken promises by the regime to the sons of Badr al-Din al-Houthi following the success of the 2000 Border Treaty with Saudi Arabia. Houthis, who were part of the military and ruling party, were instrumental in gaining the support of many Zaydi tribes along the border in order to ensure Saudi Arabia of stability along its southern flank, but in the past 11 years Zaydis had remained targets of Islah’s political agenda in Sanʻa which focused on a stronger hold for Sunni-based education nation-wide. In addition, Zaydis continued to face increasing pressure from Salafist groups bent on engaging Dawa (Calls to Islam) projects in predominantly Zaydi territories, such as the now four-decade-old Damaj ( Saʻdah) Dar al-Hadith center which is part of a major network of teaching centers around the country under the leadership of students of the late Shaykh Moqbil al-Wada’i.

Houthi rebels, led by Abd al-Malik b. Badr al-Din al-Houthi, are now engaged in what could be a war for survival. Following a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2010 the group still remains engaged in armed conflicts in al-Jawf (against Islahi tribesmen), in Saʻdah (vs Salafis in Damaj), in Hajja (against tribes that may offer government forces positions from which to attack Saʻdah) and unarmed conflicts with Islah within Change Square in Sanʻa since late April as they joined the physical occupation of the streets of Sanʻa in support of the Youth Revolution. As a result of their continued marginalization within the political process, Houthis have now moved to a strategy of expansion in order to produce a network of potential launching sites proving them with bargaining power. This expansion includes presence in southern areas as far as ‘Aden, and newly territories such as Rada which would allow them access to Dhamar, an area with Zaydi population. Such positions should be of interest since both Aden and Rada are major targets of Islah during the ten month long revolution and in a post-revolution electoral process as well. Rada has itself witnessed increasing clashes between tribes from al-Ghaysh, loyal to Islah and often associated with Salafist/AQ related training camps (this is where Anwar al-Awlaqi’s brother-in-law comes from as well). The government has so far failed to settle the security issues in Rada, even after visits with Ahmed Ali by the city’s major shaykhs, and while the population has so far remained in support of President Saleh they have threatened to withdraw their support if they have to engage Islahis on their own. Rada is far from joining Islah in a political agreement, and though we see pro-revolution demonstrations in Rada residents indicate they are often under guard of heavily armed men and of low numbers.

We must also keep in mind that the Houthi issue has remained outside the political negotiations that produced the GCC Initiative signed by President Saleh on Wednesday. The Zaydi group, often associated with Iranian elements based in the Yemen Affairs Offices in Tehran and Damascus, has been marginalized politically even though its leadership formed part of the high ranks of the military and were members of parliament. One reason given in Sanʻa for such marginalization has been the fact that there is no viable Zaydi political party active in the negotiations. Al-Haqq party, member of the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), is not recognized legally by the government. Leaders of al-Haqq party have often remain in conflict with the Houthi leadership, and the only contacts of influence for the Houthis have been with personalities outside Yemen that remain in direct conflict with the regime. Neither Mr. Hasan Zaid nor Dr. Mohamed Mutawakkil have been able to produce a rapprochement between the government and Houthis over the past seven years, even though they have full access to the leadership of al-Islah within the JMP that would allow Zaid and Mutawakkil to mediate between Islah and Houthis and pave the way to the end of confrontations with the government.

This week Aaron Zelin posted a video of Salafist shaykh Yahya al-Hajuri from YouTube (dated November 6th) encouraging jihad against the ‘drunk’ Houthis, while we read at the same time this week that Salafis in Damaj and Houthis had agreed to a ceasefire. Last week, before I left Sanʻa I also posted on twitter that Yemeni analysts had mentioned Saʻdah was probably the safest area in Yemen and its economy actually showed signs of growth at a time of complete economic stagnation in Yemen. The accusations against Houthis, which have previously included rapes and forced marriages, in the video of al-Hajuri seem out of place and beyond the Iranian-linked accusations. This conflict in Damaj should also be considered in relative terms and not as an all-out Salafi-Houthi conflict since most Salafis are pre-occupied with the ten-month-old political crisis as they position themselves in support of President Saleh and in direct opposition to Sunnis of al-Islah, mainly seen as Muslim Brothers and not Salafists. This conflict with al-Islah has resulted in a demonizing narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood as the new vanguard of al-Qaeda during sermons, Friday speeches at Sabaeen Stand, even radio talk shows in Sanʻa.

As if things were not yet confusing enough, the role of Saudi Arabia further complicates matters. After the outright failure of Saudi armed forces against Houthis along the border in 2009 the Kingdom had secretly established direct contact with Abd al-Malik al-Houthi and set up confidence building mechanisms in order to avoid clashes along the border. Things were then made more complicated as Gen. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, head of al-Firqa, reached an agreement with Houthis in March in order to prevent clashes between Houthis and Firqa in Saʻdah in order to focus on the political crisis, then he completely disengaged when he defected on 20 March to ‘protect’ the revolution. This situation handed Saʻdah to Houthis and saw the appointment of Faris Man’a, a weapons dealer, as de facto provincial governor. Firqa were withdrawn to the borders of Saʻdah, while Republican Guard forces remained beyond Firqa positions, and Houthis were allowed free movement while encircling Damaj district housing the salafis. All the meanwhile Houthis refused to withdraw from territory gained inside al-Jawf province, to the east of Saʻdah. Since the deals with KSA and Ali Muhsin only addressed the situation in Saʻdah Bakil confederation tribal forces loyal to al-Islah began to engage Houthis in al-Jawf under presumed patronage from KSA. Under Shaykh Ameen al-‘Ukaimi tribal forces had already taken control of al-Jawf and formed a Tribal Council in late March to substitute central government authority and declared their support for the Youth Revolution.

Saudi does not automatically support Salafis in Damaj. The relationship with al-Wada’i’s successor still remains fragile as result of conflicting agendas. It is unclear where Damaj-based Salafists obtain their funding, but they have managed to resist Houthi pressure this year. Houthis still face a long uphill battle in the post transition period, and it seems political actors are in no hurry to take on the issue any time soon. Failure to address the matter immediately will result in prolonged instability and force Houthis to find new staging points around the country in order to exert pressure on the interim government and potentially increasingly destabilize many regions as the 90 day deadline for elections approaches. We must wait to see which political actor assumes the mantel of mediator between Houthis and their religious and political rivals. Just as we see no alternatives for the post of Prime Minister and President in the coming weeks, it is difficult to think of one individual within the JMP or among the Zaydi community willing to take on this task. Also, the previous failure of Qatar to intervene in the matter removes potential international actors able to fill the vacuum. It would also be against Qatar’s interests to represent the Houthis at a time when their vested interests may rest only with Islah and Bayt al-Ahmar as reported by Yemeni journalists and analysts. Iran is often mentioned as a potential mediator, but as the international community continues its rhetoric against Iran vis-à-vis the nuclear issue and Syria’s revolution, it seems highly unlikely the interim government under al-Hadi and BaSundwa will accept any overtures from Tehran and endanger any relations with KSA, the US and the EU at a critical time.

He signed...now what?

We're honored once again to offer our readers a guest-post by University of Exeter PhD candidate and renowned Yemen-watcher Fernando Carvajal. I should probably stop calling them "guest-posts," though, since Fernando is responsible for more of our recent content than we are. This one offers some much-needed insight into the behind-the-scenes politics of the formation of the new unity government and the immediate future of Yemen after the signing of the infamous GCC agreement. Fernando prefaces his post with a phrase familiar to American readers: "Sic semper tyrannis"

So far this has been one of those intense weeks for Yemenis and our group of observers.  Events began to develop on Saturday November 19^th with news that UN Special Envoy Jamal Ben Omar would cancel a planned trip to Riyadh with Opposition leaders and representatives from president Saleh’s government, and instead would remain in Sana’a until the final deal would lead to agreement on the GCC Initiative introduced in April.  Ben Omar pressed both sides for a final agreement as the 30 day deadline imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2014 approached. This deadline would require Ben Omar to produce a report on the situation, which would not paint a favorable picture for President Saleh, who already began to feel the heat from calls to freeze his assets outside Yemen and impose sanctions on his relatives and government officials by activists like Tawakkol Karman and others online.  Such efforts against Saleh gained the ear of French officials who made their opinion public and threatened to act on sanctions if the stalemate and killings continued in Yemen.

As I left Yemen on Monday November 21^st it looked like I would miss another historic event this year, even though my Yemeni friends remained pessimistic about the president’s intentions.  On Wednesday, as I waited for my flight from London to Los Angeles I began to read the news that President Saleh had signed the GCC initiative in Riyadh, which was then followed by a series of signatures elsewhere of the documents containing amendments and additions to the initiative as agreed by the Joint Meeting Parties and government officials like FM Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Dr Abd al-Kareem al-Iryani.   As people in Sana’a informed me before my departure, two points were essential to ensuring signatures on both sides. First was the issue over immunity. Many people still think this only concerns President Saleh and his relatives, but indeed the deal includes immunity for about 16 major personalities directly involved in the conflict since February in areas like Aden, Arhab, Sana’a and Taiz.  All individuals involved in violent clashes with official posts are covered by the immunity deal, even so-called defectors who curiously enough have remained on official government payrolls since March 20^th.

Second, the Southern question had been a vital issue to address before any deal could be agreed. This was Dr. Yasin Saeed No’man’s main agenda.  Dr. No’man, head of the Yemen Socialist Party, has remained the primary face of the Southern issue since the failed National Dialogue process. Al-Harak, or Southern Movement, has been unable to become a legitimate representative of the South within political negotiations as an ‘unconstitutional’ entity.  This leaves Dr. No’man with the burden to carry on under pressure from the population in the South and obstacles created by ‘leaders’ in exile.  Dr. No’man, and his junior political allies within the JMP, had to press for the issue to be included in the agreement in order for it to remain in the agenda for the Dialogue process leading to the interim government. The issue had to be recognized within the agreement in order to marginalize any communiqué produced during the two day meeting of southern leaders in Cairo between November 21 and 22.  Fortunately for Dr. No’man the meeting in Cairo was a fiasco. Only a few activists attended the meeting and the few opted to continue supporting secession, moving away from loud voices supporting negotiations on the establishment of a Federal Republic, whose political entities are still debated inside and outside Yemen.  The matter remains highly volatile but at least the Southern question has not been completely ignored as the Houthi issue, which remains completely outside the political process today.

Finally, today we began to hear news of Mr. Mohammed BaSundwa as the most probable candidate from the JMP for the post of interim Prime Minister for the 90 day period under the GCC Initiative.  The Twitter-sphere also began to transmit opinions of many at Change Square who claimed BaSundwa was not the ideal candidate but would be acceptable, we assume this is the case for JMP youth, not independents who continue rejecting the legitimacy of the GCC deal.  I was told last weekend that the other two candidates would be Dr. Yasin No’man and Abd al-Wahhab al-Anesi of al-Islah.  The former would be the ideal candidate but Dr. No’man failed to accept President Saleh’s offer after 22 May 2010 and he would lose further credibility in the South by merely participating in the interim government.  People have hopes for No’man as a Prime Minister after the elections, not merely within the 90 day transition period.  Mr. al-Anesi would be problematic as a candidate since he is the head of al-Islah party, blamed for hijacking the youth revolution, and representing the old guard within the party with a more conservative image.  His candidacy would also represent Islah’s hegemony over the JMP and would raise red flags for the US and UK governments at a time when Islamist parties begin their ascent through the Arab Spring in North Africa.

As for Mr. BaSundwa, a former UN Ambassador and Foreign Minister under president Saleh, his candidacy appears the most appropriate for the interim period.  I spent my Fridays during Ramadan this year with him and a group of opposition personalities in Sana’a, where I had the opportunity to gain further insight into the complexities faced by the National Transition Council.  It was also a great opportunity for me to understand some of the personalities involved.  My most memorable exchange with Mr. BaSundwa and company was when I complained to the group about the Council’s holiday announcement. I was a bit harsh, in a diplomatic way, when I expressed my disgust of the idea that politicians could go on Eid holiday in the middle of a ‘revolution’ while youth remained at Change Square and Freedom Square away from their own families. Many agreed with me but at the end they said ‘this is Yemen’.  Mr. BaSundwa impressed me with his understanding of the crisis and international actors, but I have to say that we must keep our expectations low during his brief term in office.  His role will be to maintain the parties engaged, as he did during the National Dialogue process.  We must also keep in mind that his presence will not be well received by President Saleh, who still holds BaSundwa responsible for the direct attacks on him produced by the final communiqué from the Central Committee of the National Dialogue.  Saleh also opposed BaSundwa’s presence during the signing of the GCC Initiative in May.  We must also keep in mind that the interim government, if it includes BaSundwa, will actually be an ‘all Southern government’. Both VP al-Hadi and BaSundwa are southerners, and if we look at the overwhelming majority of Deputy Ministers they too are Southerners. We need to see who will be the new Vice President and how many Deputy Ministers are changed after the 90 day transition period.  I guess Hamid al-Ahmar will get his wish.

Some analysts in Sana’a also point to BaSundwa’s relations with Hamid al-Ahmar as a major point of friction between him and President Saleh.  After all these negative points against BaSundwa one may wonder why him?   We must keep in mind the process engaged in ending the nearly ten month long stalemate merely included regime actors, not the youth or groups beyond existing political parties.  Choices are few from within the political elite.  Many of us will agree this has been a direct negative consequence of the many opportunities missed by the independent youth to organize themselves and become active participants rather than marginalized and co-opted numbers contained by Firqa and al-Islah.  The major theme over the past ten months in Yemen has been the absence of viable alternatives.  None have surfaced, even from among the defectors, like Muhammad Abu Lahum of the Justice & Building Bloc or from within the newly announced Democratic Awakening Movement.  No individual or group has been able to challenge the JMP leadership, yes, not even Tawakkol Karman.  The lack of viable alternatives leaves the elite to negotiate among themselves and to proceed along expected political lines without any plans to change the status quo.

We must keep in mind that no political actor, not Abu Lahum or the Democratic Awakening, have produced any vision for progress following the transition process.  It is a shame that after ten months neither the government nor groups of activists have a program for constitutional reform, economic recovery or national reconciliation.  We are now in the days after the signature and since March all I hear is ‘the plan will come out after the signature, it will be ready’.  Well, where is it? As a foreigner I understand that my role should be limited to that of an observer, but after spending so much time with activists and government officials I cannot avoid asking such questions. I truly hope that some vision is announced within hours, otherwise the youth will find themselves having thrown away ten months of their lives for nothing.  Occupation of streets in Sana’a or Ta‘iz will mean nothing without a vision of what the ‘post-Saleh period’ should look like.

A voice from Yemen

I'm pleased to be able to share with you all this very thoughtful video, made by a friend of ours in Yemen, about the current situation there. [youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyv71sirA-8&w=420&h=315]

RIP Christopher Boucek

Yemen analyst, author, and Carnegie Endowment associate Christopher Boucek died suddenly this morning at the age of 38. He leaves behind a wife and two young children. Boucek was one the Yemen watchers whom I greatly admired. His work showed a real concern understanding for the needs of Yemen's people. I never knew Boucek personally, but I know that the community of Yemen analysts and policy makers are greatly impoverished by this loss.

Below is a Storify of many of the tweets I saw today commenting on Boucek's passing.

[View the story "Christopher Boucek: Condolences" on Storify]

What Saudi Arabia wants

Who says you can't fit everything you need to say into a tweet? This entry was originally a very long tweet by our friend and sometimes blogger Fernando Carvajal. It was in response to a conversation (Storified below) between a few Yemen-watchers about why Saudi Arabia hasn't decided to back Yemen's opposition Islah party as a replacement for President Saleh and the GPC. View "What Saudi Arabia wants" on Storify

A strong Yemen means its institutions within the Jumhuriya (Republic) context are strong, this means democracy is strong. This threatens the KSA because even under Abdullah they have a reform project that is to run at a pace comfortable to Al Saud, and if Yemen, or any other neighbor in the peninsula reforms too quickly it will force Al Saud to speed up reform, confront rivals sooner then they want, and it will be a distraction for their own mid- and long-term projects. This will also impact the rest of the GCC of course, not just KSA. Any advance on democratization in yemen would mean the entire Peninsula would have to catch up quicker. Monarchs have not yet figured out how to do this without losing. I'm sure they like King Felipe (Spain) & Queen Elizabeth some, but they dont envy their symbolic positions. [I.e., Gulf rulers aren't ruling out a transition to constitutional monarchy with a functional, empowered parliament, but not on their own schedules and not without maintaining a significant degree of power and wealth.]

On the other hand, a weak Yemen poses other challenges for Al Saud: if the country spirals downward away from "controlled chaos," like Bernard Haykel says, it will force KSA to focus on security issues and neglect mid long term projects, which already carry natural rivals from within the Kingdom. Al Saud can't handle too many rivals or challenges at once; all of this Arab Spring is getting in the way of a mid-term plan to increase hegemony in the region vis a vis Iran, Iraq and yes, Israel. If it has to watch its flank all the time it can't focus on succession, economic stimulus, energy markets, competing with Dubai in finance sector, playing a new role in Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iraq and placating US on counter-terrorism. People forget that 'terrorists' are still trying to kill Saudis, never mind Iran. We forget migration, human trafficking, tribal disputes along the border. Also, an unstable Yemen means KSA needs to spend more money on tribal leaders to minimize, not end, distabilizing disputes that might end up costing more, like this revolution. This cuts into their own budget, and as the new generation fights amongt themselves, it leaves less cash to go around the family itself.

KSA is not the only Gulf state threatened by a weak Yemen. Oman fears spread of Salafi groups into its territory at a time when the Sultan is also looking at succession, and is also going through an economic crisis. People forget KSA just saved Oman's butt in February with a large contribution to counter any type of Arab Spring there. The UAE, for it's part, can't afford increased instability in Gulf of Aden because it affects its port operations at a time when they can't afford to lose any more cash or investments. AQAP will remain a threat not because of numbers but because it still has a hideout in Yemen for ideologues and small groups of operatives able to reach KSA or the Horn. With Awlaki out of the way and yemen cracking down on visas for Westerners and Asians the training camp factor decreases as well as the recruitment ops, [but none of the Gulf states can afford to neglect counter-terrorism efforts until and unless Yemen is able and willing to address the threat itself.]

People need to forget about the old myth in which Saudi's king 'Abdul 'Aziz told his sons, while on his death bed, to "keep Yemen weak." This was more about the Imam [Yahya] than any crystal ball effect on his part for his successors. The King didn't trust Imam Yahya or Ahmad ibn Yahya or the British in the south so he needed to ensure his son Faysal learned from his campaign in Tihama and prevent the Imam from returning to Najran and Asir (the treaty of 1934 was never intended as a permanent border, until 2000). Being a holy man, the Imam threatened Al Saud's hold on al-Haramain as other Sunni groups (MB) wished the Zaydis could fill the power vacuum after the Ottomans.

The new reality is that KSA and the other Gulf states can't afford to allow Yemen to become too weak, or too strong, yet.

"One Yemen" relief campaign

As our supporters know, the Yemen Peace Project has been raising money since March for the field hospitals in San‘a and Ta‘iz, and since June for IDP camps in 'Aden. The money we raise is sent to those responsible for these relief projects via trusted YPP volunteers inside the country. Thanks to the hard work of our volunteers and the generosity of our donors, we've been able to contribute several thousand dollars so far. We're pleased to announce that another concerned friend of Yemen has launched a new initiative to provide the field hospitals with much-needed medicines and equipment. This new project uses an online platform to collect donations. The donations go to a German medical charity that then supplies medicine and medical equipment to a network of volunteers in Yemen.

Make a contribution to the One Yemen campaign here.

Please note, the One Yemen campaign is not managed by or affiliated with the Yemen Peace Project. The link above will take you to an external website.

Saleh's return

Fernando Carvajal, PhD candidate at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. The author has visited Yemen for over eleven years and witnessed the initial five months of the popular uprising in Sana’a. His most recent visit to Yemen was during the past month of August. I am one of those who hates blurb and sound-bite articles so as soon as I heard the news of Saleh’s return this past Friday morning I decided to sit and write about conversations I had in Sana’a during Ramadan.  Everyone I met with from the ruling party assured me the president would return and that even though some in the Saudi ruling family preferred him not to, Saleh would return, as long as his health permitted.  The original version of this piece was written before I had a chance to catch up with news of the clashes and dozens of deaths. This is an updated version based on information from Sana’a and my own analysis.  The article changed direction from the idea of ‘Saleh’s major opportunity to rescue any legitimacy he had remaining’ to ‘the major opportunity he failed to capitalize on’.  Much still remains unclear about the events of September 23^rd, but we can be assured that even with the support of Saudi Arabia, the US and UK, he is now the one with his back against the wall instead of the opposition elements. It’s a bit long, but this was the plan agreed by members of the GPC to address the crisis.

As Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh abruptly returned to Sana’a under the cover of dawn on “the Friday of Confidence in God’s Victory” protesters and outside observers brace for prophetic escalation into civil war.  The immediate reaction from Yemenis at the protests sites and observers outside the country was one of surprise to Saleh’s apparent ‘defiance’ of the US and UK stance and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s brokered plan for peaceful transition of power.  A second reaction raised prospects once again of a devastating civil war as consequence of Saleh’s expected revenge against the opposition for the June 3^rd attack inside the Presidential Palace.  Saleh’s close advisors and members of the ruling party dismiss such views back in August and for a month spoke of a deal that would work to de-escalate the crisis and present a more realistic plan for the peaceful transition of power from Saleh to his Vice President, Abdo Rabo al-Hadi.  Essentially, Saleh’s last opportunity to prove he is able to be part of the solution.  The events of September 23^rd shocked everyone, even those    predicting  Saleh’s savage revenge, which seemed to be released upon unarmed protesters at the perimeter and center of Change Square in Sana’a.

Most important to president Saleh’s return to Sana’a has been his health.  After spending nearly “112 days” convalescing in Riyadh, as Mohammed al-Basha of the Yemeni Embassy in Washington DC indicated, Saleh’s return indicates his health is in good condition.  His spokesman in Sana’a, Abdo al-Janadi, had often reported on Saleh’s imminent return since late July, as if teasing people each week.  Another sign of why his return indicates Saleh is now in good health is the lessons learned over past two months as his close allies injured along with him began returning to Yemen.  One such official was mentioned during my last visit to Sana’a in August, who upon his return from Riyadh in early Ramadan passed away as result of complications from his burns and the poor medical care available in Sana’a.  No doubt Saleh arrived with what should be substantial medical assistance.

While most people in opposition to Saleh and many observers in the West began writing Saleh’s political obituary following the attempted assassination, his relatives, along with political and tribal allies have worked for nearly four months to hold the fort until his return. As many have speculated, the timing of his return is no coincidence, as the crisis once again escalated following deadly clashes on Sunday September 18 leaving over 60 peaceful protesters dead in Sana’a. We can deduce from his unannounced arrival that President Saleh perceived this to be the right time to re-engage the opposition in dialogue to prevent further escalation and show regional and international allies he indeed represented the only solution to the crisis.  His return followed a private meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on September 19 and renewed efforts to implement existing transition plans brokered by the US, UK and the GCC.  Until the morning of his return we knew this was completely rejected by independent youth protesting in Sana’a, Taiz and the port of Aden, and further complicated the opposition’s efforts to negotiate a transition directly with the Vice President.

Most observers and opposition personalities now see no solution to the crisis beyond a protracted and devastating civil war as result of the savagery this past Friday.  Yet members of the ruling party continue to see things different and the membership remains confident President Saleh’s own initiative from August still provides the best way forward.  This is evident by the lack of defections from Saleh’s camp following the clashes this past Friday.  I can only assume that the plan drafted under the umbrella of a committee established by Saleh in late July to address amendments to the GCC Initiative introduced in April remains en force.  The ruling party assumes that even after the violence of the past week the president holds enough political capital to force the opposition to sit at the negotiating table.  The committee stands firm with the arguments they original resented against the transfer of power to the Vice President as unconstitutional, and second, arguing the provisions in the GCC Initiative to hold presidential elections within 90 days after Saleh stepped down remain unrealistic. The latter view gained unsolicited support from a report produced by IFES on June 7^th, titled transitions in Yemen: An Overview of Constitutional and Electoral Provisions, where it argued much had to be done before any legitimate elections could be held in Yemen.  The committee agreed to a number of changes to the GCC plan under the guidance of President Saleh.

While Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, head of the 1^st Armored Division, strongly condemned the acts of September 23^rd and blamed Saleh for the savagery against unarmed civilians, the ruling party believes the opposition is has more to lose and will still be forced to accept negotiations along with the Joint Meeting Party (JMP) and tribal leaders and allies of the al-Ahmar family.  It is understood that the independent youth will never accept anything short of a full transfer of power beyond the hands of the president and his relatives, which has been the case from day one.  Yet, the more ‘realistic’ plan to be offered to the opposition, and diplomatic actors, was drafted to include seven steps: 1) an initial plan for de-escalation; 2) following the ceasefire we could expect direct dialogue; 3) an extensive agreement for de-militarization of the Capital; 4) the formation of a military council to oversee de-militarization and address the security vacuum; 5) a committee to pave the way for Parliamentary elections in six to eight months; 6) the new Parliament would address reforms and presidential elections would still be held in September 2013, and 7) President Saleh would delegate most of his authority to the Vice President until 2013.

None of this could actually move forward of course until the president announces a comprehensive amnesty retroactive to February, and seeing that Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar signaled a willingness to negotiate on Saturday September 25^th we assume there is no talk of amnesty for the president.  In order to de-escalate the crisis it is understood the youth would have to abandon their positions across the country, now made even more difficult following the events of this past week. The opposition will not be able to guarantee demobilization on its own and if Saleh is to be taken seriously as the only ‘light of hope’ it cannot be achieved by force, as it is rumored to occur in the coming days.  Persons within the government and the ruling party mentioned in August that the amnesty would be a guarantee for all youth participating in protests across the country and that no one would be arrested or prosecuted.  No one mentioned the mechanisms guaranteeing such safety, and I am sure the youth and activists would live under constant fear of random arrests.  Without a legitimate body to serve as guarantor and capable of investigating violations of the amnesty the youth would not receive this as a credible offer.

President Saleh’s plan has plenty of support among ruling party members and allies, who also believe the GCC plan is completely unrealistic.  The ten main points contained in the GCC plan, from elections in 90 days to a new constitution before parliamentary elections, would be unachievable under a working government, never mind under a fractured coalition where the opposition has not presented to the people of Yemen or international mediators the ability to manage such transition.  Prior to leaving Riyadh President Saleh should have clearly expressed his views to King Abdullah and GCC officials denying his defiance of the Initiative but rather ‘considering the reality of the situation.’  His defiance is more directed at demands from the people on the street, who continue to be firm in their demand for Saleh to step down and be prosecuted along with his son Ahmed and nephews Yahya and Ammar Mohammed Saleh.

Up until this past Friday the opposition had their backs against the wall, they either escalate to full direct military conflict or acquiesce to sit at the same table with Saleh.  At this point, the president’s plan would not grant the opposition the same offer as in early February of a shared government until Parliament elections are held.  He will insist on the current care-taker government, under Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar, to oversee his conflict resolution plan.  As we await President Saleh’s first address to the people of Yemen, tentatively scheduled for Sunday September 25^th (a day before celebrations of the 1962 Revolution) we already witnessed the usual moves by Saleh of offering a cease-fire while continuing to engage with force on the day of his arrival.  His first step was to address the cease-fire between the opposition’s military forces and government security forces led by his son Ahmed and nephews Yahya and Ammar, which in reality led to a violent strike against protesters and al-Firqa in order to attempt to regain lost territory around the streets of Sana’a.  We now expect Saleh to speak on Sunday and an olive branch once again in order to gain the support of diplomats once again.  Who would sit with Saleh at this point is beyond reason.  Saleh will naturally aim for direct negotiations with his former confidant Gen. Ali Muhsin, and while the JMP would be tempted to have either Mr. Mohammed BaSundwa, president of the National Transition Council and former head of the National Dialogue Committee, or someone like Abdul Wahab al-Ansi, Secretary General of the Islamist party al-Islah (less likely a candidate since he always remains in the background) they will risk political suicide in the eyes of the youth.  In any case Saleh will instantly oppose Mr. BaSundwa, even tough he served as Ambassador to the United Nations and was Foreign Minister under Saleh in the 1990s.  General Ali Muhsin has already indirectly expressed his objections to engaging Saleh as consequence of Friday’s clashes and especially after a blatant attempted assassination following his defection in late March of this year.  But since Saleh will never sit with any member of the al-Ahmar family after all the animosity from Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar and his eldest brother Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar, Ali Muhsin appears as the only logical actor to sit with Saleh, which may ultimately have to include Shaykh Sadeq keeping with Yemeni political tradition.  This meeting will undoubtedly have to take place at the house of Vice President Abdo Rabo, which now lies within the perimeter secured by forces loyal to Ali Muhsin following last Sunday’s clashes.

Having overcome the most difficult steps, which may likely be aided by US and UK diplomats who often meet with Gen. Ali Muhsin, the second most difficult step would come when the committee is formed to oversee de-militarization of the capital.  The most difficult step will remain asking the youth to accept such rapprochement. Mistrust on both sides will be the most difficult obstacle to overcome once the decision is made, considering the regime’s atrocities against unarmed civilians since March and the fact that al-Firqa maintains nearly 40,000 soldiers and militia within Sana’a’s borders.  To this we add the protesters’ heightened mistrust of the regime, and if Ali Muhsin were to ever agree to de-militarization it would leave protesters absolutely vulnerable if they remain within protests squares around the country.  The opposition will lose further credibility in the eyes of the youth who already believe they will only protect their own interests.  The response to Saleh’s overture will depend on whether the opposition wants still wants to risk civil war or prevent further atrocities, which it can later claim as their virtue for saving hundreds of lives.  Ali Muhsin, the JMP and the al-Ahmar family will only save face if they become the primary mechanism to guarantee full amnesty and prevent violations until final solutions are in place.

It is believed that once the primary confidence building measures are in place the remainder of Saleh’s plan will allow for a “peaceful” process toward holding elections.  A remaining obstacle will be opposition from the youth to the fourth point in Saleh’s plan, a military council, which would include direct participation by Saleh’s son and nephews.  This point is in no doubt in response to US concerns over control of the armed forces and assurances the regime will not allow subversive elements to gain safe-haven anywhere in Yemen.  How this military council will incorporate officials who defected still remains unclear. Ali Muhsin has already expressed his assurance to Western diplomats he will remove himself from all military service once transition begins, yet we still don’t know at what exact point he will do so and what his role would be in a post-transition Yemen.

The most important issue for the youth is reform, and it appears as the major task.  Yemen has not had a full voter registry since February 2009.  Many of the youth protesting today were under age and will instantly demand access to the electoral process.  IFES also commented on the state of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCRE), which was a primary source of conflict in December 2010 when Saleh appointed a number of judges without consulting the opposition.  If security were to return to the entire country and ensure safety of polls and transport of ballot boxes following the elections there still remains the problem that poll committees need to be appointed and staff trained, in addition to training local and international observers.  None of this could be accomplished within the 90 days set by the GCC initiative.  Once the committee is in place to begin work on elections, whether parliamentary or presidential, dates must be set and a number of benchmarks met before legitimate elections can take place.  This will also test the credibility of the opposition in the eyes of the independent youth as the opposition’s dedication to democracy will definitely be tested.  This process may take six to eight months, and the thought of such a long period will continue to worry the youth who believe Saleh will pull another ace from under his sleeve in order to prolong his term in office or guarantee his son’s succession in 2013.

The prospect of president Saleh remaining in office until 2013 will lead to a demoralized youth movement which has proven its resolve over the past eight months.  The movement has revitalized each time following clashes with government forces, and proven they do not fear death or clandestine persecution.  Yet, if the opposition sits with Saleh to negotiate a deal short of removing him from office, they ill feel as though all their efforts would have been in vain as they do not see anything at all positive from an electoral process including Saleh and his regime.  The youth will also question the credibility of the plan drafted by the ruling party concerning the authority and power of Vice President Abdo Rabo. The Vice President has disappointed all in the opposition, and some in the care-taker government, for his lack of authority during Saleh’s absence.  Abdo Rabo is also perceived as having given into the power of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and his cousins Yahya and Ammar.  The reality of any deal negotiated by the regime and the opposition clearly indicates that Abdo Rabo will remain without real authority and power under a military council and an interim coalition committee drafting the electoral procedures in the coming months.  President Saleh will still have the ability to influence the military council, as commander-in-chief (a position difficult for him to give up), and the elections’ committee, as head of the ruling party.

Prior to September 23^rd it was difficult to imagine the opposition rejecting Saleh’s olive branch under such scenarios.  Without a doubt Saleh will once again publicly offer dialogue to the opposition and if they reject such offer, the opposition will risk losing any credibility they have left in the eyes of Western diplomats who are desperate for final solution to the crisis. Saudi Arabia is however a different story.  By rejecting dialogue they would all then be risking their own lives during direct military conflict beyond the numerous ongoing proxy battles around Sana’a and Taiz.  The only way the opposition would retain some credibility with the masses will be if they were to organize the National Transition Council as a legitimate entity truly safeguarding protesters under full immunity and acting against the regime in cases where violations take place in full view of the public and with international collaboration.  Anything short of this will seal their political suicide in the eyes of the independent youth.  On the other hand, Saleh has a much tougher road to travel as he attempts to de-mobilize the streets occupied by his opponents.  His first step would have to be a public address to his own supporters in the streets of Sana’a to withdraw and allow only government forces to oversee security.  This would mean Saleh will have to appease many of his tribal supporters already used to nearly eight months of sustained financial contributions.

Saleh’s return to Sana’a has proven many correct on predictions of his vengefulness, but he is now forced to prove to his allies that he can end the crisis.  Friday’s events ultimately destroyed Saleh’s image as the responsible head of state willing to contribute to the stability of the region and Western interests.  Relations with the youth after so many deaths will be irreparable.  Saleh knows that political and financial support from Saudi Arabia will never be sufficient to avoid Bin Ali’s or Hosni Mubarak’s fate, especially since all Western diplomats from the start rejected the immunity clause within the GCC initiative.  If he is to retain what ever legitimacy he has left in the eyes of Western diplomats, President Saleh simultaneously must rein in his son and the rest of the regime, de-militarize the capital and other cities, complete the defeat of terrorist elements in the southern provinces of Abyan, Lahj and Shebwa, and fully engage a credible process that delivers as many of the demands from the youth as possible.  Anything short of this will definitely etch his political obituary in stone once and for all.

Activists and protesters on the street will object to this analysis in full, but reality in Yemen still adheres to traditional modes of positioning and both sides look after their own interests, not the people’s interests.  For those of you who follow Yemeni history remember al-Sabaeen (70 days) when Sana’a was besieged by Royalists forces and all retreated at the end.

Confusion and counter-revolution

The word "Yemen" has not been spoken very often in State Department press briefings of late. Two weeks ago (the last time a question about Yemen was asked in such a briefing) DoS spokesperson Victoria Nuland seemed completely disinterested in answering questions about President Saleh's possible return. "Whether he stays, whether he comes back," she said, "we need him to sign this GCC agreement and move on, allow his country to move on. So our position is unchanged." Readers of this blog already know how I feel about the GCC deal. It's insulting to the people of Yemen, and completely irrelevant to the political process, because it excludes most of the factions that need to be included for a real resolution of the current situation. The US administration's continuing insistence is basically an admission that the US is not interested in playing any role in such a resolution, and a slap in the face to Yemen's protesters. Unfortunately, the US is still involved in Yemen in other ways.

Just over a month ago, back when 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh still looked frail and beaten, President Obama's CT advisor, John Brennan, went to visit him in Riyadh. The White House assured us that Brennan was trying to convince Saleh to step down. We were told that the US insisted on a peaceful and immediate transfer of power in Yemen. We were told that Brennan even takallum-ed a little 'arabiyah to drive the point home. But the evidence suggests that the administration's mind was elsewhere. While Brennan was doing his "y‘ani shwayah mumkin" routine in Riyadh, the Pentagon and CIA were supposedly hard at work ramping up their "covert" war against AQAP (by "covert" I mean "constantly leaked to the press in order to make the administration look proactive").

The real signal that the US administration is not, in fact, committed to a peaceful transition in Yemen came at the beginning of this month, when Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers visited San‘a to meet with the chief of staff of Yemen's (regime-loyal) army. Neither DoD nor the White House felt like talking about this meeting, so we don't have much to go on other than the Yemeni state media's account, according to which the two men discussed military cooperation and the ongoing fight against AQAP.

The optimist in me wants to believe that Vickers was talking to the chief of staff about how Yemen's army can stop killing civilians and play a positive role in the dismantling of the Saleh regime. But I don't think that's what happened. Were the US committed to Saleh's removal, Saleh would be gone. Were the US committed to Yemeni self-determination, the process of forming a new government, free of the Saleh family and the regime's inner circle, would be much further along. Clearly the Obama administration isn't supporting President Saleh, but its confused policy is enabling his persistence.

But there's more to hate about America's current confused policy than its impact on the Yemeni people. The Obama administration and congress should be looking at how their short-sighted decisions affect American security and interests in the Middle East. Since the start of the "Arab Spring," Saudi Arabia has been flexing its muscle and showing the world that it has the capability and the will to pursue a regional policy that may be at odds with those of its western allies. Al Saud has always seen Yemen as its plaything, and has an interest in a certain level of continued instability in Yemen which is directly at odds with American interests. By thoughtlessly promoting the GCC deal instead of trying to engage with the various anti-regime factions in Yemen, the US is effectively letting the KSA dictate the terms for future engagement with Yemen.

It's also pretty clear that the escalation of the "covert war" against AQAP is designed mainly to bolster Obama's counter-terror cred in the run-up to the 2012 elections. Otherwise the super-secret plan to build a new airbase in Yemen wouldn't have been leaked to every single journalist in the world before the lease has even been typed up. There has already been plenty of debate among analysts over the effectiveness of drones in Yemen. To my mind the most obvious argument against the current US drone/missile campaign is that it has killed far more civilians than AQAP operatives (I would estimate the ratio at about 10:1). Aside from the simple fact that killing people is wrong and should be avoided whenever possible, the killing of innocent, non-terrorist Yemenis has several negative effects on the counter-terrorism effort in general.

One of these effects is that it hands AQAP a ready-made recruiting tool even without launching a single missile. Obama et al. seem to have forgotten that Bin Laden's original rallying cry back in the 1990s was the expulsion of infidel armies from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques. The presence of US troops and military facilities in Saudi Arabia inspired many of al-Qa‘idah's early recruits. Do the policy makers in Washington not think that AQAP will use the construction of new US bases on Yemeni soil to recruit Yemenis? I admit I don't know the miles-per-gallon figures for Predators and Reapers, but would the tactical advantages of launching drones from Hodaydah instead of Djibouti really outweigh the rhetorical advantages this move has already given AQAP?

What the US needs to do is stop running its mouth in all directions, and put together a policy toward Yemen--the real Yemen, not the boogeyman Yemen of congressional hearings and campaign speeches--that considers American interests and the needs of the Yemeni people.  If we wait until after the 2012 elections, it may be too late.

Revolution in Their Eyes: Photography from Change Square - Los Angeles, CA, 9/16-10/9

The Yemen Peace Project and 118 WINSTON host a unique exhibition of revolutionary photography from San‘a, Yemen in Downtown LA. The exhibition features over one hundred photographs by participants in the ongoing revolution, documenting the reality--both brutal and beautiful--of daily life in Change Square, the heart of the revolution in Yemen's capital city.

Gallery hours are 11am-6pm Friday-Sunday, and by appointment. Opening reception will be Friday, September 16, 6-9pm. The gallery is located at 118 Winston St. 2nd floor, Los Angeles, CA  90013. Click here for gallery info.  Map & directions

Read more about this exhibition.

Proceeds from the exhibition will go toward humanitarian relief efforts underway in Yemen.

Founded in early 2010, the Yemen Peace Project is an international network of activists and scholars working to develop and promote peaceful solutions to the challenges facing the people of Yemen. Click here to learn more about us.

Politics and proxy wars

We are pleased to present a fascinating guest-post by an experienced scholar/analyst who has been in Yemen for most of the revolution. This piece provides a rare insight into the dynamics of the multiple armed conflicts occurring around the country right now. Fernando Carvajalis a PhD candidate and Yemen specialist at the University of Exeter (UK) and is currently in Sanʻa. He has conducted field work throughout Yemen since 2000.

(This piece will be updated to include events following a cease-fire in al-Jawf between Huthi rebels and tribesmen this week)

A Revolution by Proxy

As the number of pundits add their voices to warnings of Yemen’s ‘Somaliazation’ local analysts and officials remain confident escalation will be averted. This confidence remains misunderstood outside the country due to a reality that sees a number of ongoing low-intensity conflicts in areas like Arhab (Sanʻa), Abyan, al-Jawf, al-Haima, Hodeida (Western Province), Hadhramawt (Eastern Province), Lahj, Mareb, Nahm, and Taʻiz. While covering such conflicts local and foreign media present skirmishes between pro-Revolution and pro-Government forces as mainly battles to “protect protestors” on the one hand, and erratic knee-jerk reactions by the regime to cling on to power while President Ali Abdullah Saleh recovers in Riyadh from injuries sustained during and attempted assassination on 3 June inside his Presidential Palace in the Capital Sanʻa.  As sources in Yemen begin to confirm the ongoing clashes across the country developed from a strategy of war by proxy “in order to slowly weaken the enemy” within an intra-regime power struggle.

While former Prime Minister Dr Abd al-Karem al-Iryani indicates that “the only solution to the conflict is a peaceful one within the parameters of the GGC Initiative”, the opposition continues to prepare for violent escalation amid news of President Saleh’s release from a hospital in Riyadh this past Saturday, August 6.  Sanʻa residents and media outlets soon jumped on this possibility when new clashes were reported this past weekend in the area of al-Hassaba, under limited control of tribal militias loyal to Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar (head of the Hashid tribal confederation) who now heads the new Tribal Alliance.  The skirmishes ended quickly with casualties on both sides, which included a colonel of the Republican Guard under the leadership of Saleh’ son Ahmed Ali.  Such clashes inside the Capital city began two weeks before the attempted assassination on Saleh and ended with a cease-fire brokered by the King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and “still managed behind the scenes to prevent any major escalation” says Nasser al-Muwada, an independent analyst in Sanʻa.

Origins of intra-regime power struggle

Soon after President Saleh announced three major amendments to the constitution on 29 December 2010, the opposition Joint Meeting Party (JMP) began to voice its condemnation of the amendments that could extend Saleh’s rule by a third seven-year term. The JMP’s primary financial supporter, Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar (brother of Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar) also increased his opposition to Saleh’s regime through his National Solidarity Forum.  Since the Arab Spring protests began in February, Shaykh Hamid has remained a staunch supporter of the youth movement in Sanʻa and Mareb, as he once promised he would to a US Embassy official in 2009 and revealed through a cable published by WikiLeaks. Although Hamid remains one of the most outspoken opponents to President Saleh, many people in Yemen recognize that he had been part and parcel of the regime along with his brothers who held positions such as Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Executive of the ruling General People’s Congress, Deputy Minister of Youth and Sport and positions within Yemen’s Oil Company.  In 2006 Shaykh Hamid was the primary supporter of Faysal Bin Shamlan’s presidential campaign and other candidates of al-Islah party, the Sunni Islamist party within the JMP coalition.  Soon after Hamid also increased his public rants against Saleh and his son Ahmed during interviews with Doha-based al-Jazeera satellite network. Hamid was also the man supporting the efforts to establish the National Dialogue process through the National Solidarity Forum under the Chairmanship of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Basundwa.  The National Dialogue process was suspended in 2009 after a final meeting issuing a communiqué with proposals for a national reconciliation, but this statement also included a direct accusation against President Saleh as the person responsible for Yemen’s crises and the primary obstacle to reconciliation.

As cables published by WikiLeaks also showed Brg. Gen. Ali Muhsin Saleh al-Ahmar (of Senhan), commander of the North-West Army Command known as al-Firqahh and former primary ally of President Saleh, had a gripe to settle with Saleh. In the cables released early this year there is an account of an attempt to kill Ali Muhsin during the protracted conflict with Zaydi Huthi rebels in the north regions of the country in 2009.  We learned how Saudi Arabia’s Air Force was given coordinates to Ali Muhsin’s position rather than the location of rebel tribesmen presumably in order to eliminate another source of opposition to the rise of Ahmed Ali as successor to President Saleh.  Such tension within the regime unraveled two days after the March 18 massacre of unarmed youth protesters in Sanʻa when Ali Muhsin publicly announced his opposition to Saleh and declared himself and his troops protectors of the Youth Revolution, setting up a security corridor around the expanded area controlled by the youth in Sanʻa.  His ‘defection’ also prompted dozens of government officials including members of the al-Ahmar family, in Yemen and abroad, to resign their posts and either declare their support of the Youth movement or simply join Gen. Ali Muhsin.  Although al-Firqah’s area of operation covered the northern provinces bordering Saudi Arabia its headquarters are in Sanʻa across from Sanʻa University and behind the Yemen Economic Corporation.

Both primary opponents to President Saleh, the al-Ahmar family and Ali Muhsin, have always been staunch supporters of al-Islah party.  In particular, the former due to the late patriarch’s (Shaykh Abdullah Hussain al-Ahmar) role as tribal leader within the party and Speaker of Parliament from 1993 until his death in late 2007.  The party itself remained the primary partner in government with the GPC since the end of the 1994 Civil War.  Led by its charismatic spiritual leader, Shaykh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, al-Islah is also the strongest party headed by Secretary General - within the JMP coalition.  Shaykh Zindani, as head of Yemen’s cleric council made a number of attempts in February and March on behalf of Saleh to disperse the street protests in Sanʻa through TV interviews and an impromptu appearance on the main stage at Change Square in Sanʻa, where he gave a log winded speech about the coming Islamic Caliphate, his pride and admiration over what the youth had accomplished to the minute, and finally on how the crisis should end through dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition, dismissing early on any role within the process for the disenfranchised youth joining the Arab Spring.

Alternative Strategies by Proxy

At the end of March, nearly two months since the sit-in at Change Square in Sanʻa began, fighting erupted once again in the northern province of al-Jawf, bordering Saudi Arabia.  The province had already fallen to a tribal council formed by Shaykh Ameen al-Ukaimi in opposition to President Saleh.  This province also borders Sa’dah province, under full control of Huthi rebels after the elected governor retreated to Sanʻa and was replaced by Shaykh Faysal Mana’a, under what Yemenis believe to have been an agreement between Huthi leader Abdul Malek Badr al-Din al-Huthi and Gen. Ali Muhsin.  The agreement would guarantee both sides a cease-fire while Ali Muhsin ‘protected’ the Youth Revolution.  The cease-fire in Sa’dah has lasted but the four month-long clashes between Huthi tribesmen and pro-Islah tribesmen in al-Jawf presents itself as a proxy war outside Sa’dah aimed at weakening al-Huthi’s forces and support until an eventual settlement of the political crisis in Sanʻa.  Analysts in Sanʻa also mentioned that al-Firqah has sent personnel in civilian clothes to join the fight and that as result of the ongoing conflicts elsewhere and the lack of funding and resources, the pro-Islah fighters are primary funded by Saudi Arabia under the same goals, to weaken a potential growing threat from al-Huthi.

While the conflict in al-Jawf has largely gone unnoticed by media outside Yemen it has been well covered by Yemeni journalists like Muhammad Ghazuan with a nine page report published by as-Shara newspaper on 30 July.  This coverage also raised a number of questions for Yemenis following the conflict in the city of Taʻiz.  In the past two months clashes escalated between government armed forces and militias led by Shaykh Hamoud al-Maghlafi , a known member of the Muslim Brotherhood wing of al-Islah party, former bodyguard of Shaykh Zindani and former employee of the Ministry of Education as mentioned during brief conversations with Dr. Mustafa Bahran (former minister of Electricity) and journalist Nasser Arrabyee.  Shaykh al-Maghlafi declared himself and his militia as “protectors” of the youth movement in Taʻiz following a bloody attack on Freedom Square by elements of the Republican Guard.  The aim of the attack was to disperse protestors from the sit-in, as the government had done in late April in al-Mansura District of Aden.  The Square was later retaken by the youth and continues to organize demonstrations against President Saleh and his relatives remaining in power.  A Source inside al-Firqah also corroborated information that indicates Gen. Ali Muhsin granted leave to junior officers and soldiers of al-Firqah, such as Commander Sadeq Serhan, in order to join the militia in Taʻiz against government forces.  Dr. Bahran also commented that if it were not for financial, personnel and material support from Firqah soldiers, al-Maghlafi would be unable to independently maintain his position against government forces.  The situation in Taʻiz is extremely unique, for although the area within the province has been a hotbed of dissent since the early twentieth century, it has always been led by intellectual movements rather than direct violence against rulers.

Toward a “Compromise of Weakness”

Clashes in al-Jawf and Taʻiz are clear examples of what al-Muwada referred to as “battles of attrition” (harb Istinzaf). The fighting in Arhab, which began in mid-July, now represents the most brutal confrontations between opposition forces and the government of President Saleh.  News of government soldiers and tribesmen dying by the hundreds in an area controlling the northern entrance to the Capital and where Mount as-Sama’ overlooks Sanʻa International Airport, which also serves as a main runway for the Yemeni Air Force, have captured the attention of international media networks.  This village is also where Shakh Zindani resides since his failed attempt to disperse the youth at Change Square. Confrontations in Arhab represent more than simple clashes between a desperate group of relatives of Saleh and villagers.  Observers agree this is a major strategic battle by both the regime and al-Firqah since “the road from Arhab represents the door into Sanʻa” and would provide either side with a strategic artery into the Capital for reinforcements and logistical support, said Dr. Bahran.

The source within Firqah also confirmed information that soldiers in civilian clothes travelled to Arhab in order to join tribesmen led by Shaykh Mansour al-Hanaiq (Minister of Parliament for Arhab, cleric of the Muslim Brotherhood wing of Islah and right hand man of Shaykh Zindani).  Officials within the government have no doubt al-Hanaiq coordinated with Ali Muhsin prior to the battle against the 3^rd Brigade’s camp on Mount as-Sama’ on 28 July.  Nasser Arrabyee and members of al-Islah party also confirmed al-Hanaiq position and role in Arhab. It is presumed Firqah’s headquarters in Sanʻa currently hold around 39 light-armed units of 600 soldiers each, which include some of the recently defected soldiers from the Republican Guard and Central Security looking for salaries around one hundred and twenty dollars per month, and they are mostly identified by sources as non-active reserves who carried no weapons upon defecting.  Same source indicated many soldiers abandoned their posts during the Holy Month of Ramadan.  The tribes of the Bakil confederation in Arhab allied to al-Islah party form part of a strategy that would eventually push south into Sanʻa from the airport road past al-Imam University and as far as the area of al-Qa’a, near Tahrir Square where the Republican Palace is located. While such analysis may seem outrageous to some observers, Yemeni analysts indicate it is also urgent for Ali Muhsin to advance prior to the potential arrival of president Saleh, where a take-over of the airport would symbolically deprive the president of a landing strip of significant relevance as Saleh aims for a triumphant return.

Such confrontations where the opposition avoids direct conflict with government forces primarily aims at dispersing the armed forces throughout a number of battle theatres requiring an overwhelming show of force against low funded and undermanned tribal militias.  This has given further credibility to claims by foreign observers that Yemen is close to a Somaliazation as it breaks up into conflict areas led by perceived war-lords.  The presence of al-Qaʻidah affiliates in the southern provinces of Abyan and Lahj also adds to such alarmist scenarios that ignore a political crisis as both the creator and manager of the armed conflicts.  The proxy battles have government forces gravitating toward areas claimed by the opposition, which prevents them from providing stronger support to forces based in Sanʻa. Also, analyst view the clashes as “a controlled armed struggle with a variable escalation” aimed at producing “a military balance of power” which no side can win.  The strategy is also evident in Firqah’s daily containment of protestors and during Friday prayers, when some groups agitate the masses to march toward the Presidential Palace producing direct clashes and further civilian casualties.  While the clashes represent tactical moves by the opposition led by Ali Muhsin, neither side seems to move strategically because they recognize the country could break up into pieces and would be beyond their ability to regain territories upon taking power, in the case of the opposition, or upon an agreement for the regime.  Abd al-Ghani al-Iryani, an independent analyst based in Sanʻa, repeated what analyst Ahmed Saif Hassan has called the “compromise of weakness” necessary for a peaceful end to the crisis avoiding a ‘committed step’ that would launch all out war between a number of factions with divided allegiances.

Muwada agrees with Dr. Abd al- Kareem al-Iryani in that the only solution is a peaceful transition under the GCC Initiative and mediation of both Saudi Arabia and the United States.  Both sides are beholden to Saudi support during the crisis and after it is resolved.  Yemen’s government will continue its dependence on Saudi aid that is beyond the capacity of Western governments, and the opposition also requires aid in order to sustain expanding patronage networks to balance the regime in order to avoid a civil war or retribution by elements of the regime as result of the violence perpetrated in recent months.  Observers in Sanʻa also believe that Saleh’s regime has no chance of survival after this crisis due primarily to its internal weakness created by defections and overt opposition more so than as direct result of the now fragment and powerless Youth Revolution. Yet, we cannot dismiss the youth movement as completely irrelevant since the course of events developing in Yemen prior to the resignation of Tunisian President Zein El Abidine Ben Ali (January 15) under the leadership of the JMP would not have led to such dissent within the regime or violent clashes in such short period of time.  The youth movement accelerated events as they joined the Arab Spring tsunami, and the escalation of conflict between the regime and its opponents would have continued simply through dialogue following Saleh’s preemptive speech in Parliament on February 2^nd, when he promised to withdraw amendments submitted by the ruling party in December 2010.  Any violence would have erupted in 2012 as political opponents began to position themselves for Parliamentary elections and scheduled presidential elections of 2013.

US Senate hearings, part II

My previous post presented a Storified version of the live-tweeting of yesterday's Senate hearings on US Yemen policy. Here I'd just like to add a little bit of analysis. As is often the case with these things, one of the most notable things about the hearings was what wasn't heard. The witnesses testifying included several individuals from the Department of State, and two think-tankers who commented on US involvement in Yemen more broadly. But there was no one among the witnesses from the CIA or the Joint Special Operations Command, the two organizations involved in so-called "kinetic" operations in Yemen--that is, targeted counter-terrorism strikes.

What this means is that while US diplomatic and humanitarian efforts were put on trial (very politely, of course), US military operations were not. At a time when the Congress is looking for programs to cut, and politicians are looking to score points ahead of elections, this discrepancy is particularly noteworthy. The Obama administration loves drones and special ops (as does much of the public), and Congress is much more willing to fund military projects than diplomatic ones. A hearing like this one, in which senators challenged witnesses to prove the effectiveness of "soft" assistance to Yemen, could certainly aid in explaining the prioritization of the kinetic approach to America's problems in Yemen, while still maintaining the fiction that this country cares about the plight of the Yemeni people. I doubt it's a coincidence that on the same day, someone from the military/intelligence community fed ABC news a very sexy and impossible to verify story on just how close US operators have come to killing the dreaded Anwar al-Awlaqi.

US Senate hearings on Yemen Policy

View "US Senate hearings on US Yemen policy" on Storify

Why Mr. Brennan should shut up

President Obama's counter-terrorism advisor, John O. Brennan, visited President Saleh in Riyadh recently. Almost nothing new was said in this meeting, but in that "almost" hides a great deal of trouble. The penultimate sentence of the White House press statement on the matter reads:

Mr. Brennan said that the United States is working closely with Yemen's friends and supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Europe, and elsewhere to ensure that much needed assistance will flow to Yemen as soon as the GCC proposal is signed and implemented.

The Yemen Peace Project has, since its inception, called upon the US to cut off aid to the Saleh regime, or to make such aid contingent upon political reform. The contingency Brennan suggests, though, is absolutely contrary to the objective of reform. There are two major dangers with this formulation.

First, foreign aid to Yemen has always gone through Saleh himself, or members of his inner circle. Saleh has appropriated foreign military aid to fight his own political enemies, while non-military aid has mostly gone into the president's own pocket. The US administration thinks it's offering Saleh a way to help his country, but the fact is that President Saleh has absolutely no interest in securing the welfare of the Yemeni people, only in protecting his own wealth and power (though the latter is now greatly diminished). Right now, that means keeping his closest allies, particularly his son and nephew, in Yemen and in power. The continued presence of Ahmad and Yahya Saleh in Yemen is the main cause for the current stalemate, and the continuing loss of life in Yemen. But telling Saleh that aid will start pouring in once the GCC deal is signed only gives him more incentive to keep his relatives in place, directing a new flow of funds and perhaps a measure of power back into his own hands.

Second, this formulation denies the demands of Yemen's revolutionaries, the only ones in the equation that actually do care about their country. The White House is essentially telling them (despite the embassy's effort to reinterpret the message) that to secure foreign aid for Yemen, they must give up their movement for democracy and reform.

Gregory Johnsen called Saleh (before the assassination attempt) a warlord with half an army. He may never return to Yemen, and the dynamics within his inner circle may change if and when he finally signs the GCC deal. But whether Ahmad and Yahya continue to serve the interests of 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh, or whether the inner circle fragments after the president steps aside with each member pursuing his own goals, the result for the Yemeni people will be the same.

We have argued, along with many in Yemen, that the GCC deal represented an attempt to maintain the status quo. In fact its result could be much worse. What the US wants is a quick fix for Yemen, one that will allow the administration to pursue its stated objective of fighting al-Qa‘idah, and allow Mr. Obama to enter the 2012 election having not "lost Yemen." But if the deal goes ahead as envisioned, it will once again place power and foreign money in the hands of the most irresponsible, destructive elements in Yemen, leaving the country in tatters, and the Yemeni people at the mercy of the same warlords, newly empowered and rearmed.

Breaking daggers

This week and last have brought few if any real developments in Yemen. Daily life for most Yemenis gets harder day by day, as water, fuel, and money run out. Politicians continue to bicker and play for points, and the remnants of the regime continue to lash out at their enemies. At present, we can see the regime using a few different kinds of violence. There is the violence of deprivation, experienced by people all over the country. In Arhab, Nihm, and Ta‘iz, Republican Guard units launch artillery barrages against civilian neighborhoods. In Abyan artillery is complemented by air strikes and ground attacks. In Lahj and 'Aden, it seems that regime agents may be responsible for sporadic, random incidents of gunfire and the like. In this post, I'm less concerned with detailing such acts of violence than with looking at the motivations behind them.

Essentially, I want to look at the regime's use of what anthropologists call "symbolic violence," what political scientists would refer to as "signalling." The best academic treatments of symbolic violence in Yemeni society can be found in Shelagh Weir's A Tribal Order and Steve Caton's Yemen Chronical. The basic point they make, in reference to uses of violence among Yemen's northern tribes, is that in the tribal context a violent act is usually intended primarily as a means of communication. This does not mean that the violence isn't "real," that people don't get hurt; rather, it means that the primary function of such violence isn't to harm or to kill, but to signal an intention or a demand.

To give a basic example: if a tribesman feels he has been wronged in some way by another tribesman, he may attack his enemy in a public place, where neutral bystanders will be present. He does this because tribal law, 'urf, forbids "ganging up" and requires bystanders to intervene in such a situation. He's not attacking because he wants to hurt or kill the other man, but because he wants a third party to mediate and provide him with redress for his grievances. The same principle applies to bigger acts of violence within the tribal system, even pitched battles or prolonged wars between tribal factions. People are hurt and killed in such events, but the violence always retains a symbolic and communicative dimension as well.

For most of Yemen's history, violence between the state and other segments of society has tended to follow these precepts as well, though some rulers have been more willing than others to use extreme force to subdue unruly subjects (Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamid al-Din, the last real Imam of Yemen, was one such ruler, and his violent tendencies were a big part of why he inspired the overthrow of the imamate). But violating the social norms of symbolic violence is also a symbolic act. 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh is a legendary violator of tribal law and social order; and much like Imam Ahmad, Saleh's crimes against these norms are directly responsible for the fact that he's now in a hospital bed covered with burns. And I believe that we can see in each of his crimes--each of his unacceptable uses of violence--a clear message to his opponents.

I'm not going to go too far back into the past in this blog post, because I tend to get a bit wordy as it is, but suffice it to say that the civil wars of 1994 and 2004-2010 were marked by excesses intended to send certain messages to Saleh's enemies and to outside observers. Here I'm just going to look at some of the regime's uses of violence since the start of the 2011 revolution--using two specific but representative examples--and what I think they mean.

On a number of occasions, forces directly answerable to the president have committed acts that are flagrant violations of Yemeni social codes of honor and decency. One that comes to mind, from mid-April, was the kidnapping of four female medical volunteers on their way to Change Square in San‘a. This one doesn't take much explaining: male security forces--maybe soldiers, maybe paid thugs--physically grabbed and abducted women, and not just women, but women doctors. Just in case violating Yemeni social codes wasn't clear enough, the act violates international laws, or at least norms, about the protection of medical aid providers in a conflict zone. This incident came a month after the Change Square massacre, at a time when the youth and other protesters were demonstrating their strength and resilience with great effect and the movement was drawing in new tribal and political allies by the minute.

The regime's intended message with this abduction was clear: Saleh and his security forces would make no consideration for decency in their campaign against protesters; they would combat the revolution without any concern for honor. In fact, the abduction signals clearly that regime intended to fight dishonorably. This message, I believe, was entirely deliberate. It was intended to intimidate, and to signal (especially to the tribal factions of the revolution) that the regime was not interested in an honorable process of negotiation or mediation.

In the tribal/traditional system (non-tribal segments of society, like sadah and qudah, historically adhere to the same system), all negotiation and mediation is based on a recognition of mutual honor. Although it seems like a strange thing to do, the regime's goal was to do the opposite of what warring parties are supposed to do: the regime sought to demonstrate that it was without honor, and thus could not be bargained with. The regime pursued the same tactic throughout the Sa‘dah wars of 2004-2010.

This message was sent most explicitly on the morning of May 23, when Saleh's forces shelled the home of Shaykh Sadiq ibn 'Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount leader of the Hashid confederation. To attack the private home of such a man, without provocation, is one of the most shameful crimes that one can commit. This, and the fact that attacks on al-Ahmar's compound were launched while a mediation committee was present (seriously, Saleh?), sent Saleh's message in the clearest possible terms: the regime was not interested in coming to terms. The revolution would be crushed, not negotiated with, and not mediated away. I should note that it was Imam Ahmad's assassination of Shaykh Sadiq's grandfather and uncle that swung the bulk of Hashid's weight behind the Republican movement last century.

While such acts of violence are reprehensible, and especially disgusting within the traditional Yemeni frame of reference, Yemen has certainly been overshadowed, in terms of the ferocity of its regime, by Syria, Libya, and, I believe, Bahrain. The regimes in these countries have shown no mercy and no restraint in attacking their opponents, and they have the military capability--for now--to demonstrate this lack of restraint. In Yemen, however, we've seen what looks like a greater level of restraint. Yes, there have been terrible and costly attacks on unarmed protesters, most clearly the May 29 Freedom Square massacre in Ta‘iz. But it could all have been much worse (though maybe not in Abyan. Things seem to be almost as bad as they can get there). So we have a regime that signals no respect for rights or for laws, but security forces that fail to destroy the regime's enemies. What accounts for this gap?

I argue that it is, in fact, the inability of Saleh's security forces to crush the revolution that necessitates such extreme symbolic violence. Saleh, and now his son Ahmad and nephew Yahya, knows that his men just aren't up to the task. The Yemeni military has never been a reliable institution, and its commanders know that if the Republican Guard and the Central Security forces are pushed too far, they will disintegrate. This is why these forces now favor artillery barrages and other indirect applications of force. Since May 29, there has been no ground assault against protesters, and I get the feeling that none of the regime's commanders would feel confident in ordering such an attack. So, the symbolic demonstrations of ferocity were intended to scare the regime's opponents precisely because the regime knew it couldn't match such symbolic acts with real, effective violence.

And for the record, it didn't work. But the violence expended in the effort has been only too real for thousands of Yemenis.

An Unfinished Revolution: Yemen and the Arab Spring – Irvine United Congregational Church 6/26/2011

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Islamic Relief

Two days ago, the NGO Islamic Relief USA announced a new Emergency Campaign for Yemen. We were curious about this, as our contacts in Yemen told us months ago that IR was providing no medical assistance in the context of the protests throughout Yemen, because the situation was too politically sensitive. We have also been told that IR's Yemen operations are notoriously corrupt and inefficient. At the same time, many people have been asking us how they can help Yemenis affected by the humanitarian crisis in Abyan and 'Aden. People have asked if Islamic Relief is working on the situation.

So, I sent an email to the contact person at IR in Washington, DC, asking for details about the new campaign. I also asked if IR was now going to support the efforts of Yemeni medical volunteers in other cities, as YPP has done. Here is the response I received:

Thank you for your interest in our Yemen campaign.  Our Yemen Emergency Campaign focuses on the emerging humanitarian crisis in Abyan and Aden.  We seek to support internally displaced people (IDP's) of the region by providing food for families and host communities.  Our relief efforts are slated to include creating community kitchens for communities affected by the massive displacement.

The campaign plans to include distribution of hygiene kits as well. Currently our campaign does not include supporting the work of medical volunteers, but I have sent a request to our programs department to notify me if such initiative will be undertaken in the future.

I'm sharing this information so that our friends and supporters can make their own decisions about how best to help. I've also been informed by Yemenis in New York that several mosques there are collecting for Islamic Relief. YPP will of course continue to collect and send funds to people working in Abyan, San‘a, and Ta‘iz. Thank you.