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Al-Houthi Lays Down the Law

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The ceasefire agreed yesterday between President Hadi and Huthi Popular Committees was quickly shown to be a dead letter, as intermittent clashes began again on Tuesday. By the evening, Huthi forces had the presidential palace, President Hadi's residence, and the military camp overlooking the palace all surrounded, and had cut off all roads leading into the area, according to reports. On Tuesday night, 'Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, the leader of the movement, gave a lengthy televised speech in which he accused President Hadi and his inner circle of betraying the Yemeni people, and threatened further escalation if the president fails to meet four demands. Al-Huthi's demands are:

  1. The restructuring of the body established to monitor the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes (which makes sense, given that the Huthis are still holding former NDC Secretary General Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak, whom they kidnapped on Saturday);
  2. The revision of the new constitution (al-Huthi wasn't specific about what revisions he wants to see, but much of his speech focused on the idea that the proposed scheme of six federated regions was an assault on Yemen's unity);
  3. The full implementation of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), the accord signed by all parties after the Huthis drove Islah-affiliated military units out of San'a in September, and established de facto control over the city;
  4. Resolution of the security situation in Marib Governorate. This is arguably the most important of the four.

You can hear al-Huthi's ultimatum in his own words below (Arabic). You can also read Hisham al-Omeisy's archived live-tweeting of the speech (in English) here. Given the abandon with which observers have thrown around words like "coup" and "overthrow" this week, it's important to note that al-Huthi did not frame his actions in such terms, nor did he explicitly state any intention to remove President Hadi by force. He did, however, refer to "options" which would be pursued if the above demands are not met.

The first and third demands, concerning the NDC and PNPA, seem a bit silly at this point. Though al-Huthi made a big deal in this speech about adhering to the NDC outcomes and the PNPA, he also made it clear that his movement is above the law, and will not be bound by any of its prior agreements. The Huthis viewed the PNPA, despite its actual wording, as a formal surrender of the capital by the president and the Islah party leadership. The PNPA will never be fully implemented, because the Huthis will not implement their side of the agreement, which involves demilitarization.

The redrafting of the constitution is arguably more important. The Huthis see the six-region federal scheme as an attempt to limit their power to the landlocked north-central highlands (Azal Region), though I don't really think they need to worry about that anymore. Ansar Allah has established an armed presence in at least four of the six proposed federal regions already, so continued whining about this aspect of the constitution might be a bit of a smokescreen. It can also be seen as an overture toward the Southern Movement, which seeks a single southern unit, rather than a south divided between Aden and Hadhramawt.

The demand that President Hadi resolve the security situation in Marib--where, to summarize the events of the past four years, tribesmen hostile to the government routinely cut off the supply of electricity and fuel to the capital--is very interesting. Huthis and Huthi-watchers have been talking about a possible assault on Marib since September, and today's speech makes that eventuality more likely. The Huthis have fought their various adversaries (many of which have some degree of connection to the Islah party or to AQAP) on fronts all over the western part of Yemen already. Marib is the next logical battlefield. As for today's demand, it should be obvious even to casual observers that President Hadi is utterly incapable of meeting it. The president controls very little of Yemen's military (i.e. the continigent of Presidential Guards that failed to hold their tiny bailiwick in southern San'a this week), and a war in Marib would leave the army in tatters. It would seem that al-Huthi's demand can instead be read as a threat that his own forces plan to move into Marib very soon, and they want the military's support (or at least acquiescence) when they do. As weak as it is, the state's military does have a few things the Huthis don't, like an air force, and access to American aerial surveillance assets. Whether or not the Huthis can really afford such a campaign and still hold on to San'a remains to be seen. Their recent campaign to "wipe out" AQAP certainly hasn't gone as well as they'd hoped.

If 'Abd al-Malik is to be trusted, his actions this week were not a coup, but a warning to the president. We'll have to wait and see how many more warnings Mr. Hadi is afforded.

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Coup, or Business as usual in San'a?

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Monday in southern San‘a began with the sound of machine-gun and artillery fire, as fighting broke out between Huthi "Popular Committee" militiamen and military units loyal to President Hadi. Some sources said the fighting started when Huthi fighters tried to set up a new checkpoint too close to the presidential palace. Others said the Presidential Guard began shelling a Huthi position unprovoked. Either way, the two sides exchanged fire for several hours, from about 6:00am until the late afternoon. President Hadi, who does not live at the presidential palace, was not in any direct danger during Monday's clashes. Minister of Information Nadia al-Sakkaf, who took control of the government's PR effort today, claimed that a "third party"--made up of forces loyal to former president 'Ali Saleh and his family--was also involved in the fighting today, and was responsible for shots that hit the prime minister's convoy and the vehicle of a Huthi representative as they left meetings with President Hadi. Notably, the Presidential Guard units fighting the Huthis did not appear to receive any support from other branches of the military during today's fighting.

By the afternoon, the fighting seemed to center on the hills overlooking the palace, known as al-Nahdayn, which are home to the 3rd Armored Brigade. Huthi officials claim that the Popular Committees took control of the base, which contains several tanks and armored vehicles, though government sources haven't confirmed this. The government did announce a ceasefire beginning at 4:30pm, and said that Huthi representatives were attending negotiations with the president, but sporadic fighting continued after that point. According to al-Sakkaf, the topics under negotiation include the release of Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak--the director of the office of the president, whom Huthi fighters kidnapped on Saturday--and changes to the new constitution, an advanced copy of which was released last week.

Despite early claims by many observers that San‘a was witnessing a coup d'etat, it's not clear what, if anything, was accomplished by Monday's fighting. At day's end, the AP reported that at least nine people had been killed in the fighting, and over 60 injured.

For a more detailed take, read this piece by Shuaib Almosawa and Kareem Fahim and this one from the AP. For a blow-by-blow account of the day's events, read through eye-witness Hisham al-Omeisy's Twitter feed.

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An in-depth look at the factions of al-Hirak

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Following his excellent post on the al-'Arudh Square protest encampment, our guest blogger returns with an in-depth look at the different factions involved in southern Yemen’s independence movement, commonly known as al-Hirak. The author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of ‘Aden. I have edited the English version of this post for clarity. Our guest posts do not necessarily reflect the positions of the YPP. The day of November 30, 2014—which Hirak leaders hyped for weeks as a day of definitive revolutionary action—has passed, and it seems it did not meet with the desires and wishes of many of the protesters in the ongoing sit-in in Khor Maksar district. Especially disappointed were the many who expect the day to be a historical turning point in the struggle of Hirak.

Despite the anticlimax of November 30, southerners continue to join the ranks of al-Hirak’s several factions. Though nearly all Hirakis are united in their demands for independence, there are significant factional differences within the movement.

The factions of al-Hirak can be grouped into three umbrella categories:

  1. Factions with a non-religious orientation,
  2. Factions with a religious orientation,
  3. Factions with a solely militant orientation.

Factions with a non-religious orientation

The most influential of the non-religiously oriented factions include:

The Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Movement for the Peaceful Liberation and Independence of the South This important group contains two sub-factions with even more cumbersome names: the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South, and the Supreme Council of the Southern Revolution for Liberation and Independence. The first of these is commonly referred to as the Ba‘um Faction, as its members follow the prominent Hadhrami activist Hassan Baʻum, while the second is known as the al-Baydh Faction, after the self-proclaimed president of South Yemen, ‘Ali Salim al-Baydh. The split between the two factions came in September 2012; more recently, fear of losing popular support to competing factions has pushed the Baʻum and al-Baydh Factions closer together.

The League of the Free Sons of South Arabia/the Preparatory Committee of the General Southern Conference The South Arabian League, founded in 1951, was one of the oldest political parties in the Arabian Peninsula. Shortly after its founding, the United Kingdom (which controlled southern Yemen until 1967) expelled the party’s leadership from Aden. In 1989 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri established a breakaway faction called the League of the Sons of Yemen (RAY). Further schisms within the RAY included the establishment of the Path Correction Party by ‘Umar al-Jifri.

Recently, the League launched a prominent initiative called the Southern Comprehensive Conference, which aims to unite a number of Hirak factions in a common front for the sake of communicating with the outside world.

National Conference of the Southern People/Southern National Council for Salvation Formed by Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad, a politician from Abyan, after his return to the country in 2012, this faction has support from a number of prominent Adeni families and individuals. These include the Bashrahil family, which owns al-Ayam newspaper, Radiyah Shamshir, and Yasin Makkawi, in addition to a number of Hadhrami politicians and tribal leaders. The faction also received support from Ahmad bin Farid al-Surimah, a wealthy businessman from Shabwah who holds Omani nationality.

Following the decision of other southern leaders—including the expatriate leaders who participated in the 2012 Cairo Conference—to boycott Yemen’s post-revolutionary National Dialogue Conference, Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad’s NCSP took up the seats in the Conference allocated to al-Hirak. However, controversy over the group’s participation in the National Dialogue led to internal divisions, as al-Surimah withdrew financial support, and several of the faction’s delegates to the NDC pulled out during the latter days of the Conference.

Currently, the National Conference of the Southern People counts on Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad's relations and contacts, as well as the limit media support which is still provided by al-Ayam newspaper and the Bashrahil family.

More recently, Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad launched the Southern National Council for Salvation in yet another attempt to unite various factions and constituencies. The project has not accomplished much, though the threat of another major center of power within Hirak encouraged the al-Baydh and Baʻum factions to reunite, as noted above.

The First Southern Conference/Cairo Conference Held in Cairo on November 20-22, 2011, this conference brought together a number of prominent southern leaders, some of whom had been living in exile. Those in attendance included former PDRY presidents ‘Ali Nassir Muhammad and, in addition to Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad.

At the end of Cairo Conference, the former president ʻAli Nassir Muhammad was elected to be the chairperson, with Haydar al-ʻAttas elected as first deputy, and Salih Ahmad Ubayd as second deputy.

The Cairo Conference could be considered an elitist grouping, and it has no real control over those working on the ground in southern Yemen.

Factions with a Religious Orientation

Lawfulness (Sharʻiah) Committee This group consists of religious leaders, most of whom are moderate Salafis or jihadi Salafis. Some members of this faction were involved in the recruitment of southern young men for the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and some are involved in the mobilization and funding of Ansar al-Shariʻah, a militant movement affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Committee members have claimed the exclusive right to speak at Hiraki Friday prayer services. The location of such Friday prayers are announced by local Hirak leaders in various areas. The estimated numbers of attendees in each place of religious gathering is between 30 to 1,000 people.

Islamic Awakening (al-Nahdah) Movement This Salafi-oriented movement uses humanitarian relief and charity as a way to expand its work and attract new members. It works mainly in remote rural areas, far from the civic center of the provinces.

Al-Nahdah is active throughout southern Yemen, though its founder, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rab al-Salami, is from Yafiʻ.

Islah Party/Muslim Brotherhood Before the entrance of Ansar Allah/the Huthi Movement into Yemen’s capital, the Islah Party, which includes members of the Muslim Brotherhood, had a very important role to play in southern Yemen and in particular the provinces of Aden and Hadhramawt. But this role completely disappeared after the departure of both Hamid al-Ahmar and General ‘Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who fled Yemen in the face of the Huthi advance.

A large number of Islah party leaders in southern Yemen have met in Aden, and rumors have circulated about their intention to create a new political faction called the Southern Platform Party. Moreover, a number of Islah Party leaders in the south have announced their support for the right of self-determination and secession, which is strange as it was well known that Islah Party members previously espoused unity between north and south.

Ansar al-Shariʻah The armed group known as Ansar al-Shariʻah is generally considered an affiliate of AQAP, though there is an increasing affinity within the movement toward the Islamic State/ISIS. The group has been based mainly in the south since its establishment, and a large number of its members are from the south. Recently, though, its operations in the south have slowed, and its focus has shifted to combatting Huthi expansion in areas like al-Baydha and Ibb.

The Militant Orientation

The Southern Security and Military Council The creation of the Southern Security and Military Council could be understood as a “third generation" of activism by former members of the PDRY army and security forces. The forced retirement without pay of these men was one of the original drivers of the Southern Movement. The military retirees first formed associations in 2007. The military commander Nassir al-Nubah, from Shabwah, is the real founder of this trend.

The formation of Southern Security and Military Council at Aden’s Coral Hotel on September 19, 2014, astonished many observers, who interpreted the move as an explicit declaration of armed resistance to the “Yemeni Occupation.”

According to statements by one of the Council’s commanders, the main aim of the Council is to fill the gap in security that will result from the eventual withdrawal of Yemeni security forces. But this raises the question of whether the Council really has the manpower and materiel required for such a task, especially given the presence of other armed groups in parts of the south.

The Council’s leader, Muhammad Qassim Tamah, is one of its main strengths. It is important to note that he is a former southern military commander from Yafiʻ. His tribal connections in Yafiʻ mean that he has significant human and material resources. However, most of the members of the Council are relatively old, and their influence is largely limited to the Yafiʻ region.

[Editor's note: As one reader pointed out, it's not really accurate to list Ansar al-Shari'ah as a faction of al-Hirak. However, some elements of AAS and AQAP have, in the past, explicitly supported the call for southern independence, and according to our blogger there are financial and personal connections between some official Hirak members and AAS. I also think it's important to remember that while the first generation of al-Qaeda in Yemen was explicitly anti-socialist and opposed to the PDRY regime, AAS emerged in the post-Hirak south, and many of its members identify with southern nationalism, even though southern nationalism is closely tied to the legacy of the PDRY. Finally, if all of this factionalism reminds you of this scene from Monty Python's Life of Brian, you're not alone.]

في عمق الحراك...

مضى يوم الـ 30 نوفمبر، 2014 ويبدو انه لم يتوافق مع رغبات الكثير من المعتصمين في الساحة او ممن توقعوا لهذا اليوم إحداث "منعطف تاريخي" في مسيرة الحراك السلمي الجنوبي. وذلك يبدو محبط للكثيرين من الجنوبيين الذين ينضمون يوماً بعد يوماً للقوى الجنوبية المنضوية تحت مظلة الحراك الذي يطلب "فك الارتباط" و "استعادة دولة جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية" شريك "الجمهورية العربية اليمنية" في عام مايو 22، 1990  .

ترتكز تلك المظلة المسماة "بالحراك الجنوبي" على ثلاثة اعمدة وهم:

  1. مجموعات دون توجه ديني
  2. مجموعات ذات توجه ديني اسلامي
  3. المجلس الجنوبي الأمني و العسكري "التوجة القتالي"

اولاً: مجموعات دون التوجه الديني

يمكن جمع كل المكونات الجنوبية المنضوية تحت مظلة "الحراك الجنوبي" والتي لا تتبنى كهدف اساسي في نشاطها "توجه ديني" في بوتقة واحدة حيث تتنوع تلك المكونات فمنها على سبيل الذكر "مجموعة الاكاديميين الجنوبيين" و " المجلس الاعلى للحراك الثوري السلمي لتحرير واستقلال الجنوب" بالإضافة "لمؤتمر القاهرة" ... إلخ

نتناول اهم تلك المجموعات كالتالي:

  1. المجلس الاعلى للحراك الثوري السلمي لتحرير واستقلال الجنوب

يتكون من فصيلين اثنين وهما: المجلس الاعلى للحراك السلمي لتحرير الجنوب "تيار باعوم" و المجلس الاعلى للثورة الجنوبية للتحرير و الاستقلال "تيار البيض" حيث ان في الاساس يعد المكون واحد لولا اختلاف وجهات النظر ادت في انشقاق فيه بما اصطلع على تسميته "تيار باعوم" و "تيار البيض" وحصل ذلك في تاريخ سبتمبر 7، 2012م .

في الواقع، ان اعادة التئام المكونان جاء كما يتحدث احد المراقبون بسبب خوف مشروع مؤتمر شعب الجنوب المتمثل في " مجلس الانقاذ الوطني الجنوبي" خوفاً من خسار كلا المكونين للتأيد و الزخم الشعبي الذاني يحضيان به و تحول التأييد الشعبي الى  "مجلس الانقاذ الوطني الجنوبي" .

  1. رابطة ابناء الجنوب العربي الحر – اللجنة التحضرية للمؤتمر الجنوبي الجامع

يعد حزب "رابطة الجنوب العربي" من اقدم الاحزاب على الساحة اليمنية وشبه الجزيرة العربية حيث تأسس في عام 1951م حيث قامت بريطانيا بنفي قادته للخارج، تلى ذلك عمليات انشقاق للحزب تزعمه السيد "عبدالرحمن الجفري" وسمي تياره المنشق "رابطة ابناء اليمن (رأي)" في عام 1989م.

شهد الحزب ايام عصيبه اثر محاولة تقسيمه من خلال خروج جزء من قيادته وتأسيس حزب سياسي منه سمي "حزب رابطة تصحيح المسار" يقيادة عمر الجفري.

من ابرز مبادرات حزب رابطة ابناء الجنوب العربي الحر بقيادة "عبدالرحمن الجفري" مبادرة المؤتمر الجنوبي الجامع والذي تهدف للخروج بحامل سياسي يضمن فيه اكبر عدد ممكن من المجموعات الجنوبية امام العالم.

  1. المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب – المجلس الوطني الجنوبي للإنقاذ

بعدما عاد محمد علي احمد وهو احد السياسيين الجنوبيين نفوذاً في ابين تحديداً وبعض مناطق الجنوب، و ربما بعيداً عن مؤتمر القاهرة الذي كان احد اهم الذين حضروه وجد ضالته بتأسيس كيان جنوبي اخر اسماه "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" بتاريخ ديسمبر 16 -18، 2012 بعدن.

اعتمد محمد علي احمد بشكل رئيسي على استيعاب الرموز العدنية في مكونه السياسي مثل "صحيفة الايام متمثلة بأسرة باشراحيل" و "رضية شمشمير" و "ياسين مكاوي" بالأضافة الى بعض سياسيين حضرموت وقبائلها كما لا ننسى إستقطاب احد اكبر رئوس الاموال الجنوبية الخارجية متمثلاً برجل الاعمال احمد بن فريد الصريمة الذي يحمل الجنسية العمانية ويعود بالأصل إلى محافظة شبوه.

ويمكن ان نجد تفسير لخروجة عن إجماع مؤتمر القاهرة وتأسيسة لمكون "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" حيث شارك لاحقاً بمكونة في جلسات مؤتمر الحوار الوطني ! وخلال مؤتمر الحوار الوطني شهد المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب محطات مثيرة تمثلت بخروج حليفة المالي من المكون وهو رجل الاعمال "احمد بن فريد الصريمة". كما خروج ومقاطعته للجلسات النهائية لمؤتمر الحوار الوطني حيث تم استنساخ مشاركة المكون في مؤتمر الحوار الوطني وخروج عدد من حلفائة وعلى رأسهم "ياسين مكاوي - عدن" و "العقيد خالد باراس – حضرموت" .

في الوقت الراهن يرتكز بشكل رئيسي "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" على محمد علي احمد بالإضافة إلى الدعم الإعلامي المحدود الذي ما تزال اسرة باشراحيل صاحبة صحيفة الأيام تقدمه له.

و ربما يمكن الحديث ان مبادرة مجلس الانقاذ الجنوبي الذي طرحها محمد علي احمد التي تفاعل معها عدد من المكونات الجنوبية لكنها سرعان ما تجمدت ! يعود لها الفضل بشكل غير مباشر بدفع كلاً من تيار باعوم و تيار البيض إلى إعادة التوحد في محاولة منها لمواجهة المشروع الذاني نجحى حقاً الى حد كبير فيه تجميده و الحفاظ على مناصريهم في الساحة الشعبية الجنوبية التي كانت تطالب القيادات الجنوبية بالتوحد.

  1. المؤتمر الجنوبي الأول "مؤتمر القاهرة"

تكمن اهمية المؤتمر الجنوبي الأول المعروف بإسم "مؤتمر القاهرة" كونه أول اجتماع جنوبي شمل عدد كبير من السياسيين و النشطاء الجنوبيين في الداخل والخارج وهو الذي انعقد في القاهرة بتاريخ نوفمبر 20 – 22، 2011، وممن حضروا هذا المؤتمر الرئيس السابق علي ناصر محمد، و السيد حيد العطاس بالإضافة إلى محمد علي احمد .

وقد تم انتخاب كلاً من الرئيس الاسبق علي ناصر كرئيس للمؤتمر الجنوبي الأول بالاضافة الى نائبين له وهما حيدر ابوبكر العطاس "نائب اول و صالح عبيد احمد كنائب ثاني.

والحقيقة ان مكون "مؤتمر القاهرة" هو في الاساس نخبوي ليس له فعل حقيقي على الأرض حيث يعتمد بدرجة رئيسية على برجماتية و الحنكة السياسية التي يصف المراقبون بها كلاً من علي ناصر و حيدر العطاس.

ثانياً: مجموعات ذات توجه ديني اسلامي

هناك المجامع ذات الايدولوجية الاسلامية وهي بطبيعة الحال تتكون الي:

  1. الهيئة الشرعية

تتكون من مجموعة من المدنيين الاسلاميين ذات التوجه السلفي المعتدل و السلفي الجهادي ولبعض الافراد المنتسبين للهيئة الشرعية تاريخ يرتبط بدور مهم إبان فتره تجنيد الشباب في جنوب اليمن للمشاركة في ما سمي بالجهاد ضد القوات الروسية في افغانستان، بالإضافة للمشاركة في الحشد المالي و الدعوي كما الاستقصائي لصالح المجموعة المسلحة المدعوة "انصار الشريعة" .

للهيئة الشرعية الحديث حصراً يوم صلاة الجمعة حيث يجتمع عدد كبير جداً من المصلين في تجمعات محلية تحددها قوى الحراك الجنوبي كلاً في منطقته حيث يتراوح عدد الحضور في تلك التجمعات الدينية ما بين 30 – 1000 شخص في جميع مناطق جنوب اليمن.

  1. حركة النهضة السلفية

وهي حركة اسلامية ذات توجه سلفي تتخد من العمل الاغاثي و الانساني وسيلتها للتمدد و استقطاب اعضاء ومناصرين جدد لها. ويلاحظ عليها انها تركز في انتشارها على العمق الريفي البعيد عن مركز المدني للمحافظة حيث تعمل في جميع المحافظات الجنوبية. ويعتبر مؤسسها الشيخ عبدالرب السلامي الذي ينتمي جغرافياً الى منطقة يافع .

 

  1. 3. حزب الاصلاح "الاخوان المسلمين

في سبق دخول انصار الله للعاصمة اليمنية "صنعاء" كان لحزب الاصلاح اليمني "اخوان المسلمين في اليمن" دور غايه في الاهمية في جنوب اليمن وعلى وجه الخصوص محافظات عدن و حضرموت. لكن ذلك الدور اختفى تماماً بعد خروج كلاً حميد الاحمر و الجنرال علي محسن الاحمر خارج اليمن ليتبدل ليصبح الدور الذي يلعبه حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن بالمنتهي !

فقد اجتمع عدد كبير من قيادات حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن في عدن ويقال عنه توجه جديد لهم للضهور مجدداً في المشهد السياسي الجنوبي لكن بإسم اخر يدعى "حزب المنبر الجنوبي"، كما واصبح الموقف السياسي لأعضاء حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن داعمين لحق الجنوبين في حق تقرير المصير بل ان بعض قيادات حزب الاصلاح في عدن تحدث صراحة عن دعمة لفك ارتباط جنوب اليمن ! ويأتي هذا الموقع المستجد من حزب الاصلاح بعد ان كان اعضاءه سابقاً احد اهم الداعمين لإستمرار الوحدة الاندماجية بين جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية و الجمهورية العربية اليمنية.

  1. انصار الشريعة

تعتبر المجموعة الاسلامية المسلحة المدعوة "انصار الشريعة" احد الاذرع المحلية التي تدين بالولاء بشكل متزايد الى "الدولة الاسلامية" وما يزال جزء لا بأس منه ما يزال يحتفظ بالولاء لتنظيم القاعدة بقيادة "ايمن الظواهري".

يتواجد جزء كبير من عناصر و مناصرين انصار الشريعة في الوسط اليمني و عدد لا بأس منه في جنوب اليمن.  ومؤخراً تكاد تكون عمليات انصار الشريعة في جنوب اليمن "شبه متوقفة" حيث تركز بشكل متزايد لمقاومة التمدد الجغرافية لأنصار الله للوسط الأمني. تأخد المقاومة شكل "حرب كر وفر مفتوحة" في كلاً من محافظة البيضاء و إب. حيث تغدى تلك الجبهات بدعم من عناصر انصار الشريعة الموجودة في الجنوب.

ثالثاً: المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري "التوجة القتالي":

إن تأسيس "المجلس الجنوبي الأمني و العسكري" يمكن فهمة بأنة "الجيل الثالث" من التطور الأمني و العسكري الذي يصنعه المتقاعدون  قسراً العسكريون و الامنيون الذي كانوا فيما سبق المحرك الرئيس للجيش الجنوبي المندثر حيث لاحقاً وفي عام 2007 شرع المتقاعدون قسراً العسكريون و الامنيون بتشكيل جمعيات سميت "بجمعيات العسكرين و الامنيين" ويعد القائد العسكري "ناصر النوبة" الذي تعود اصوله لمحافظة شبوه احد اهم الفاعلين فيها !

لقد شكل تأسيس المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري في فندق كورال في مدينة عدن بتاريخ سبتمبر 19، 2014  إندهاش عدد من المراقبين حيث ما يزال لا يفهم كيف يتم تأسيس مجلس امني وعسكري يناهض الجمهورية اليمنية ويدعو صراحة للمقاومة ما اسماها "قوات الاحتلال اليمنية" جهاراً دون خشية من اي تبعات مثل هذه الخطوة التصعيدية الامنية و العسكرية !

وبناء على حديث احد قادة المجلس فإن دورة الرئيسي يكمن بسد فراغ اي تراجع للقوات الامنية و العسكرية التابعة للدولة اليمنية في جنوب اليمن، وهنا يبدو السؤال مشروعاً عن "العدد البشري و العتاد العسكري الذي يملكه هذا المكون ومدى انتشاره في المساحة الجغرافية الجنوبية  في ظل وجود مجموعات مسلحة اخرى !؟"

في الحقيقة، احد اهم نقاط القوه في المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري هي رأسه المجلس المتمثلة ب"محمد قاسم طماح" وهو قائد عسكري جنوبي من منطقة يافع القبلية وهذا يعني ان سيتلقى دعم قبلي مالي وبشري بالاضافة لكون جميع المؤسسين لهذا المكون العسكري هم في الاساس من كان يوماً في قوات الامن و الجيش الجنوبي المندثر !

إلا ان اهم نقاط ضعفة ان نسبه المنتسبين له هم من كبار السن ! وهم المشكلين للفئة العظمى حيث ان التمثيل الشبابي يكاد يكون "غير موجود" كما ان المساحة الجغرافية التي يتواجد فيها هذا المكون تكاد تكون مقتصره على مناطق صغيرة جدا في يافع فقط ! بالإضافة ما يزال غير واضح مدى العتاد العسكري الذي يملكه المكون والذي يرجح ان يكون ايضاً بسيط وبدائي !

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Luke Somers, 1981-2014

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Luke Somers, an American photojournalist, was killed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula early last Saturday, December 6. Luke had been held captive by AQAP for fourteen months. Along with another captive, South African teacher Pierre Korkie, Luke was apparently executed in haste as American Special Operations Forces commandos stormed the compound in Shabwah where the two were being held. Though Luke’s long captivity was something of an open secret in San‘a, it had received almost no coverage in the international press. This was deliberate; Luke’s family asked, from the beginning, for an embargo on coverage. The idea, as I understood it, was that minimizing Luke’s publicity would make negotiations for his release easier. Like many in San‘a, I learned about Luke’s kidnapping very soon after it occurred; like his friends among the press corps in Yemen, I refrained from writing anything about Luke, and urged others not to mention his name online. We all held on to the hope that he would eventually be freed.

On November 25, US commandos raided an AQAP location in hopes of rescuing Luke. The raid freed several other hostages, but Luke had been moved ahead of the operation. During the second raid, on the 6th, a number of AQAP fighters were killed by US forces. The Pentagon reported no casualties among the US assault team. Some sources reported that the Americans killed several civilians as well as Luke’s captors. According to Yemeni government spokesman Mohammed Albasha, four Yemeni soldiers participating in the operation were wounded. The South African charity for which Pierre Korkie worked said that they had previously reached an agreement with AQAP for Korkie’s release, which would have taken place on the 7th. Korkie’s wife Yolande, who was kidnapped with him, was released by AQAP in January.

Luke’s family has told press that they were not informed of plans for either raid ahead of time, and suggest that they would have objected if given the chance.

Luke was well-liked and respected by those who knew him. He had worked hard as a journalist to bring under-reported stories to light, and he cared deeply about Yemen and its people.

Tom Finn wrote a touching piece about Luke for Middle East Eye, and the BBC published this profile, which includes links to some of Luke’s work. Some of Luke’s friends have established a fund to help Luke’s family pay for funeral arrangements; if you feel so inclined, you can make a donation here.

There are only a handful of foreign journalists working in Yemen today. They risk a great deal to cover a country that is badly misunderstood in the wider world. Yemeni journalists risk even more. We are extremely grateful for their efforts in the face of many dangers and obstacles. Perhaps the best way to honor their sacrifice is to make sure we bear witness to the stories they tell.

You can view an archive of Luke’s photographs here.

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New study says US kills as many as 28 people for each drone "target"

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If you follow the news about the US-led war against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), you're probably familiar with the phenomenon of the zombie mujahid. In several cases, US or Yemeni officials have announced the death of certain AQAP operatives, only to have the men in question appear alive and well weeks or months later. A recent study by the UK-based NGO Reprieve looked at this issue, and also tried to figure out who the US had actually killed in place of the intended targets. Reprieve released a report based on the study on Monday. Among their key findings, Reprieve identified 41 individuals who appear to be US-designated "high-value targets," and who have each been reported killed multiple times. "Each was targeted and/or reported killed more than three times on average before they were actually killed. In one instance, a person was targeted seven times before eventually being killed. Two others were killed six times and one is believed to still be alive today."

Reprieve staff attorney Jennifer Gibson collected data on US air strikes in Yemen and Pakistan for the study, which also found that:

Strikes targeting the above [41] individuals killed on average 28 other people each before they actually succeeded in killing their target. In total, as many as 1,147 people may have been killed during attempts to kill just these 41 men, accounting for a quarter of all possible drone strike casualties. Yet, evidence suggests that despite multiple attempts, at least seven of these forty-one men are likely still alive and a further individual died not from drone strikes but rather natural causes.

Seventeen of the high-value targets the study identifies were/are in Yemen. According to Reprieve:

Missile strikes on these men killed 273 other people and accounted for almost half of all confirmed civilian casualties and 100% of all recorded child deaths. Each [of the 17 HVTs] was killed on average well over three times each. Strikes against these 17 targets accounted for almost half of all confirmed civilian casualties in Yemen. Yet, evidence suggests that at least four of these 17 men are still alive (Qassim al-Raimi, Nasser Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi, Ibrahim al-Asiri, and Abdulraouf al-Dahab).

Of course, reliable data on US air strikes are hard to come by, since the targeted killing program is covert. In particular, it's hard for researchers to determine who is a civilian and who is a "militant." You can read the methodology section of the report to get a sense of how Reprieve arrived at these numbers, and how they established who was killed in which strikes. Reprieve's press release, with a link to a PDF of the full report, is here.

 

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The View from Khor Maksar: Fog on the Horizon

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We're pleased to present a guest post on the current situation in Khor Maksar District of 'Aden, where southern activists have occupied a public square. The author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of 'Aden. This is our first bilingual blog post; the Arabic version has not been edited. Guest posts do not necessarily represent the position of the YPP or its staff. It has been approximately seventeen days since the first tents were installed on al-‘Arudh Square, in Khor Maksar district of ‘Aden, which has become the revolutionary square for all who demand the restoration of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

Al-‘Arudh Square sit-in is a unique and exciting experience, and an important phenomenon for all Southern factions, in addition to the powers in the North and certainly the regional and international players. The sit-in has drawn a large number of revolutionaries coming from different areas of southern Yemen: protesters from Lahj, Abyan, Shabwah, al-Dhali‘, a few from ‘Aden, and fewer still from Hadhramawt. So far there is no representation in the sit-in from al-Mahrah, Soqotra, or the other southern islands.

Today al-‘Arudh Square sit-in is shaping the contours of the southern state tomorrow. It is true that the largest proportion of the protestors are from the Yafi‘ area, which is divided between Abyan and Lahj governorates the next largest constituency is from al-Dhali‘.

The Shari‘ah Committee and the Islamic-Salafi trend are the groups controlling the al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, in terms of management and receiving donations, roles from which the liberal and socialist factions are completely absent. Judging from the current moment, it seems the Salafi trend will be very prominent in the future of South Yemen, based on its ability to manage and resolve a number of issues and its monopolizing of Friday prayers in the Square.

As of the moment of writing this report, no tent in the Square carries the name of a southern governorate, but a large number of tents carry the names of tribes, villages and prominent families. What does this mean? This trend sends the message that there are many local players preparing for the next stage, and suggests the southern governorates could fragment along tribal or other lines as these local players work to impose their own agendas.

The absence of tents representing particular governorates—for example, an “‘Aden tent” that might contain activists from local Hirak, Islah, GPC, and socialist groups—is a major shortcoming of the current sit-in. Such gatherings would allow for discussion of mutual concerns between different groups and the formation of stronger links between them. At present, no such discussions are taking place.

Protesters have spent more than two weeks in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in without a having serious discussions about the escalatory steps the movement should take after the November 30 deadline they've announced. Nor are they having debates about the future of southern Yemen or the role of southern leaders.

It would be bad for the larger southern movement, if the southern leaders were restricted to discussing those issues outside the sit-in among themselves, away from the protesters, leaving them to an unknown destiny.

In addition to all the above, there is still a conflict within the Southern Movement between those who support the idea of a Yemeni federal republic made up of two regions--North and South--in which southerners would have the right of self-determination and a referendum on independence after 5 years, and those who want immediate secession. The conflict between these two trends has reached its peak.

Both parts are trying to gain support from the protesters in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, as well as to seek control of the sit-in. Immediately after Shaykh Husayn bin Shu‘ayb, a federalist, was selected to manage the sit-in, the protesters were surprised by another announcement from those who want immediate secession announcing the name of Shalal ‘Ali Sha‘i—a Hirak leader from al-Dhali‘—as administrator of the sit-in.

Such actions firmly entrench this intra-southern division, and even call to mind the old factional conflict between “al-Tughmah” (representing Yafi‘, al-Dhali‘, and Lahj) and “al-Zumrah” (Abyan and Shabwah), but reenacted by contemporary southerners living in different circumstances.*

Although there are good initiatives from southern groups, such as the initiative of 33 group in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, these still pale in comparison to the vast amount of challenges, which are made by the Southern leaders and their factions. The current moment is really critical, and requires dialogue and partnership in making a common future…but the future of southern Yemen is far from clear yet.

*Editor’s note: The author is referring here to a conflict that emerged in the 1980s between different factions within the Yemeni Socialist Party, which ruled the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen at the time. Al-Zumrah and al-Tughmah refer to the factions loyal to ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad and ‘Abd al-Fattah Ismail respectively. In January 1986, a brief and bloody civil war erupted between the two. ‘Ali Nasir and his supporters (al-Zumrah) eventually fled to North Yemen, while ‘Ali Salim al-Beidh—the most senior surviving member of ‘Abd al-Fattah’s al-Tughmah faction—took control of the PDRY.

جنوب اليمن... افق غير واضح

سبعة عشر يوماً تقريباً منذ ان وضعت الخيام في ساحة العروض بمديرية خورمكسر وتحولها إلى ساحة ثورية لجميع ثوار جنوب اليمن المطالبين لإستعادة دولة جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية.

يشكل مخيم ساحة العروض تجربه فريدة... مثيرة و مهمة ايضاً لجميع المكونات الجنوبية بالاضافة إلى قوى الشمال وبالتأكيد اللاعبين الإقليميين و الدوليين. فمخيم الاعتصام هو المكان الذي يجتمع فيه عدد كبير من الثوار القادمين من مناطق مختلفة من جنوب اليمن، معتصمين من عدن،لحج،ابين،شبوه،الضالع و قليل جداً من حضرموت! ولا تمثيل حتى الان في ساحة الاعتصام للمهرة و سقطرى وبقية الجزر الجنوبية!

إن ساحة الإعتصام اليوم تشكل ملامح دولة الغد التي يتحدث عنها الجنوبيين. صحيح ان النسبة الاكبر من الحضور هم لأبناء منطقة يافع التي تقع بين محافظتي ابين و لحج بالاضافة إلى ابناء الضالع إلا ان ثمة حضور مقبول لبقية المحافظات المذكورة في ساحة الاعتصام.

الهيئة الشرعية و القوى الاسلامية ذات الاتجاه السلفي هي المسيطرة على إدارة ساحة الإعتصام وإستلام التبرعات المالية و المعنوية مصاحب لذلك دور غائب تماماً للقوى الليبرالية وحتى الاشتراكية ! فيما يبدو ان اللحظة الراهنة تريد ان تخبرنا ان مستقبل جنوب اليمن سيكون من نصيب القوى الاسلامية ذات الاتجاه السلفي التي اظهرت حتى الان قدرتها على الإدارة وحل عدد من القضايا مما يدفع بالمواطن في جنوب اليمن للثقة بشكل متزايد بتلك القوى يوماً بعد يوم خصوصاً انها من يحتكر حديث يوم الجمعة ايضاً.

إلى لحظة كتابة هذا التقرير لا يوجد خيام بأسماء المحافظات الجنوبية ! بل مجموعة كبيرة من الخيام بأسماء القبائل و القرى و العائلات الجنوبية، فماذا يعني ذلك.

إن غياب خيمة المحافظة الجنوبية الجامعة واستبدالها بخيمات تتبع قبائل، قرى و عائلات جنوبية يرسل لنا رسالة مفادها ان ثمة لاعبين محليين كثر يستعدون للمرحلة المقبلة وذلك يعني ان المحافظات قد تشهد تشضي نتيجة الصراع الذي سيأتي بين اللاعبين القادمين من قبائل وقرى و عائلات المحافظة الواحدة والتي سيتصارعون فيما بينهم في سبيل فرض اجنده معينه.

إن غياب خيمة المحافظة الجامعة كسبيل المثال، خيمة عدن التي يجتمع فيها: الناشط الحراكي، الاصلاحي الجنوبي، الاشتراكي الجنوبي، المؤتمري الجنوبي... إلخ جميعاً يتحدثون فيما بينهم حول هموم محافظتهم وتذوب حواجز الماضي لتتشكل فيما بعد رابط اقوى يجمعهم معاً هو اكثر الامور تعقيداً وتحدياً لمخيم الاعتصام اليوم.

أن ذهاب الوقت الذي يمضيه المعتصمين في ساحة الأعتصام دون نقاش جاد حول مستقبل الخطوات التصعيدية و مستقبل جنوب اليمن تديرة النخب الجنوبية يعد خسارة كبيرة اولاً.

وثانياً بالإمكان ان يكون انانية و إحتكار بل وتضليل إذا ما تم إقتصار مناقشة تلك المسائل خارج المخيم بين القيادات الجنوبية فقط بعيداً عن المعتصمين في ساحة الاعتصام تاركينهم لمصير مجهول.

علاوة على كل ما سبق، ما يزال الصراع بين اولئك الذين يؤيدون دولة يمنية من اقليمين جنوبي وشمالي مع حق تقرير المصير بعد 5 سنوات للجنوبيين . و فك الارتباط المباشر قد وصل الى اوجه هذه الاثناء.

فكلا الفريقين يحاول ان يحضى بالتأييد الاكبر في ساحة الاعتصام كما يسعى إلى السيطرة على إدارة شئون مخيم الاعتصام ففي الوقت الذي تم فيه إختيار الشيخ حسين بن شعيب لأدارة مخيم الاعتصام تفاجئ المعتصمون في الساحة ببيان اخر من قوى فك الارتباط المباشر تتحدث عن إختيارها لشلال علي شائع من محافظة الضالع كمدير لشئون مخيم الاعتصام بخورمكسر عدن ! إن مثل ذلك الفعل يرسخ  بقوة للأنقسام الجنوبي بل ولا ابالغ ان قلت بأنه يستدعي صراع الماضي بين الطغمة (يافع/لحج و الضالع) و الزمرة (ابين وشبوة) ولكن هذه المرة بشخصيات معاصرة و ضروف مختلفة.

ومع ان ثمة مبادرات جيدة من بعض المجاميع الجنوبية كمجموعة ال 33 لساحة الاعتصام الا ان ذلك ما يزال ضعيف امام الكم الهائل من التحديات التي يصنعها قادة المكونات الجنوبية فيما بينهم.

ان اللحظة الحالية حرجة وتتطلب حوار ولقاءات وشراكة في صنع المستقبل المشترك... لكن في جنوب اليمن يبدو بأن افق مستقبل هذه الرقعة الجغرافية غير واضح.

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A new crackdown on foreign press?

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Maybe. Yesterday it came to light, via a wave of social media outrage, that American journalist Adam Baron had been deported from Yemen. Adam had been living in San‘a since the beginning of 2011, and as a freelancer for McClatchy, the Christian Science Monitor, and other outlets, he was responsible for some of the best English-language reporting to come out of Yemen's uprising of 2011. Since then he has cemented his position as one of the most well-connected, insightful, and reliable foreign correspondents in the country (an admittedly small pool, but Adam would do as well on any other beat). The events that lead to Adam's expulsion began on Monday, it seems. Yesterday he arrived in Cairo, at which point his friend and flat-mate (and Mafraj Radio guest) Farea al-Muslimi began discussing the case on Twitter.

By last night, Gregory Johnsen had published additional details in a piece for Buzzfeed, while one of Adam's McClatchy colleagues, Hannah Allam, wrote an even more detailed piece. Late last night, Adam finally spoke for himself on the situation:

While all of this was going on, another American journalist, Tik Root, was trying to get back to San‘a after some time away (Tik covered Olympic skiing for NBC, among other things). Yemeni security had other plans, though.

Naturally the Yemeni government hasn't commented officially on the reasons for Tik's and Adam's expulsions, and neither has the US State Department. Some officials who spoke on background to the Yemen Post suggested that Adam had been kicked out for his own safety; kidnappings of foreigners have been on the rise, and AQAP seems to be stepping up its campaign of violence in the capital in response to the military's assault on AQAP positions in the south (more on that later). It could well be that Yemeni authorities are just too scared of anything happening to American citizens to risk allowing them to stay in the country. The US embassy in San‘a closed to public today, citing a recent attack on the EU mission and the general insecurity. 

It could also be, of course, that Yemeni authorities (some of them, anyway) want less foreign press coverage right now. If that's the case, I can't tell exactly why it would be. In recent days the government has seemed eager to publicize its "advances" against AQAP. I doubt we'll get any further official clarification from the Yemeni government, but if we hear anything enlightening, we'll update this post accordingly. There are still a few foreign journalists in San‘a, including Iona Craig and Casey Coombs; I doubt either of them would be surprised to get a call from the authorities, but let's hope they're left alone.

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Playing dumb: US policy in the face of popular protests

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Yesterday the Yemen Peace Project had a chance to talk at length with a US State Department official about US policy toward Yemen and the current political and security situation there. I began by mentioning the March 8/9 incident in which security forces identified by witnesses as Republican Guard units attacked protesters at Sanʻa University with live ammunition and gas. I asked if the State Department or the White House would be issuing a formal condemnation of this attack, or the previous attacks on protesters in Ibb (thugs with guns and clubs) or ‘Amran (tanks and small arms). The official said that no such statement would come from the State Department, but that DoS would urge an investigation into the incident. I can’t quote my source, but DoS spokesman Mark Toner matched him almost ver batim in yesterday’s press briefing:

We’re still working to establish the facts of what happened. We’re aware that there was an altercation where security forces reportedly used tear gas and live fire to disperse protestors. We understand there was one fatality, and we certainly extend our condolences to that individual’s family. And we urge the Government of Yemen to investigate and hold accountable those who appear to have utilized excessive force.

Again, we’ve seen security forces in Sana’a. They’ve made efforts to improve security by preventing clashes between the demonstrators and the – screening demonstrators for weapons. But they need to do more to prevent these kinds of incidents in the future. We remain deeply concerned about ongoing violence in Yemen, and we continue to call on security forces and demonstrators alike to exercise restraint and to refrain from violence.

The laughable part of this statement is the idea that US officials are diligently “working to establish what happened.” US embassy staff in Sanʻa don’t go outside on a good day, much less head to the center of anti-government protests to conduct interviews. Bottom line, the US is going to strongly urge that an investigation be carried out by the same Yemeni forces who did the shooting. That investigation will (already has done) conclude that it was really the protesters who started the shooting. This will be a lie. The US will not raise the issue again.

More troubling is this insistence that Yemen’s security forces have been trying really hard to prevent violence. While the incident in question was the first instance of uniformed personnel firing on protesters in Sanʻa, they have been doing so with regularity, and horrific effect, in ‘Aden, and more recently in ‘Amran and maybe Saʻdah. And as Greg Johnsen and most of the Western freelance journalists currently in Yemen have made clear, the thugs responsible for most of the violence thus far in Sanʻa—the ones DoS thinks security forces are doing a great job of restraining—are largely plain-clothes soldiers and other government employees.

I stressed the fact that if it is Republican Guard and—as witnesses have reported in other cases—Counter-Terror units attacking protesters, that would mean that US funding and training is being used, in a very direct and undeniable way, in the repression of what President Obama has said are legitimate popular demonstrations. My source fell back on the statement that DoS does not have enough information to have an opinion on this.

I asked my source about the embassy’s ability to investigate incidents like this, or really to know anything about what’s going on in Yemen, from within the walls of their compound. He assured me that they do have their ways of gathering information, including asking other foreign missions in San‘a what’s going on. I was less than reassured by this.

I asked about Secretary Clinton’s statements on Iranian involvement in protests in Yemen and elsewhere. My source, strangely, was not aware of the Secretary’s claims, but was sure that the DoS does not have any reason to believe that Iran is involved in protests. We were also able to agree on the complete falsehood of prior claims by the Saleh regime of Iranian involvement in the Huthi movement. I have since emailed to my source copies of news articles quoting Clinton on this subject. I await a response.

The big take-away from this interview can be summed up this way: the US supports democracy everywhere, and insists that the rights of assembly and free speech are universal human rights. The US further insists that it is up to the Yemeni people to decide how and by whom they are governed. However, the US will only support a process of peaceful dialogue between the government and the opposition parties. This position essentially ignores the will of the Yemeni people. Protesters in all of Yemen’s cities have made it clear that most of them don’t trust the JMP to represent them, and the JMP, smartly recognizing this fact, has said that dialogue with the government is impossible while Saleh remains in power. I asked if, using the case of Egypt as a parallel, the US could foresee a point at which it may change its position and call for Saleh’s resignation. The clear message I got back was that US support for Saleh is essentially unconditional, and that the US really, really wants Saleh to stick around. DoS also insists that Saleh is sincere in his calls for dialogue and that it’s the opposition and the protesters who are preventing or sabotaging progress and reform.

Given the position stated above on the right of the Yemeni people to choose their own government, I felt it made sense to ask if the US position on the question of Southern secession might change, in light of the fact that over 70% of southerners support independence. The answer was a simple no. The US will continue to support Yemeni unity, essentially at any cost.

I can't say I was surprised by what I heard yesterday, but I was disappointed by the State Department's conviction that Saleh is leading the way forward, and that the opposition had better get on board or be left behind. This is willful ignorance. The US government isn't stupid. They know that no one is going to be punished in Yemen for killing protesters, and they know that Saleh isn't interested in sharing power or restructuring his rule in any meaningful way. That the US insists on pretending to believe otherwise makes it complicit, in my opinion, in the violent repression of protests and the trampling of democratic expression.